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The thesis consists of an Introduction, four Chapters and a Conclusion. In the 
Introduction some of the interpretations that have been offered of Oakeshott’s 
political writings are discussed. The key issue of interpretation is whether 
Oakeshott is best considered as a disinterested philosopher, as he claimed, or 
as promoting an ideology or doctrine, albeit elliptically. It is argued that when 
his works are considered in their entirety they can best be thought of as 
advancing two doctrines, based on his accounts of the historical conceptions 
of the state in modern European history and the nature of political activity. 
The first doctrine is that the state conceived as a civil association is best suited 
to promote individual liberty. The second doctrine is a conservative, anti-
rationalist, anti-ideological, thesis that political activity cannot and ought not 
be conceived as anything other than the pursuit of intimations within a 
political tradition. The purpose of the thesis is to assess these doctrines. 
 
The method used is to draw out and assess the assumptions that underlie 
Oakeshott’s claims.  In Chapter One it is argued that the best point of entry to 
understand Oakeshott’s preference for the state conceived as a civil 
association is to make explicit the postulates that underpin his account of 
human conduct and his personal values, or dispositions. In Chapter 2 the 
political implications of his formal theory of morality are highlighted. In 
Chapter 3 Oakeshott’s answer to the question of “what should government’s 
do?”, and the implications of his response to his understanding of law and 
justice are evaluated. In Chapter 4 the sufficiency of Oakeshott’s account of 
politics and the political is considered. The conclusion is that the arguments in 
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Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) is considered by many historians to be one of 
the most eminent political theorists of the twentieth century. In ‘Political 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’, for example, Catherine Zuckert 
bracketed Oakeshott with John Dewey (1859-1952), Hannah Arendt (1906-
1975), Leo Strauss (1899-1973), Eric Voegelin (1901-1985), Yves R. Simon 
(1903-1961), Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) and John Rawls (1921-2002) (Zuckert 
2009, pp. 1-6). Zuckert’s assessment is relatively commonplace. George 
Feaver concluded: ‘Oakeshott has reasonable claims to be regarded as the pre-
eminent political philosopher in the British political tradition of the past 
century’ (Feaver 2004).  
 
To be placed alongside such luminaries is, perhaps, surprising given 
Oakeshott’s modest academic output. Gertrude Himmelfarb remarked in 1975 
that he had achieved prominence ‘with a minimum intellectual exertion on his 
part’, and that one of the apparent anomalies surrounding him was that he 
was an intellectual who was ‘a reluctant a producer of intellectual goods’ 
(Himmelfarb 1975, p. 407). He published just two full-length monographs 
during his lifetime: Experience and its Modes (1933), and On Human 
Conduct (1975a). Only the latter can be described as a work of substantial 
political theory. In addition to these are the essays that brought him to the 
attention of a wider public, and led him to be branded by many as a 
conservative. These essays were collected together as Rationalism in Politics 
(1991). 1  
 
His works on Hobbes, history and education were subsequently published in 
book form during his lifetime. 2  Thanks, moreover, to committed 
                                                   
1 Many of the essays were published in the Cambridge Journal, which Oakeshott 
helped found in 1947. He was the editor from its inception to its closure seven years 
later. 
2 Hobbes on Civil Association (1975b); On History (1983); The Voice of Liberal 
Learning (1989). 
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Oakeshottians, notably Timothy Fuller and Luke O’Sullivan, several further 
collections of his essays, lectures and book reviews have been published since 
his death in 1990. The Notebooks (1923-1986), edited by Luke O’Sullivan, are 
the latest, penultimate addition to this series. Almost all of Oakeshott’s papers 
have now been published in readily accessible form. According to O’Sullivan, 
Imprint Academic plans two further volumes to complete the publication of 
his works: a volume of correspondence and one of miscellaneous items (2014, 
p. vii).  
 
Neil McInnes described the first decade following his death in 1990 as ‘a long, 
quiet limbo: marked only by the publication of two small books he left in his 
desk drawers and not by the rise of any Oakeshottian school that might have 
developed or applied his teachings’ (2000). 3  In the past fifteen years, 
however, there has been an outpouring of secondary literature. Two thousand 
and twelve, for example, oversaw the publication of two prestigious 
Companion volumes - the Cambridge Companion edited by Efraim Podoksik; 
and A Companion to Michael Oakeshott, edited by Paul Franco and Leslie 
Marsh. These publications signify the heightened attention given to Oakeshott 
by the academic community.  
 
The turn in his fortunes coincided with the foundation of the Michael 
Oakeshott Association in 1999 by some of his friends and former colleagues. 
Initially, this was an informal forum devoted to encouraging critical 
discussion of Oakeshott, but it has since developed into a mature non-profit 
organisation (www.michael-oakeshott-association.com/about-us/).  
Conferences are held every other year, in the USA and Europe. 4   The 
Association website maintains a comprehensive bibliography as well as a 
wealth of other materials. It is likely that the increased attention of recent 
years is sustainable in the medium term in spite of the death of most of the 
original founders of the Association. 5 
                                                   
3 An exception is Paul Franco’s The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (1990). 
4 The most recent conference was held at the University of Hull in September 2015. 
5  Of the eight founder members, only two are still alive: Timothy Fuller and 




A Question of Interpretation:  Philosopher, Covert Ideologue or 
Both? 
 
Oakeshott is one of the most controversial political theorists. He is regarded 
as a Tory apologist by his critics and a philosopher without a practical agenda 
by many of his admirers. Both descriptions are problematic. The former 
interpretation was typical of the newspaper obituaries following his death. The 
New York Times described him as a ‘right-wing guru’ and ‘a High-Tory Oracle 
mainly concerned with interpreting current events, usually in a negative style’ 
(20 December 1990). According to the London Times, though a philosopher 
who did not engage directly in politics, he was nonetheless the thinker who 
articulated  ‘the real philosophical foundations of Margaret Thatcher’s 
policies’ (22 December 1991). The claim that he influenced Thatcher was, 
moreover, not confined to the press. The dust jacket description of Steven 
Gerencser’s The Skeptic’s Oakeshott claimed that Margaret Thatcher based 
much of her political thinking on Oakeshott’s theories, but ‘Gerencser shows 
how she widely misinterpreted his work’ (2000). Yet in the text, there is not a 
single reference to Mrs Thatcher to justify this claim.  
 
Oakeshott politely refused an offer of being made a Companion of Honour by 
Mrs Thatcher.6 His reasons are not a matter of public record but, as we shall 
see, he rejected materialism or “economism”. He despised the idea that a 
principal purpose of government is to deliver material benefits or welfare to 
its citizens. In his lecture to new students at the LSE, ‘On Arriving at a 
University’, he described modern society as ‘lunatic’ and ‘productivist’ (2004, 
Section 23).  He thought that capitalist society is one that goes beyond the 
simple fulfilment of material needs and is obsessed with unlimited money 
making for the sake of it (Oakeshott 2014, p. 291). This stance put him in 
opposition to the explicitly free market and materialist ideology of Thatcher.   
Moreover, the systematic campaign that Mrs Thatcher organised to convert 
                                                   
6 See Mrs. Thatcher’s letter to Oakeshott, 4th December 1981 (Michael-oakeshott-
association.com/files/thatcher.gif)  
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the Conservative Party to a free market ideology was exactly what he had 
criticised and ridiculed as “rationalism in politics”. To the extent that 
Oakeshott can be called a conservative, Thatcher was ‘clearly not his type of 
conservative’ (Brittan 04/03/2011).  
 
The ‘disinterested philosopher’ interpretation of Oakeshott, as Steven J. Wulf 
describes it, is more credible, as there is plenty of textual evidence to support 
this interpretation (2007, p. 245). His modal account of experience and 
insistence on the strict separation of theory and practice are arguably his most 
singular contributions to general philosophy. Oakeshott was much influenced 
in his general philosophy by the Oxford philosopher, F. H. Bradley’s 
Appearance and Reality and G. F Hegel’s Phanomenologie des Geistes 
(Oakeshott 1933, p. 6). Ayreh Botwinick argues, however, that whereas the 
influence of Hegel and Bradley is clear, the influence of Plato is equally 
fundamental with regard to his scepticism and anti-foundationalism (2011, p. 
5). 
 
Oakeshott’s primary claim as to the nature of philosophy, or theory, was that 
it ‘must be understood as an explanatory, not a practical, activity’ (1991, p. 
66). He argued that philosophy is not a privileged form of knowledge that 
endorses and dictates to other forms. This means that it cannot be cannot be 
supposed to increase our political effectiveness (ibid., p. 65). In his first major 
work, Experience and its Modes (EM, 1933), the author described practice as 
one of the modes of experience alongside science and history. A “mode” is the 
consideration of the whole of experience from a particular standpoint, which 
he called an “arrest” of experience. What distinguishes the mode of practice 
from others such as history and science is that it is concerned with changing a 
situation ‘by willing it to be different’ (1933, pp. 257-258).  Practice is the 
mode of doing: a present, living and always changing world of choices and 
actions, composed of images of desire and aversion, approval and disapproval. 
This world is characterised by our concern to bring what is into harmony with 
what we want it to be. In the political sense, it is the process of changing what 
is into what ought to be in civil arrangements. Politics is a quintessentially 
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practical activity. It is concerned with the direction and pace of change. In 
contrast, the modes of philosophy, science and history change nothing. 7 
 
The gulf between philosophical and practical understanding can never be 
bridged, and such a task should not be attempted. Oakeshott claimed in EM, 
moreover, that an attempt to treat a conclusion drawn from one mode of 
experience, such as science, as relevant to another mode, such as practice, is 
illogical. Such an attempt commits the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, or 
irrelevance. The logical mistake is to assume that the modes are 
interdependent when they are independent of one another (1933, p. 76). He 
later described the mistake as a category error.8 
 
Oakeshott elaborated the distinction between theory and practice in his 
response to a critical review of Rationalism in Politics by Professor D. D. 
Raphael of Glasgow University (Raphael 1964, pp. 202-215). He claimed that 
an explanation of conduct, the term he subsequently substituted for practice, 
is a different activity from recommendation or approval of an action that has 
been carried out. Practical reasoning, he argued, is different from explanatory 
reasoning. The former is based on diagnosis, prescription and justification, 
which are not explanatory activities in contrast to the reasoning typical of the 
modes of history and science (Oakeshott 1965, p. 89).   
 
Most commentators agree that he was consistent throughout his life in his 
view that political theory and practice are separate activities. The stated 
purpose of political philosophy for Oakeshott, then, was not to change the 
world – but to understand and interpret it. He repeated the position he 
adopted in EM towards philosophy in general in his essay ‘Political 
Philosophy’, which was written sometime after the Second World War: 
                                                   
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein was a contemporary of Oakeshott’s at Cambridge in the 1930s. 
Wittgenstein famously claimed that ‘Philosophy (...) leaves everything as it is’ (2009, 
p. 102). There is no evidence that they met. Oakeshott frequently cited authors he 
read in the Notebooks (2014). There is no reference, however, to Wittgenstein in 
spite of their similar understanding of the nature of philosophy. 
8 This probably reflects the influence of Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949), 
which articulated the notion of category mistakes. This work was favourably reviewed 
by him (Oakeshott 2007, pp. 217-218). 
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‘Political philosophy can provide no principles to be followed, no rules of 
political conduct to be observed, no ideals or arrangements to be pursued’ 
(1993, p. 154). 
   
In his second full-scale work, On Human Conduct (1975a), published over 
forty years after EM, Oakeshott disparaged the ideologue or theoretician, as 
distinct from the theorist or philosopher. His tone was reminiscent of Burke’s 
vitriol against the philosophers of the French Revolution. 9 The ideologue is a 
‘deplorable character’ (1975a, p. 26). He is a fake who confuses the postulates 
of conduct for principles of conduct from which ‘correct’ performances may be 
deduced or somehow elicited (ibid.). 
 
That he consistently practised what he preached is endorsed by some 
commentators. They insist that he consistently avoided partisan politics and 
advocacy of any political doctrine. Jeremy Raynor claims, for example, that 
‘nowhere in his work is Oakeshott concerned to justify any particular set of 
political arrangements’ (1985, p. 329). Efraim Podoksik agrees that there is 
nothing politically partisan in his writings and they cannot be used to support 
political policies. He concedes, however, that this does not mean he was 
indifferent to contemporary concerns and that his works possess no evaluative 
message (Podoksik 2003b, Prologue). Terry Nardin argues that Oakeshott 
illustrated in his writings that one can theorise politics without having to 
formulate political prescriptions. This, Nardin argues, is a good reason for 
reading him as it sets him apart from most political theorists. It might explain, 
however, why his work ‘can leave readers who are looking for substantive 
arguments puzzled and unsatisfied’ (2001a, pp. 201, 237). 
 
Oakeshott’s famous essay, ‘On Being Conservative’ (1991, pp. 407-437) is 
arguably a good example of political theorising according to his own 
conception. In this essay he did not attempt to justify or advocate 
conservatism as a foundational creed or doctrine. He merely explained its 
                                                   
9 Burke derided rationalists as ‘smugglers of unadulterated metaphysics’; ‘metaphysic 
Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance’ and ‘the aeronauts of France’ (1887, W3 pp. 
351, 241, 562). 
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character as a contingent disposition that holds certain beliefs about the 
proper role of government. 
 
He usually avoided taking a public position on contentious political issues of 
the day.  The psephologist, Robert McKenzie, once asked him, for example, 
whether he favoured British entry into the European Community. Oakeshott 
replied: ‘I do not find it necessary to hold opinions on such matters’ (Mack 
1978, p. 590). Notable exceptions to his diffidence towards policy issues were 
the Education Act of 1944 and the BBC ( 1996, p. 96, fn. 2).10  
 
For those who interpret him primarily to be a disinterested philosopher, it 
follows that those participating in politics have nothing to learn from him. He 
has nothing to teach or recommend them in practical terms. If we accept this, 
the attempt to place him on the ideological spectrum, and ask whether he 
belongs more to conservatism or liberalism, is a futile activity.  He has no 
practical advice to give or values to recommend. Oakeshott’s conservatism is 
‘beside the point of an argument’ as his works seek to explain political activity’ 
(Minogue 2011, p. 135). 
 
Oakeshott argued that political thinking, in contrast to theorising, is about 
changing the world. A political ideology, or doctrine, is a more or less coherent 
set of beliefs about how the world should be changed. He was consistent 
throughout his career in claiming that he wrote as a philosopher, not an 
ideologue.  This claim will be refuted, however, by demonstrating that his 
supposedly neutral “explanations” of human conduct and his conception of 
the state that is most conducive to its proper expression - civil association - 
often reflected barely suppressed individualist and libertarian values. This will 
be done by showing the normative foundation of his political theory, and by 
explaining that his repetition of a few core ideas, though expressed in a variety 
of ways, advance a characteristic political doctrine.  
                                                   
10  Oakeshott was highly critical of the BBC in his review of the Report of 
Broadcasting Committee, 1949. He thought it was ‘astonishing’ that a monopoly had 
been granted to a Corporation ‘self-dedicated to the improvement of mankind 




It is certainly contentious to describe him as doctrinaire: ‘To accuse Oakeshott 
of having ulterior practical motives is to place him in the company of the 
theoreticians he deplored’ (Boucher and Vincent 2000, p. 188). But to pretend 
that he always wrote as a disinterested philosopher is not sustainable.  It will 
become evident during the course of this thesis that the question posed by 
Andrew Vincent, ‘is Oakeshott just a covert conservative ideologist artfully 
trading on philosophy?’ is legitimate, although simplistically formulated 
(1994, p. 217). 
 
 
Oakeshott’s philosophical orientation 
 
Oakeshott had a different understanding of the remit of both general and 
political philosophy to most of his contemporaries. The British school of 
Idealism, to which he subscribed, was already falling out of fashion in the 
philosophical community by the time he wrote Experience and its Modes 
(1933). According to Anthony Quinton absolute Idealism exerted its 
maximum intellectual authority between 1874 and 1903.  The end point was 
marked by the assault on Idealism in Bertrand Russell’s Principles of 
Mathematics and G. E. Moore’s Refutation of Idealism. Yet, given the time lag 
between professorial appointments and changes in intellectual fashion 
Idealist professors continued to head university philosophy departments for a 
substantial time after 1903 (Quinton 1971, pp. 4-5). 
 
 Idealism had been the dominant school of philosophy in the UK since the mid 
nineteenth century. Its leading proponents, including F. H. Bradley, B. 
Bosanquet, E. Jones and J. M. E. McTaggart had all died in the 1920s. 
Oakeshott admitted to the fading popularity of Idealism in the Introduction to 
EM, which he conceived as a ‘restatement of its first principles’ (1933, pp. 6-
7). Idealism came under attack from positivism in the 1930s, which holds that 
human affairs can be understood scientifically: that is, in relation to general 
laws based on induction from observable facts. A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth 
and Logic (1936) was the most popular statement of positivism in the 1930s. 
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A brief summary of the tenets of Idealism is necessary to understand how it 
might be relevant to an interpretation of Oakeshott’s political theory. 11 The 
first tenet is based on a strong critique of empiricism: David Hume’s 
argument that knowledge begins with sense experience.  The Idealists rejected 
this. They argued that in order to experience at all, the mind must play a more 
active role. For Idealists, the notion of having a simple “unmediated” 
experience is a chimera. Their starting point is ‘the idea of a complex unity of 
experience’ (Boucher and Vincent 2000, p. xiv). The central question for 
Idealists, including Oakeshott, was how the unity is distinguished into its 
various modes. They were unhappy with dualisms such as those of mind and 
nature, individualism and collectivism, or nature and the environment as 
‘each includes something of the other’ (ibid., p. xv). 
 
Second, and as a consequence, we cannot say that an experience is invalid.  
There is no external reality against which to measure it. We make sense of 
new experiences by seeing how they cohere with our previous experiences. In 
the Notebooks, for example, Oakeshott claimed that truth does not rest on any 
argument, it belongs solely to the way it coheres with the prior experience of 
the person experiencing anew (2014, p. 92). Each time we interpret an 
experience, moreover, ‘we invoke the principles and procedures prescribed by 
the different worlds of experience or imagining’ (Boucher and Vincent 2000, 
p. 185). 
   
Third, and consequently, Idealists argue that the only way we can have a 
truthful and satisfactory experience ‘is if we aim to reconcile all experiences 
with one another’ (Neill 2011, p. 19). Fourth, by analogy, the Idealists hold 
that at the level of society, paralleling the epistemological argument, it is a 
mistake to conceptualise human agents as separate units, since the whole will 
be more coherent than its constituent parts. Oakeshott articulated this point 
of view in his 1925 essay ‘Some Remarks on the Nature and Meaning of 
Sociality’ (1993, pp. 46-62). 
 
                                                   
11 For a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between British Idealism and 
Political Theory see David Boucher and Andrew Vincent (2000). 
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But, Oakeshott’s lack of interest in the topic of social justice set him apart 
from most Idealists. T. H. Green, for example, for many the leading 
nineteenth century British Idealist, advocated an activist state to improve the 
“common good”. This view was shared by other leading Idealists such as 
Caird, Ritchie, Jones and Haldane who understood that liberalism is obliged 
to bring up all members of society to an improved state of life (Boucher and 
Vincent 2000, p.  xxii). This idea became increasingly anathema to Oakeshott 
over time. Furthermore, these Idealists had a direct political influence as 
“New Liberals” such as J. A. Hobson, L. T. Hobhouse, A. L. Fisher and, to 
some degree, H. H. Asquith12 held similar moral and political ideals (ibid.). So 
Oakeshott’s dogmatic insistence that political philosophy is explanatory, not 
normative, and that theory cannot guide practice differentiated him from 
most of the Idealists, with the significant exceptions of Bradley and 
McTaggart. 
 
It is clear from the summary of its basic ideas that Idealism is a metaphysical 
and epistemological position. An epistemological stance does not necessarily 
entail any political orientation. But there are three aspects of Idealism that 
had an indirect influence on his political thought. First, if “truth” lies merely 
in the coherence of experience and not with reference to some external 
standard, analogously “political truth”, in the sense of the right course of 
action, lies in identifying what best coheres with our accumulated political 
experience, or tradition. This idea underpins Oakeshott’s well known 
definition of politics as ‘the pursuit of intimations’ within an existing tradition 
(1991, pp. 56-58, pp.  66-69). It echoes his assertion in EM that knowledge is 
the achievement of coherence within a system of thought through the ‘pursuit 
of the implications’ of that system (1933, p. 41). 
 
Second, Oakeshott’s Idealistic understanding of society and the individual as 
being two sides of the same coin sets him apart from much mainstream 
contemporary liberal thinking. We will see that whereas he revered 
individuality, he had no time for methodological individualism, which 
provides the ground for much liberal thought. It will be seen, however, that he 
                                                   
12 Liberal Prime Minister 1908-1916. 
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gave up most of the Idealistic understanding of the state over time. In his 1925 
essay, ‘A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political 
Philosophy, he spoke of the state as the ultimate society and that the objective 
or end of a state is to provide the ‘good life’ (2010, p. 76). He argued that the 
state is a ‘cultural unit’ and defined culture as the end ‘a state sets before itself’ 
(ibid., p. 77). We shall see in Chapter Three, however, that the idea of a 
purposeful state became anathema to him as it compromised his conception 
of freedom. 
 
Third, his analytic style was typically Idealistic. He addressed theoretical 
problems by setting up opposing types, or “ideals”. Both sides were then 
convicted of being one-sided and failing to take into account aspects of the 
other perspective. In Oakeshott’s case, however, his preferences are easy to 
discern so the synthesis that unites the element of truth expressed in both 
ideals always falls much closer to one ideal than the other. 
 
There is a debate as to whether Oakeshott gave up Idealism as he grew older. 
W. H. Greenleaf (1966), Dale Hall and Tariq Modood (1982), and Paul Franco 
(1990), claim he did not. Greenleaf, for example, noted minor changes in his 
approach but considered them amendments or clarifications of his point of 
view rather than critical changes. (1966, p. 5). There is, however, a more 
nuanced version of the evolution of his theoretical position. This version takes 
into account his scepticism. Steven Gerencser (1995 and 2000) argues that 
beginning with his essay The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind 
(Oakeshott, 1991, pp. 488-541), Oakeshott allows for limited interaction 
between the modes. Gerencser attributes this to his increasing scepticism, 
which came at the expense of his Idealism (1995, p. 730).  Efraim Podoksik 
rejects both positions. He claims that there is continuity in his work but EM 
demonstrates that he had already broken with absolute Idealism (2004, p. 2). 
 
Oakeshott’s opposition of the politics of faith to the politics of scepticism will 
be examined in Chapter Four. At this point, however, we should step back to 
consider the nature and significance of his philosophical scepticism. This was 
arguably the unifying link, or ground, of his account of morality, to be 
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considered in Chapter Two; his political theory, considered in Chapter Three; 
and his account of political activity, considered in Chapter Four.  We should 
note that although Oakeshott described conservatism as a “disposition”, he 
admitted that a justification could be articulated: ‘In the idiom of general 
ideas’ and ‘it is not to be presumed that conservative conduct is less eligible 
than any other for this sort of interpretation’ (1991, p. 407). If he had felt the 
need to justify conservatism “in the idiom of general ideas”, I would suggest 
that scepticism and the related idea of prudence would have been to the fore. 
 
Oakeshott described himself as a sceptic: ‘One who would do better if only he 
knew how’ (1991, p. 44). He did not, however,  directly explain what he meant 
by this. 13  His philosophical scepticism is at its most fundamental in his 
assertion of the independence of the modes of experience and his claim that 
political philosophy is impractical. But “scepticism” covers a number of 
philosophical positions, and is a term often used unphilosophically. It can be 
used in any number of ways. It has been used to signify very nearly any type of 
doubt including ‘uncertainty, criticism, distrust, suspicion, opposition, 
disagreement, subversion, negativity, humility, nominalism, reticence, 
pessimism or irreligion’ (Laursen 2005, p. 40). So to estimate the significance 
of Oakeshott’s scepticism to his political outlook we need to specify what he 
meant by the term. 
 
A number of commentators have discussed his scepticism with reference to 
the writers that inspired him.14 In his Foreword to On History, for example,  
Fuller describes it as being based on Socrates’ demonstration of human 
ignorance, St Augustine’s scepticism about human affectations to insulate 
ourselves from impermanence and death, as well as de Montaigne’s doctrine 
of the fallibility of human judgment  (1983, p. ix). With regard to the latter 
Oakeshott explained that ‘no man is ever free from it - & the arrangement of 
                                                   
13 J. C. Laursen thinks that Oakeshott was historically uninformed of the different 
sceptical traditions in Western culture, such as those of the Pyrrhonians or Academic 
sceptics (2005, p. 39). 
14 See Neal Wood (1959); Jeremy Rayner (1985); Steven Gerencser (2000); Paul 
Franco (1990). 
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the world should be based upon it as the finest and most certain foundation 
we have (2014, p. 318, italics added).  
 
Oakeshott clarified that this fallibility is not so much an ‘imperfection’ in 
human character but the ‘very stuff and structure’ of it’ (ibid.). The total 
absence of fallibility is impossible. What we should aspire to, he argued, is the 
absence of certain kinds of fallibility in certain men: ‘e.g. injustice and 
partiality in judges, pusillanimity in soldiers, etc.’ (ibid.). The notion of 
fallibility of human judgment, and the dangers of not recognising this in 
practice, is the fundamental idea behind the anti-rationalism that strongly 
marked his post-war political essays and his hostility to the politics of faith, 
which he characterised as the pursuit of perfectionist projects such as the 
promotion of a common good. 
 
Roy Tseng describes Oakeshott, like Hume, as a mitigated, or moderate, 
sceptic who seeks a middle course between rationalism and total scepticism. 
The latter, which Hume sympathised with, before rejecting it as a practical 
outlook, offers a radical doubt of the basis of every human belief. Mitigated 
scepticism, however, refers to a particular epistemic predicament. On the one 
hand, because of the imperfection of human agency, it seems impossible to 
completely deny scepticism. On the other hand, it is not plausible to propose a 
total denial of human reason (Tseng 2013, pp. 143-4). 
 
But Oakeshott was not a consistent sceptic. We might best describe him as a 
selective sceptic. He was sceptical when it suited him.  He was dogmatic in his 
assertions on many issues, in spite of his professed scepticism. Hannah Pitkin 
found On Human Conduct ‘rigidly dogmatic, assertive and idiosyncratic 
almost to the point of being crotchety’, a judgment that can be readily 
supported by a reading of the final third of the book, at least (1976, p. 302). 
His anti-rationalist and anti-perfectionist theses are examples of arguments 
that a thoroughgoing sceptic would contest. In particular, he was sceptical 
about rationalism and scientism in support of his philosophy of practice.  
 
But, being a philosophical sceptic entails no particular normative orientation 
and sheds no light on the question of what governments should do, the central 
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question in Oakeshott’s political theory. Philosophical scepticism, like 
idealism, is an epistemological position, not a political ideology.  There is no 
logical bridge that links scepticism to a conception of a state in which freedom 
and the pursuit of individuality dominate. Roy Tseng has illustrated how 
moderate scepticism can be used to advocate “left wing” positions, such as 
that of John Dunn, who, like Oakeshott, thought human beings to be 
‘creatures of limited understanding, skill and virtue’ (Dunn 1984, p. xv).  
 
 However, it has been suggested that there is a sentimental link between 
philosophical scepticism and conservatism, which Oakeshott identified with 
political scepticism.  J.S. Mill thought, for example, that there was a 
connection between David Hume’s scepticism and his conservatism. If no 
confidence can be had in the determinations of the human intellect, and one 
answer to every question is as likely to be as true as the other, it is 
understandable that a man will be inclined to that state of affairs which he has 
hitherto found agreeable and ‘compatible with his private comforts’ (Mill 
1963, p. 80).   
  
Mill’s explanation of Hume’s Toryism reminds us of Oakeshott’s description 
of the conservative as someone who esteems the present ‘not on account of its 
connections with a remote antiquity, nor because it is recognised to be more 
admirable than any possible alternative, but on account of its familiarity’ 
(1991, p. 408).  In this thought we find the true significance of Oakeshott’s 
scepticism: scepticism implies prudence as regards political change and 
respect for tradition. For Oakeshott, scepticism was not a systematic 
philosophy but rather ‘a general doubt, negativity, propaedeutic to further 
study’ (Laursen 2005, p. 50). With regard to his belief that human activity and 
intercourse should be conceived of as a conversation, for example he said it 
‘will, perhaps, appear both frivolous and unduly sceptical’ (Oakeshott 1991, p. 
492). 15 In this context “unduly sceptical” appears to mean lacking ambition or 
being uninspiring  
                                                   
15 David Hume intimated that the metaphor of conversation describes the human 
quest for truth, in his essay The Epicurean: ‘In our cheerful discourses, better than in 
the formal reasoning of the schools, is true wisdom to be found’ (1996, p. 80). 
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In his critique of ‘The Study of Politics in a University’, Oakeshott argued that 
‘doubt’ should be recognised as one of the ‘intellectual virtues’ (1981, p. 59). In 
the preface to the first edition of Rationalism in Politics, he further insisted 
that his essays do not constitute a settled doctrine but ‘disclose a consistent 
style or disposition of thought’ (1991, p. xi).16 This disposition we may describe 
as moderately sceptical or prudential.  
 
In the same way as Oakeshott left scepticism loosely defined, he did not 
analyse the terms “prudence” or “prudential” despite regularly using both: 
chiefly in On Human Conduct and his essay ‘The Rule of Law’. Judith 
Swanson argues that he used the term in two ways: a third of the time, to 
‘characterize agency and to mean reflection, deliberation and diagnosis’ 
(2007, p. 9), and the remainder of the time to mean ‘instrumental, helpful, 
utilitarian or strategic’ (ibid.).  
 
In the Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (PFPS, 1996), he used 
the term “prudence” on three occasions, twice as a qualification for 
“diffidence”. He explained that it is more accurate ‘to find the roots of 
sceptical politics in (...) prudent diffidence rather than in some radical doubt’ 
and claimed at the end of the book that older people tend to have ‘an affinity 
with the prudent diffidence of scepticism’ (1996, p. 31, p. 124). In ‘On Being 
Conservative’, he claimed that ‘what others plausibly identify as timidity, he 
recognises in himself as rational prudence’ (1991, pp. 412-3). The conservative 
is cautious, and he is inclined to indicate his agreement or disagreement ‘not 
in absolute, but in graduated terms’ (ibid.). 
 
Several philosophers have offered a high-minded moral argument against 
scepticism, which is relevant to Oakeshott’s account of morality, which we will 
assess in Chapter Two. He was sceptical that the pursuit of moral ideals could 
be a sound way to approach morality. It was ‘untrustworthy’ (1991, p. 486). 
Martha Nussbaum calls scepticism ‘profoundly selfish, indeed solipsistic’, 
                                                   
16 Edmund Burke considered prudence the most important political and moral virtue 
and, moreover, ‘the director, regulator and standard of all moral and political virtues’ 
(1887, W4: p. 81). 
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which we will see suggested in Oakeshott’s account of morality (2000, p. 194). 
Julia Annas could have him in mind when she speaks of scepticism’s 
‘detached attitude towards morality’ as it excludes any significant concrete 
commitment to any moral venture (1986, p. 21). For this reason, Gertrude 
Himmelfarb likened his scepticism to philistinism. She thought that 
Oakeshott was right to censure the rationalists for undermining both good 
and bad habits but complained that he did not offer the means of 
distinguishing between good and bad or reasons for developing a disposition 




Oakeshott’s understanding of political philosophy was even more out of tune 
with the prevailing normative orientation of most contemporary political 
philosophy; or political theory, as Oakeshott preferred to call the activity in 
his later work. Most political theorists are inclined to see their proper activity 
as providing prescriptive reflection and argument. Paul Kelly, for example, in 
his review of contemporary political theory, defines it as ‘normative political 
theory or philosophy and not second-order theorizing about theory’ (2003, p. 
207).  
 
Contemporary debates among liberals, communitarians, natural law theorists, 
and postmodernists about political issues are informed by a shared 
understanding that philosophical analysis can and should guide political 
activity. John Rawls’ influential A Theory of Justice (1971) strongly 
encouraged this conception of political theory: ‘An important test of a theory 
of justice is how well it introduces order and system into our judgments over a 
wide range of questions’ (1971, p. ix). Rawls claimed that there is an 
irreducible disagreement about the nature of ethical values. He recognised 
that with regard to such disagreements, political philosophy has little to say.  
This conclusion was understood by most analytical philosophers prior to 
Rawls to limit the goals of political and ethical theory to narrow second-order 
activity. Rawls argued, however, given the fact of reasonable disagreement 
about ultimate ends, that we can nevertheless reach agreement about which 
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principles ought to regulate social cooperation. These principles can be used 
to construct a system of justice as fairness based on certain assumptions 
derived from recognition of moral equality and a certain conception of the 
self. This procedure leads to recommendations regarding the fair distribution 
of primary goods in a just society and to the priority of the principles of justice 
(1971, pp. 11-17). 
 
Oakeshott commented on Rawls’ essay, ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1958), in his 
1965 review of Philosophy, Politics and Society (1962, Laslett and Runciman, 
eds.). 17   He interpreted Rawls as pursuing a philosophical  and not a 
normative purpose. This, Oakeshott claimed, was not to tell us how we ought 
to behave or to offer a criterion of just behaviour (2008, p. 191). This was a 
misreading of Rawls’s intent. According to a close collaborator, Samuel 
Freeman (2003, p. 1), Rawls had all along been guided by the normative 
question of ‘What is the most appropriate moral conception of justice for a 
democratic society?’ (Rawls 1971, pp. viii-xiii). Kelly agrees that Rawls’s 
concern was primarily that of offering a rational defence of political principles 
(2003, p. 211). Rawls’s two principles of justice are indeed criteria of just 
behaviour contrary to Oakeshott’s assertion. At the end of his later work, The 
Law of Peoples, Rawls further argued that political philosophy should be 
targeted at citizens and not just an elite. It should lay out principles citizens 
might follow when evaluating their institutions and practices in the interests 
of illuminating the question of how ‘a realistic utopia’ might be achieved 
(2001, p. 128).  Political philosophy for Rawls was profoundly practical as it 
establishes the long-term goal of political enterprise, ‘and in working toward it 
gives meaning to what we can do today’ (ibid.). 
 
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls identified four aims of political 
philosophy, all of which are practical. The first is the need to find a solution to 
divisive political conflict and the need to settle ‘the problem of order’ (2001, p. 
1). Rawls argued that such concerns motivated Locke’s A Letter Concerning 
Toleration (1689) and Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651). The second is that of 
                                                   
17 Rawls’ 1958 essay contains many of the core ideas he elaborated in A Theory of 
Justice (1991). 
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orienting how people understand their political and social institutions and 
‘their basic aims and purposes as a society with a history’ (ibid., pp. 2-3). The 
third role is that of reconciling us to our political realities, and in so doing 
helping us to ameliorate ‘our frustrations and rage against our society and its 
history’ (ibid., p. 3). The fourth is that we should view political philosophy as 
‘realistically utopian’ (ibid., p. 4). That is, it should explore the boundaries of 
achievable political activity. 
 
In the course of this thesis, it will become clear that, despite appearances to 
the contrary, Oakeshott addressed all four of the issues identified by Rawls, 
albeit to varying degrees of specificity. Civil association is a potential solution 
to the problem of order, which, from his early days, he saw as the central 
problem of political philosophy: ‘An attempt to theorize the harmony which 
life as we know it demands as a practical presupposition’ (2014, p. 73).  When 
the phrase “civil association” appears in the Notebooks for the first time in the 
late 1950s, the emphasis is clearly on ‘the art of living well among people we 
may not like’, with whom we will frequently disagree but necessarily will have 
a relationship with them as we live in close proximity (2014, p. 421). His 
preference for societas, or civil association, over universitas, or enterprise 
association, as a mode of organising respublica is primarily because, as 
Richard E. Flathman has noted, it can accommodate plurality and the 
thoroughgoing individuality dear to Oakeshott that can be described as ‘self-
enacted individualism’ (2005, p. 122). 
 
Oakeshott was insistent that representative democracy, which nurtures 
individuality and liberty, was a contingent, historic achievement. Contingent 
in that there was no inevitability that representative democracy would 
emerge, or that its future is guaranteed. The recognition of its contingency 
and consequent vulnerability addresses Rawls’s issues of orientation and 
reconciliation. His argument that politics can only be the pursuit of 
intimations within a particular tradition directly speaks to the issue of 
practicable political possibility.  
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A Theory of Justice has provoked an enormous amount of literature on the 
subjects of social justice, what constitutes a fair distribution of resources, what 
comprises human equality, and whether liberty has priority over other 
political values.  The intention of writers sympathetic to Rawls such as Ronald 
Dworkin (2000) and Amartya Sen (1979), and critics such as Michael Sandel 
(1982), G. A. Cohen (2000) and Robert Nozick (1974), is clearly prescriptive. 
Their works are normatively grounded and intended to change the way we 
view the political and social worlds.  Much of present-day political theory 
takes its lead from Rawls’ work although the terms of political argument have 
been extended to include such topics as multiculturalism and group rights 
(Kelly 2003, 246). But, according to Oakeshott, such work is not genuine 
philosophy, or political theory. It is the second rate and dubious activity of 
ideology that he attacked so forcefully in Rationalism in Politics (1991). 
 
Some commentators, however, refuse to take at face value Oakeshott’s 
pronouncements regarding the separation of theory and practice and his 
claims about the nature and scope of political theory. Bhikhu Parekh (1979),) 
Michael Freeden (1996) and Andrew Gamble (2012) all ascribe different kinds 
of ideological purpose to Oakeshott. They acknowledge that he condemns 
ideological politics, but propose that he advances an ideology nonetheless. 
They disagree, however, over how best to characterise it.  
  
The characterisations of Oakeshott’s political project are legion. Freeden 
argues that “anti-ideology” is itself an ideological position and it was only by 
insisting that conservatism was a disposition, not an ideology, that Oakeshott 
deluded himself that he was not a conservative ideologist (1996, p. 328). 
Richard Crossman identified Oakeshott with an ‘extreme Right [that] deifies 
tradition because it fears the democratic principles which challenge privilege 
and status’ (1951, pp. 60-61). Perry Anderson likewise claims that he was a 
right-wing ideologue: ‘One of the quartet of outstanding theorists of the 
intransigent Right’ (1992, pp. 7-8). 18 Bernard Crick thought Oakeshott ‘a 
brilliant Tory pamphleteer’ and a ‘dandy-aesthete’ (1971, pp. 123-124; 1991, p. 
                                                   
18 The other members of the quartet were Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss and Friedrich von 
Hayek. 
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124).  For many, such as Roger Eatwell, he is obviously ‘the most important 
contemporary conservative philosopher’ (1992, p. 67). Russell Kirk (2008), 
Hannah Pitkin (1976) and Neil Wood (1959) all claimed that he aimed to lay 
out a foundational conservatism in the manner of Edmund Burke, who is 
typically described as the founder of British conservatism.  
 
Other commentators, however, such as Paul Franco (1990), John Gray (1993) 
and W. H. Greenleaf (1996), stress the liberal character of his thinking. 
Andrew Sullivan brings the conservative and liberal interpretations of 
Oakeshott’s political thought together. He claims they form ‘a quirky fusion of 
Conservatism and liberality’ (2003, pp. 46-49). Robert Grant offers a similar 
assessment. He describes Oakeshott’s work as ‘a kind of conservative 
liberalism or liberal conservatism’ (1990, p. 62). Ayreh Botwinick claims he 
was all of the above: a radical in his understanding of philosophy; an 
ideological conservative in his practical stance; and a liberal in his political 
philosophy (2011, p. 11).  
 
Efraim Podoksik describes Oakeshott as primarily a modernist, whereby he 
sees modernism as the idea that radical plurality and a consequent concern 
with ‘fragmentation’ are essential features of the modern era (2003b, Chapter 
I). Podoksik claims that Oakeshott was a defender of modernity who saw it as 
inherently valuable, a conclusion that I will challenge (2003b, Chapter V). 
Richard Rorty co-opts him as a postmodern relativist (1997, p. 197). In his 
introduction to his recently published Notebooks, Luke O’Sullivan suggests 
that he is best thought of ‘as the last great representative, not only of British 
Idealism, but also of English romanticism’ (2014, p. xxxi).  
 
In view of these diverse and conflicting interpretations of his work, Maurice 
Cranston’s summary of the many paradoxes in Oakeshott’s work - made over 
forty years ago – continues to resonate: 
 
 [Oakeshott] is a traditionalist with few traditional beliefs, an ‘Idealist’ 
who is more sceptical than many positivists, a lover of liberty who 
repudiates liberalism, an individualist who prefers Hegel to Locke, a 
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philosopher who disapproves of philosophism, a romantic perhaps (if 
Hume could be called one), and a marvellous stylist (1967, p. 82).  
 
Leslie Armour captures the controversy surrounding Oakeshott when he asks 
if he is ‘a fish too big or too slippery?’  (2005, p. 779). 
 
 
An outline of my interpretation 
 
The debate as to whether Oakeshott was a disinterested philosopher or a 
covert ideologue is something of a “red herring”. It can be demonstrated that 
sometimes he wrote as a disinterested philosopher while at other times he 
wrote in a normative vein. Moreover, depending on which text you look at he 
can be interpreted as either conservative or liberal. The interpretative 
challenge is to explain these apparent inconsistencies: ‘What one needs to 
explain in trying to understand a writer is the tensions in his thought’ 
(Oakeshott 2014, p. 539). Central to my thesis is to demonstrate that 
normative concerns are at the heart of his thinking and are of a coherent 
character and account for the tensions in Oakeshott’s thought. 
Oakeshott worked on three levels. He offered different insights into politics 
depending on the “level” on which he is wrote. In The Harvard Lectures he 
claimed that ‘“political thought” is a shorthand expression that covers not only 
thought about different topics but different kinds of thought (1993b, p. 13). 
The first level of thought is the thought that goes into construction of a policy 
where the upshot is political action (ibid.). The second is the activity of trying 
to discern principles and general ideas from experience in order to justify 
political aspirations, decisions, selections and performances (ibid., pp. 13-14). 
Labels such as Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy, are examples of this level of 
political reflection. They are a useful shorthand for describing a way of 
handling political matters.  
The third level of reflection is political philosophy, properly understood. It is 
not concerned with policy or understanding political intentions and goals in 
terms of general principles: it considers ‘the place of government and political 
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activity on the map of human activity in general’ (Oakeshott 1993b, p. 14.) It 
addresses such questions as what it is we are doing when we engage in 
political activity and ‘What really is this activity called governing?’ (ibid.). It is 
a much higher and rarer level of thought than the first two levels as the first 
two levels are tainted with practical considerations.  
Oakeshott wrote on all three levels: practical, historical and philosophical. 
Sometimes they overlapped because ‘they slide naturally into one another’ 
(1993b, p. 13). We will see in Chapter Three, for example, that his account of 
civil association is an exercise in theorising the postulates of a historically 
derived concept of the state. The “general idea” of civil association is 
historically derived - a level two activity - the postulates of which are then 
theorised, a level three activity, as philosophical constructions: ‘On the 
analogy of human history’ (1975b, p. 8). Suvi Soininen’s observation that he 
was methodologically inconsistent is apposite (2005a, p. 11).  He moved 
between the different levels of thinking: practical, ideological and 
philosophical. It is important to have this in mind when interpreting his 
political writings.  
This is only a fault in his work to the extent that he claimed to write always as 
a philosopher, according to his own definition. Most political theorists would 
have little problem with the idea of a writer on politics moving between the 
three levels. Stefan Collini notes that ‘politics is intrinsically hybrid as an 
academic discipline’ (2006, p. 466). It ranges from quantitative analysis at 
one extreme to philosophical reflection at the other ‘with a good deal in 
between that is hard to distinguish from well-informed journalism’ (ibid.). 19 
                                                   
19. Terry Nardin lists three methodological viewpoints on the ideal character of the 
social sciences. The first is positivism, which claims that human conduct can be 
understood in much the same way that science explains the world from observable 
facts. The second is hermeneutics. This argues that human conduct cannot be 
comprehended scientifically. It can be understood ‘only by interpreting the meaning 
of individual human acts, artefacts, practices and cultures’ (Nardin 2001b, quoted in 
Callahan 2005, p. 240). The third perspective is critical theory. This claims that our 
comprehension of human affairs is inseparable from human values and concerns. 
Nardin concludes that ‘the social sciences are therefore inevitably and properly 
prescriptive or pragmatic’ (ibid.). Nardin claims that Oakeshott can best be described 
as belonging to the hermeneutic camp from the methodological perspective. Gene 
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We noted that Oakeshott normally avoided commenting on, or 
recommending, specific policies. He often came close, however, to offering 
advice to politicians on the considerations that should be taken into account 
as they pursue their craft. This is a level one activity: political thought in the 
service of political action. The publication of the essay Rationalism in Politics, 
probably his most widely read essay, gave him a much broader audience than 
hitherto. 20  It coincided with him becoming a more public figure when 
appointed to a Professorship at LSE in 1948 in succession to Harold Laski 
(1893-1950). According to Kenneth Minogue, the essays he wrote on 
rationalism in the late 1940s initiated a period in which he emerged as a 
public intellectual: ‘To be installed in the public mind as a kind of eminence 
grise mistakenly thought to lurk behind the revival of free market 
conservative politics in the late 70s’ (2003, p. 1).  
 
Much of Rationalism in Politics can be explicitly read as a justification for a 
conservative approach to politics. His critique of rationalism, a level three 
activity, has practical implications for political action, a level one activity. 
Furthermore, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, published 
posthumously, is, as Timothy Fuller notes in his introduction,  ‘close to a book 
of advice for the practice of modern politics’ (1996, p. x).21 This may explain 
why he did not publish it in his lifetime, for it clearly undermines the 
distinction that Oakeshott claimed to sustain between theory and practice. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Callahan notes, however, that Oakeshott, like Ludwig von Mises, differed in his claim 
that the social sciences are descriptive and not prescriptive undertakings. (2005, p. 
242). Clearly he was not a positivist. His 1947 review of Hans Morgenthau’s book 
Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (1946), entitled ‘Scientific Politics’, makes this 
clear (Oakeshott 1993a, pp.  97-110). 
20 ‘Rationalism in Politics’ was originally published in two parts in The Cambridge 
Journal 1 (1947-8, pp.  81-98; pp. 145-57). This essay, together with seven others, 
was re-published as Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays by Methuen in 1962. A 
new, expanded edition, including several other previously published and unpublished 
essays, edited by Timothy Fuller, was published by the Liberty Press in 1991. 
21  Steven Teles and Mathew Kaliner attempted to construct a ‘Public Policy of 
Skepticism’, based on their interpretation of The Politics of Faith and The Politics of 






In Morality and Politics in Modern Europe; the Harvard Lectures Oakeshott 
reminded us that when attempting to interpret writings on politics, the first 
task of the interpreter is to relate them to their specific context. He argued 
that the writer is not concerned with ‘the activity of governing and the 
experience of being governed’ in general ‘but the particular idioms of 
government and politics which belong to his world’ (1993b, pp. 5-6). He also 
argued that those writers who claim to be reflecting on ‘the permanent and 
unchanging problems of government’ are doing no such thing. They are, in 
fact, involved with the issues of government: ‘As they appear in the 
circumstances of a particular place and time’ (ibid.). His advancement of this 
argument suggests that by the late 1950s he had moved away from his earlier 
efforts to sustain political philosophy at the level of generality and abstraction. 
His argument that context is all important when interpreting political writings 
anticipated the highly influential form of linguistic contextualism in the 
history of ideas associated with Quentin Skinner and the “Cambridge 
School”.22 If we agree with Oakeshott’s contention that the specificity and 
immediacy of the world to which a commentator belongs is the inspirational 
spring of his political theory, we need to interpret his writings with reference 
to their context. Most of his obviously political works were written after 1945. 
I suggest, therefore, that the context in which we should interpret Oakeshott’s 
political writings is primarily British politics of this period, not wider 
Anglophone or European politics, while acknowledging there are a number of 
concerns common to all.  
This claim is not uncontroversial. Perry Anderson, for example, argues that he 
should be placed in a European rather than specifically British context (1992). 
Similarly, Paul Franco claims that he ought to be placed alongside European 
thinkers of his generation such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Hayek, 
                                                   
22 See Skinner’s Regarding Method (2002a).  Skinner claims that past works of 
political theory cannot be understood as contributions to “perennial” debates, but 
must be understood as particularistic, ideological speech acts.  
 30 
Raymond Aron and Isaiah Berlin (2004, 183). But whereas Oakeshott often 
referred to the “Modern European State” in his theorising, it is clear enough 
that he saw himself as writing from within the British political tradition. He 
considered, for example, the continental vogue for classifying parties as either 
Left and Right as wholly inapplicable in the UK. In his 1948 essay 
‘Contemporary British Politics’, he asserted that whereas there may be a vague 
affinity between the Labour party and continental European parties of the left 
there is nothing in common between British Conservatism and any 
continental political grouping: ‘Loose talk of this kind about British politics 
merely liberates a fog of unreality, and lost in this fog British politics may 
become detached from their real root in British society and its history’ (2007, 
p. 208). 
The historical context of British politics includes the fact that Oakeshott lived 
his mature life either in the shadow of the rise of totalitarian states in the 
1930s or during the Cold War, a reality that threatened other western 
European states. The Cold War only formally ended just after his death in 
1990. He wrote some of his most influential essays in the early years of the 
Cold War: ‘Rationalism in Politics’ (1947-48); ‘The Political Economy of 
Freedom’ (1949); ‘Political Education’ (1951); and ‘The Masses in 
Representative Democracy’ (1957), which, as Nardin notes, comes closest to 
treating totalitarianism as a subject (Nardin 2015, 4). Moreover, his book The 
Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, although published 
posthumously, was written in the early 1950s. All of these works can be read 
as an exposition of the threats to individuality, pluralism and world order 
posed by ideological attempts to impose a single overriding purpose to 
government as represented by the USSR. Natalie Riendeau goes further and 
argues that ‘Rationalism in Politics’ should be interpreted as Oakeshott’s 
attempt to safeguard all Western Civilisation and its values against the perils 
of Rationalism (2014, Chapter 5). 
After 1945, the main political parties in the UK embraced the purposive idiom 
of government to varying degrees. This resulted in an expanded welfare state 
grounded in the Beveridge report. The 1942 report on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services, chaired by the Liberal economist William Beveridge, 
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identified the five “Giant Evils” in society: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness 
and disease. The report formed the basis of the post-war reforms known as 
the Welfare State. These included the expansion of National Insurance and 
the creation of the National Health Service: ‘Social security must be achieved 
by cooperation between the State and the Individual’ and ‘a revolutionary 
moment in the world’s history is a time for revolutions, not for patching’ 
(Beveridge 1942, p. 6).  
 
Oakeshott believed that the rationalist disposition that increasingly prevailed 
after WW2 put ‘too high a value on political action and placed too high a hope 
in political achievement’ (1991, p. 26). This opinion was out of tune with 
contemporary sentiments.  There was broad cross party support for the 
expansion of the welfare state after 1945. The three significant social 
innovations of postwar Britain - the Education Act, the National Insurance 
Act, and the National Health Service Act were introduced by members of the 





I will argue that when Oakeshott’s political works are considered in their 
entirety, they can best be thought of as advancing two doctrines, or theories 
above all. These doctrines are derived from his account of the differing 
conceptions of the state that have been apparent in modern European history 
and the nature of political activity. The first is that the state, conceived as a 
civil association, is best suited to promote individual liberty. It is, moreover, 
the only moral form of political association (1991, p. 460; 1975a, p. 180). The 
second doctrine is his conservative anti-rationalist, anti-ideological, thesis 
that political activity cannot and ought not to be conceived as anything other 
than the pursuit of intimations immanent within a political tradition (1991, p. 
58). The main aim of this thesis is to assess these doctrines critically by 
                                                   
23 R. A. Butler, a Conservative, introduced the Education Act; Beveridge, a Liberal, 
the National Insurance Act; Aneurin Bevan, a Socialist, the Health Service. 
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revealing the values that inform them and the assumptions upon which they 
are based. 
 
I suggest that much of the disagreement over the character of his political 
works is due to a failure to recognise that these doctrines largely cover two 
separate topics. The first is an idealisation of the form of the state that is most 
amenable to freedom-loving individualists. The second is a claim regarding 
the irreducible nature of political activity. There is no necessary connection 
between the two. The essays in RIP are mainly concerned with the second 
doctrine. OHC and his essay on the ‘Rule of Law’ refer to the first doctrine. If 
one only reads RIP it would be understandable to consider him as a 
conservative. If one only reads OHC, the conclusion that he was a liberal, or 
even a libertarian, is warranted.  
 
Many interpretations of Oakeshott are based on an incomplete assessment of 
his works. 24 Several of these were either not published in his lifetime or were 
not easily accessible at the time. A particular example is Religion, Politics and 
the Moral Life (RPML, 1993a), which contains essays written in the 1920s by 
the young Oakeshott. Other posthumously published works include The 
Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (PFPS, 1996): reckoned by its 
editor, Timothy Fuller, to have been written in the 1950s; Morality and 
Politics in Modern Europe (MPME, 1993b), which contains the lectures he 
gave in 1958 at Harvard University; ‘Work and Play’, an essay released by his 
then literary executor, William Letwin, in 1995; and the Notebooks, 1922-
1986, published in 2014.  The Notebooks highlight, for example, his romantic 
disposition and dislike of modernity far more vividly than his previously 
published works and are vital to understanding his political outlook 
(Oakeshott 2014). The Notebooks, in the words of his editor, Luke O’Sullivan, 
‘open a window onto Oakeshott’s intellectual development that simply cannot 
be found elsewhere in his writings’ and make clear the continuities in his 
thinking (2014, p. vii). 
 
                                                   
24 This is clearly the case with the earliest full-length books on Oakeshott’s political 
writings (Greenleaf 1986; Franco 1990). 
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It is reasonable to suggest that anyone seeking to understand Oakeshott’s 
political thought solely on the basis of the works published during his lifetime 
will develop an incomplete picture. There are many insights to be garnered 
from a careful study of the works published after his death. When we consider 
his works in their entirety, a distinct set of values, or attitudes of mind, are 
revealed and the way in which these ground his doctrines becomes more 
apparent 
 
Efraim Podoksik, though, disagrees with the suggestion that we must consider 
all of his works. He argues that it is more important to assign value to 
Oakeshott’s published works. He claims these are superior to the unpublished 
works in both the quality and manner of his argument (2003b, Prologue II). 
Podoksik may be correct. But it does not negate the importance of taking into 
consideration the whole of his work when making an interpretation. 
 
Oakeshott’s cryptic style means that the process of tracking his arguments is 
not a straightforward exercise. He admitted in the Preface to On Human 
Conduct that one of his objectives in writing the book was to make clear ‘the 
path my footprints make in the snow’ (1975a, p. viii), a path, which he 
admitted ‘might have been less rambling’ (ibid.). O’Sullivan suggests that ‘this 
may perhaps be read as a tacit confession of regret at the cost to his 
intellectual life of his often chaotic private circumstances’ (O’ Sullivan 2014, p. 
xxvi). The footprints are a reference to his previous published political essays.  
 
Oakeshott considered the essay to be the most appropriate mode of 
philosophical reflection (1975a, p. viii). Sheldon Wolin points out that a book-
length theory such as OHC requires much more self-disclosure than an essay 
(1976, p. 327).25 Oakeshott stated his purpose in OHC as revealing the ideal 
character of civil association in terms of its postulates, ‘a small composition of 
                                                   
25 OHC is structured as three interconnected essays. The first, ‘On The Theoretical 
Understanding of Human Conduct may be read as a consideration of some of the 
‘terms and presuppositions’ of the subject of the second essay, which is an 
‘engagement to understand the Civil Condition in terms of its postulates’ (Oakeshott 
1975a, p. viii). The third considers the place of civil association in a modern European 
state. 
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related ideas’ (1975a, p. 182). These ideas had preoccupied him throughout his 
life. When we examine these related ideas, we will see that they disclose his 
values. The postulates of civil association entail, moreover, a particular 
conception of the state, sympathetic to the interests of a certain character 
type. These types will be called “freedom-loving individualists”.   
 
Oakeshott was reluctant to spell out his values and preferences, perhaps 
because, as he claimed, self-disclosure is ‘hazardous’ (1975a, p. 73).  It exposes 
oneself to attack from others. He was prescient in acknowledging this risk. 
Hanna Pitkin, among others, gave an extremely critical review of OHC in her 
essay ‘Inhuman Conduct and Unpolitical Theory’ (1976). This criticism 
provoked him to give a testy reply, ‘On Misunderstanding Human Conduct: A 
Reply to My Critics’ (1976). His response is only the second case of Oakeshott 
engaging publicly with academic critics. 26 
 
Oakeshott claimed in 1934: ‘What I want to achieve now is a view of life which 
has gotten rid of everything doctrinaire’ (2014, p. 250). But, as we examine his 
rambling footprints over his lifetime, we can discern a body of coherent views 
that may reasonably be described as doctrines.  I use the term “doctrine”, 
following Bernard Crick, to ‘refer to a coherent sum of assertions regarding 
what a particular topic should be’ (1987, p. 6). In Oakeshott’s case, there are 
two separate topics: an enquiry into what the state is for, and an account of 
the practice of politics. In both cases, his supposedly neutral explanations 
have normative implications. The doctrines are partial and do not necessarily 
point in the same direction. They fall well short of what could be described as 
a comprehensive ideology. They exclude, for example, any consideration of 
the relation between economics and political theory.  
 
What the doctrines suggest, however, becomes clear as we analyse the clusters 
of his interwoven ideas that are, as Neil McInnes describes them, ‘slender, 
repetitive and elegantly expressed’ (2000). They can be discerned through his 
analytical method, which consists of explaining ideas in terms of contrasting 
                                                   
26  The other case is Oakeshott’s reply to Professor D. D. Raphael’s review of 
Rationalism in Politics in Political Studies (Oakeshott 1965, 89-92; Raphael 1964, 
pp. 202-215 and 1965, pp. 89-92)  
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“ideal” types or antinomies; ‘the tic of dividing things into two types’, as 
McInnes puts it (ibid.). These antinomies will be examined in the forthcoming 
chapters. 
 
 Oakeshott used the language of “ideal types” to contrast entirely opposing 
ways of interpreting a concept. This is an argumentative device that he shared 
with other twentieth-century thinkers.27 He put in opposition, for example, 
the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism; the state conceived as a civil 
association compared to one conceived as an enterprise association; morality 
understood from the perspective of individuality and that understood from 
the perspective of a “common good”. These ideal types, or antinomies, are 
contingent in that they are antinomies for members of communities like us 
who are participants in the pluralistic political tradition of Western Europe. 
Members of more uniform traditions will not understand such antinomies: ‘A 
monolithic society may be expected to have a monolithic politics’ (1996, p. 
95). 
 
He claimed, moreover, that “ideals” are not normative in that they do not 
recommend what ought to be, or what is, practically achievable. Neither ideal 
is fully realisable because it is dependant in some fashion on its antinomic 
opposite. But, as we examine his ideal types, it will become evident that he 
failed to maintain the distinction between the “ideal” and the normative. 
Oakeshott’s temperament and style precluded outright advocacy. Andrew 
Gamble observes, however, that ‘advocacy is never far below the surface and 
accounts for some of the fascination his [Oakeshott’s] writings have exerted’ 
(2012, p. 56).   
 
 It is apparent, which of two ideal types he investigated sat most easily with 
his sceptical, yet romantic, disposition and his dislike of modernity. Play is 
preferable to work; anti-perfectionism is more desirable than perfectionism; 
habitual morality is superior to a rules based morality; the individual is to be 
                                                   
27 Stephen Turner cites Max Weber’s antinomic distinction between the politics of 
conviction and the politics of responsibility and Carl Schmitt’s arguments about the 
fundamental incompatibility of liberalism and democracy (2014). 
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more esteemed than the anti-individual; morals and laws should be adverbial 
not instrumental; civil association under the rule of law is morally superior to 
an enterprise association; sceptical politics is less dangerous than faith based 
politics; pluralism is preferable to uniformity; the intimations of tradition are 
preferable to Rationalism; purposelessness is preferable to utilitarianism; 
practice is preferable to ideology, and so forth. He did not, however, comment 
on other potential antimonies in the European political tradition such as those 
between freedom and equality or the antimonies of freedom, positive and 
negative, as explained in Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty. 
 
 Most commentators approach Oakeshott’s political writings either directly, or 
by seeking to find foundations in his Idealist philosophy. Podoksik observes 
that ‘one of the foremost problems of Oakeshott scholarship has been an 
artificial and confused separation of his ‘social’ or political philosophy from 
the rest of his thought’ (2003b, p. 151).  My interpretative approach tries to 
avoid this separation. It differs from most in that I will first reveal his values 
and his understanding of what constitutes a good life and then argue that 
these are postulates of his political doctrines.  
 
To understand and evaluate the coherence of his advocacy of the state 
conceived as a civil association, and his conservative account of political 
activity, I suggest that our starting point should be to make explicit the values, 
or value promoting messages, that inform his work; and the assumptions that 
ground his preferences. When these values are made clear, it becomes 
apparent that there is a strong normative thread running throughout his 
political and related writings.  
 
Oakeshott did not like the use of the word “values”: ‘Values are what people 
parade who have neither settled habits of behaviour nor religious beliefs to 
suggest to them what they should do’ (2014, p. 420). He did not parade his 
values explicitly but I would argue that they are, nonetheless, discernible in 
his works. Most critics, however, pay insufficient attention to ‘the general 
value-promoting messages that even an anti-generalist such as himself 
transmitted’ (Freeden 1996, p. 328).  
 37 
 
 On Human Conduct (1975a) is Oakeshott’s comprehensive and general theory 
of morality, the state and political activity. It is hard to read OHC, his first full-
length book since EM (1933), without sensing the values and political 
preferences that animate it. It is, after all, a political book and as Hayek noted 
in his preface to The Road to Serfdom, ‘a political book is derived from some 
ultimate values’ (1944, p. vii). In Oakeshott’s case, we shall see that these 
values are those of reverence for freedom, individuality, pluralism and the 
rule of law. 
 
In the preface to OHC, Oakeshott remarked that it contained the fundamental 
themes that ‘have been with me nearly as long as I can remember’ (1975a, p. 
vii). Sheldon Wolin summarises these as a concern ‘with the practices and 
language of civility’; a liking for traditional practices; doubts about ‘salvific 
politics’; and an enduring worry ‘with preventing the dissociation of political 
theory from an aesthetic sensibility towards nuance and contingency’ (1976, p. 
321).  
 
The normative thread that unifies these themes is evidenced, moreover, in 
Oakeshott’s defence of a civil association based on the rule of law as the form 
of the state most conducive to the flourishing of freedom, individuality and 
pluralism. These are the values he esteemed above all others. Civil association, 
according to Oakeshott, can be understood as a mode of human relationship 
in which moral life is actualised in a system of laws that allows for the civilized 
coexistence of different viewpoints. It accommodates the diversity of human 
experience while eschewing a purposive interpretation of morality such as 
that of promoting the “common good”. His significance as a political theorist 
can be better understood once we make these values explicit, as will be shown 
in Chapter One. 
 
Consistency and Coherence 
  
How do we explain the apparent tensions and paradoxes inherent in 
Oakeshott’s two doctrines? He advocated the virtues of civil association, 
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which, in itself, is an ideological position, yet he denigrated ideological 
politics. He further insisted that politics can only be properly conceived as the 
pursuit of the intimations inherent in a particular tradition. Edmund Neill 
captures the tension posed by the latter. He observes that, in Rationalism in 
Politics he ‘seems to be making a descriptive ontological claim about 
[tradition], rather than putting forward a normative political argument’ (2011, 
p. 44). That is, Oakeshott claimed that there is no alternative to pursuing the 
intimations of a tradition. If this is the case, however, he was without the 
means of objecting, from a normative standpoint, to the manner in which 
society has developed, if he believed that that we can do nothing else but 
amend the current norms provided by tradition.  
 
So the argument that there is continuity and consistency in Oakeshott’s 
thought might appear to be derailed by his advocacy of two mutually exclusive 
ideas. First, if civil association is the only proper moral conception of the 
state, as Oakeshott claimed, this suggests that we should endeavour to bring 
about this conception of the state (1975a, p. 180; p. 321). Second, if politics is 
the pursuit of intimations within a tradition, and if traditions are contingent, 
the direction of political activity must be determined by the tradition, which 
may or may not be sympathetic towards civil association. The question then 
arises as to what is more important: the pursuit of intimations or the 
realisation of civil association. If, as Neill claims, politics as the pursuit of 
intimations appears to be an ontological claim and civil association is a 
contingent achievement, then the former appears to trump the latter. 
 
This apparent discrepancy between two of Oakeshott’s key ideas goes a long 
way to explaining the difficulty that political commentators have had in 
“pigeonholing” him as either a conservative or a liberal. He can reasonably be 
described as a conservative by those who emphasise the importance he 
ascribed to tradition in understanding political activity; and as a liberal by 
those who focus on his account of human conduct. Sullivan’s description of 
his work as a ‘quirky fusion of conservatism and liberality’ is apt if we accept 
that his two core ideas are discrepant (op. cit., p. 21). But this begs the 
 39 
question as to why Oakeshott invested so much effort in his later years in 
articulating the virtues of civil association. 
 
One way to explain away the apparent tension between Oakeshott’s core ideas 
is to claim that that there are different phases to his political writing. If this is 
the case it is consequently erroneous to claim that his work exhibits 
substantial continuity. His works prior to the Second World War, it could be 
argued, represent a first phase.28 At this time, he showed little interest in 
practical politics, consistent with his understanding of philosophy articulated 
in Experience and its Modes. His writings on politics consisted largely of 
ruminations on meta-political issues such as the appropriate subject matter of 
political philosophy and the nature of the state and its authority. These are 
conducted in the Idealistic tradition, as exemplified by Bosanquet’s The 
Philosophical Theory of the State (1899) and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
(1967).29  
 
In the 1930s, Oakeshott remained aloof from practical politics. He described 
the activity of politics and politicians in generally derogatory and frivolous 
terms. In his 1939 essay, ‘The Claims of Politics’, he described politics as a 
superficial, ‘highly specialised and abstracted form of communal activity’ that 
has little substantial impact (1993a, p. 93). He further argued that the genius 
of the poet and even the philosopher are much more useful in saving society 
from ‘its last corruption’, which is ‘a corruption of consciousness’ (ibid., p. 95.) 
He felt that the nature of political activity involves a corruption of the 
                                                   
28 See Oakeshott’s Early Political Writings 1925-1930, edited by Luke O’Sullivan 
(2010), ‘The Authority of the State’ (1993) and ‘Some Remarks on the Nature and 
meaning of Sociality’ (1993). His most substantial published political work in the 
1930s is ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’ (2007, pp. 154-183). In this 
essay, he advocates an analysis of the law that is entirely consistent with his approach 
in Experience and its Modes; and concludes that there is no way that the philosophy 
of law, properly understood, can be a normative exercise - as the latter is a practical 
and not a philosophical enquiry. 
29 Oakeshott noted his indebtedness to Bosanquet’s The Philosophical Theory of the 
State as well as Hegel. Oakeshott considered Bosanquet’s account the most 
comprehensive theory of the state, though not without its defects.  He did not specify 
what these are (2007, p. 89; p.143). 
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consciousness of society from which it needs constantly to be saved. 30 
Certainly engagement in politics is in no way a superior activity: ‘The activity 
of a music-hall artist is no less certainly connected with the common life of his 
society than that of a Prime Minister’ (ibid., p. 92).  
 
 
A second phase in his political works, it could be argued, begins when he 
began to engage with the political implications of current events. This period 
began with the Munich crisis of 1938. Encouraged by his friend Ernest Barker, 
Oakeshott compiled an anthology of the most significant ‘Social and Political 
Doctrines of Contemporary Europe’. 31   He included in this volume the 
canonical texts of Representative Democracy, Catholicism, Communism, 
Fascism and National Socialism, which he described as ‘the intellectual 
systems adduced to explain or excuse the policies and conduct of governments 
and communities in Europe today’ (1939, p. xiii). His preface to the anthology 
may be said to mark the beginning of his Conservative political phase. He was 
both critical of doctrinaire politics and the ‘crude and negative individualism 
which is apt to be associated with liberalism’ (ibid., p. 17).  This second phase 
appears to continue by way of the essays he wrote in the immediate post-war 
period and into the 1950s. These essays were mostly published in the 
Cambridge Review, and eventually brought together in Rationalism in 
Politics (1961).  
 
A third phase, which suggests discontinuities in his political thought, could be 
argued to start in the late nineteen fifties. The discontinuity is evident in the 
lectures he delivered in 1958 at Harvard University. These were posthumously 
published as Morality and Politics in Modern Europe (1993b). The phase 
culminated in his magnum opus, On Human Conduct (1975a). In these later 
writings, as claimed by Robert Devigne, his primary concern was to argue the 
virtues of the state conceived as a civil association in liberal, if not libertarian 
terms (Devigne 2012, p. 273). 
                                                   
30  The expression “corruption of consciousness” was perhaps borrowed from 
Collingwood who expounded this doctrine in Principles of Art to explain the 
difference between good and bad art (1938). 
31 Professor of Political Science at Cambridge University, 1928-1939.  
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There are alternative versions of the argument that there are discontinuities in 
Oakeshott’s thought.  Gerencser claims that over time his absolute Idealism 
was superseded by a thoroughgoing scepticism. This reflected the increasing 
importance of Hobbes in his thought at the expense of Hegel (2000). Luke 
O’Sullivan claims that Oakeshott’s approach to political theorizing changed 
significantly after 1945. In particular, he avoided explicit talk of metaphysical 
first principles, whereas in the 1920s and 1930s he was confident of the 
correctness of idealism and wrote in that idiom (2010, pp. 5-6). A third 
example is Robert Orr, who claims that it is useful to recognise three phases in 
his work, ‘pre-war, post-war, and post-retirement (1983). Orr identifies the 
pre-war period solely with Experience and its Modes, which is a theory of 
knowledge, with no practical content. The post-war period is identified with 
Rationalism in Politics, which Orr claims could be read simply as a Burkean 
defence of traditional institutions. The post-retirement phase is identified 
with On Human Conduct (1975a) and On History and Other Essays (1983).  
 
The argument for a broad continuity in Oakeshott’s values, dispositions and 
their political expression does not require that we deny that his philosophical 
approach changed over time; that he became less of an Idealists and more of a 
sceptic. Both are epistemological stances, which, I argue, do not correlate with 
political attitudes, although, as noted earlier, scepticism may be argued to 
have some sympathy with conservatism.  
 
It is true that he focused on different aspects of political theory at various 
times during his career. In his early years he was mostly taken up with the 
specification of the state from within the Idealist tradition. In his middle 
years, he focused on a conservative account of the practice of politics and in 
his later years, he was preoccupied with the specification and justification of 
the ideal form of the state as a civil association, based on his understanding of 
human conduct. I would suggest, however, that the discontinuity in 
Oakeshott’s political writings over time, mooted by O’Sullivan, Gerencser and 
Orr, is more apparent than real.  
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We can reconcile the apparent tension between the two doctrines if we 
interpret him as defending a particular political tradition that he felt was 
increasingly under threat. One must be circumspect in attaching a label to this 
tradition as Oakeshott himself never equated civil association with any 
present or historical political state.  Nonetheless, “Whig Representative 
Democracy”, “Liberal Democracy” or “old-fashioned Liberalism” grounded in 
the rule of law are potential candidates. 
 
We can rule out “Liberal Democracy”.  He did not want it to be associated 
‘with the crude and negative individualism which is apt to be associated with 
Liberalism’ (1940, p. xvii). He did not like the post-war understanding of 
“liberalism”. He felt that the modern manifestation of Liberalism exhibited his 
twin demons of ‘rationalism and scientism’ (1993a, p. 100).  Furthermore, he 
was wary of modern Liberalism’s ‘nervy conscience’, which ‘extends a senile 
and indiscriminate welcome to everyone who claims to be on the side of 
progress’ (1991, p. 385). But “Representative Democracy” does not capture the 
essence of the tradition he defended for the reason that he was less than 
enthusiastic at the extension of the franchise in the 20th century. This 
judgment is born out by a reading of his essay, ‘The masses in representative 
democracy’ (1991, pp. 363-383). 
 
In Oakeshott’s report on the Constitution of Liberty and in his letters to 
Hayek written on the nineteenth of January and the thirtieth of April 1978, he 
praised Hayek’s ‘care, originality and profundity’, and recommended it for 
publication without hesitation. Hayek described this work as a restatement of 
Whig doctrine. Oakeshott acknowledged ‘Whiggism’ as ‘one of the most 
notable idioms of European political experience and reflection’. He regarded 
Whiggism, according to Luke O’Sullivan, as equivalent to “liberal” and even 
“libertarian” thought, and his report on Hayek suggests that he thought of 
“true” liberalism, in a manner similar to Hayek, as a commitment to the rule 
of law (O’ Sullivan 2004, p. 21). 
 
“Old fashioned liberalism” is my preferred name for the tradition Oakeshott 
sought to protect, or at least what was left of it.  It encapsulates many of the 
features of civil association, as described in On Human Conduct (1975a).  I 
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borrow the expression from his favourable review of Professor Henry C. 
Simons’ Economic Policy for a Free Society (1948). Simons described himself 
as ‘an old-fashioned liberal’ (Simons quoted in Oakeshott 1991, p. 385). 
Simons argued that the emphasis on liberty is the distinctive feature of this 
tradition. Oakeshott explained that Simons was a libertarian ‘because he has 
actually enjoyed a way of living’ and ‘because he has found it to be good’ (1991, 
p. 387). This wording anticipates his justification of the conservative 
disposition in ‘On Being Conservative’.  The disposition to be conservative 
‘asserts itself characteristically when there is much to be enjoyed, and it will 
be strongest when this is combined with evident risk of loss’ (1991, p. 408).  
 
What is the essence of this tradition? In the Social and Political Doctrines of 
Contemporary Europe (1939), Oakeshott noted three features. First, it is 
more ‘a tradition and a tendency’ than a comprehensive doctrine, which made 
it difficult to give a precise and complete statement of its beliefs (1940, p. 
xviii). Second, its character is to value reasonable pluralism but not ‘so 
extravagantly diversified as to make an intelligently diversified and civilized 
social life impossible’ (ibid.). Third, the recognition that ‘the imposition of a 
universal plan of life on a society is at once stupid and immoral’ (ibid.). 
 
SPDCE was written at a time when British representative democracy was 
under existential threat from Nazi Germany. In his characterisation of 
representative democracy, we can discern three of the elements that define 
Oakeshott’s consistently held political beliefs. First, he had a positive view of a 
pluralistic society. He regarded the diversity of ends that individuals pursue as 
a matter of celebration, not regret. Second, he recognised that for a pluralistic 
society to endure, it needed a framework to accommodate a civilised social life 
in spite of differences. He subsequently articulated this framework as the lex, 
or law, of civil association, which is the political manifestation of civility. 
Third, he viewed any attempt to plan a society centrally as reprehensible. This 
would not succeed and was, moreover, immoral, as it would sacrifice the 
freedom of citizens. 
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It might be suggested that there is a similarity between Oakeshott’s concern 
with defending “old-fashioned” liberalism and Edmund Burke’s defence of the 
eighteenth-century English Whig tradition against the threat from the French 
Revolution, although the manner and grounds of the defence are very 
different (Burke 2004). Oakeshott professed to have little regard for Burke as 
a thinker: ‘Burke was not the formulator of a set of propositions to which his 
followers could dedicate themselves with assurance’ (2008, p. 84). In his 1956 
essay ‘On Being Conservative’, Oakeshott aligned himself with de Montaigne, 
Pascal, Hobbes and Hume and not with Burke (1991, p. 235).  Burke was a 
practising politician and frequently used natural law rhetoric to persuade his 
audiences, which Oakeshott thought both unnecessary and irrelevant to justify 
a conservative disposition in politics. Yet, in the course of this thesis, a 
number of common positions between the two will be noted. 
 
Both Burke and Oakeshott used conservative arguments to defend a specific 
tradition, rather than being motivated to defend the current state of affairs, 
whatever it may be. Samuel Huntington defined conservatism as ‘being that 
system of ideas employed to justify any established social order, no matter 
where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or 
being, no matter from what quarter’ (1957, p. 455). Huntington called this 
“positional conservatism”. It applies neither to Burke nor Oakeshott.  
 
Montesquieu described the tradition that Burke was defending as the nation 
par excellence of constitutional liberty via the separation of powers and the 
nation of capitalism where individualism abounded (1914, Books 11-13). 
Huntington claimed that Burke was politically a liberal and a Whig. 
Economically he supported free- trade. But ‘there was nothing that was 
corporate, feudal or aristocratic about him’, as might have been expected of 
conservatives of his time (1957, p. 463).  
 
The separation of powers, constitutional liberty, and reverence for 
individualism, but not capitalism, are prominent and recurring themes in 
Oakeshott’s work. So it is not unreasonable to read him as defending a broadly 
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Whig tradition that he inherited from Burke, but which had evolved over the 
one hundred and fifty or so years that separated their lives.   
 
His conservative essays of the post-war period should be understood then not 
as an abstract defence of tradition, but as arguments to defend a particular 
tradition that had been under threat for some time and which continued to be 
challenged on two fronts. The first threat came from the post-war Labour 
government, which enthusiastically embraced the tools of central planning in 
expanding the modern welfare state.  The second threat came from 
international communism, which remained an existential threat to the 
tradition of representative democracy during the Cold War. This adds up to 
what Andrew Sullivan describes as a ‘contingent defence of a contingent 
tradition’ (Sullivan 2007, p. 5).  That is, a conservative defence is justified by 
the tradition. 
 
In his essay, ‘Contemporary British Politics’, published in 1948, Oakeshott set 
out his low opinion of the Labour government elected in 1945. He claimed 
that it was pursuing an underlying purpose: to concentrate much of the power 
diffused throughout society into the hands of the government. So, he argued, 
nationalisation was advocated not out of necessity but because, without it, a 
planned economy cannot be created: ‘Why is not all this recognized by its 
promoters as despotism, and by those who suffer under it as tyranny?’ (2007, 
p. 213). This essay was written shortly after ‘Rationalism in Politics’, which 
established the theoretical framework for his attack on ideological politics. 
 
My contention that Oakeshott can be best understood as defending a 
particular tradition, not as a traditionalist per se, is supported by a 
consideration of his book review entitled Conservative Essays (1978), 
published three years after On Human Conduct (1975a). The contextual 
background here was the growth in the “managerial” activities of government 
since the Second World War, stagflation in the economy during the 1970s, and 
the election of Mrs Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975. He 
contrasted the managerial, purposive, conception of the tasks of government, 
as embraced by both Conservative and Labour governments since 1945, with 
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‘a more sophisticated conception … one which, in futile attempts at 
compromise or by inadvertence, has lost its distinctness and surrendered its 
integrity’ (2008, p. 280). 
 
He deployed the terminology of civil association, as articulated in On Human 
Conduct (1975a) to explain this conception. This “more sophisticated 
conception” is one where persons are associated ‘in respect of their 
acknowledgment of the authority of certain non-instrumental conditions of 
conduct’, and ‘not in respect of their interests and of the substantive 
satisfactions they may choose to seek transactionally’ (2008, p. 280). Politics 
in such a state consists of the deliberation of non-instrumental laws that 
regulate how persons interact. It has nothing to with the satisfaction of wants 
or the promotion of a common good. The government is merely the custodian 
of the rules or laws of the association. 
 
For our present purposes, Oakeshott’s further claim is of particular interest. 
He argued that this conception of the state ‘owes more to the Whigs than the 
Tories’ but ‘if it now has a home anywhere in our politics it is surely in the 
Conservative party’ (ibid., p. 281). In this sense, he considered Mrs Thatcher 
‘more of a genuine Conservative than her predecessors’ (ibid., p. 282). 
 
These comments support my contention that the political tradition he wished 
to defend can best be described as old-fashioned liberalism. Old-fashioned 
liberalism, unlike its modern variety, was not preoccupied with the free 
market. Its priorities were constitutionalism, the balance of powers, the rule 
of law, and the maintenance of basic civil and political liberties to foster 
individualism and allow for a plurality of views.32 Furthermore, by chance, 
                                                   
32  The political theorists whom Oakeshott most admired included Montesquieu, 
Hegel and de Tocqueville, who may fairly be said to be associated with Whig 
liberalism. Oakeshott was no fan of John Locke, who was considered by many to rank 
highly in the Liberal pantheon. Oakeshott found Locke’s ‘moderate individualism’ far 
too narrow for those, such as his hero de Montaigne, who subscribe to ‘a radical, an 
Epicurean individualism’ (2007, p. 85). Moreover, he associated Locke with the 
materialistic aspect of liberalism that he so despised (ibid.). Oakeshott was also very 
critical of Jeremy Bentham, a philosophical utilitarian and intellectual father of the 
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Oakeshott believed this tradition was most likely to be best defended, if 
imperfectly, within the modern Conservative Party and that Mrs Thatcher, 
frequently portrayed as a radical and ideologue, was more genuinely in touch 
with this tradition than her predecessors such as Heath and Macmillan. These 
leaders had absorbed too much of the “managerial” approach towards the 
state necessitated by the pursuit of welfarism after 1945.  
 
The commendation of Mrs Thatcher was misplaced. Under the leadership of 
Mrs Thatcher, and her ideologue-in-chief, Sir Keith Joseph, the Conservative 
Party became markedly more ideological in the 1980s. Numerous “think 
tanks” were set up to give the Conservatives an ideological edge.33 Radical 
changes to the structure of markets and limits of state intervention were 
advocated, alongside an unabashed defence of individualism of the kind that 
Oakeshott usually deplored. He may have underestimated the degree to which 
the Conservative Party had become a victim of rationalistic politics. John Gray 
observes: ‘The Conservative Party had become the vehicle for a long-
discredited brand of laissez-faire liberalism. Yet it is hard to believe that the 
great Tory philosopher [Oakeshott] would not have viewed the party’s 
subsequent electoral debacle as a vindication of his critique’ ( Gray 2001).34  
 
By situating his political writings in their immediate historical context, we can 
explain much of the apparent tension between his conservative account of the 
practice of politics and his idealisation of the state conceived as a civil 
association. Oakeshott’s predominantly conservative writings of the 1940s and 
1950s, as with other Cold War liberals such as Friedrich von Hayek, Karl 
Popper and Isaiah Berlin, can be construed as a riposte to the threats from 
collectivism to the liberal tradition emanating from Labour at home and 
communism abroad. The later, more liberal, texts reflect the reality that the 
enterprise conception of the state had made substantial strides since 1945 
                                                                                                                                                 
Radical wing of the British Liberal party: ‘There is nothing in the whole of Bentham’s 
works which is either original in conception or exposition’ (1991, p. 147). 
33 See, for example, Cockett, R. (1994), Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and 
the Economic Counter Revolution (1931-1983). 
34 Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990. Gray refers to the 
General Election of 1997, which resulted in a massive Labour majority. 
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towards dominating the political thought, of all parties. To that extent, the 
old-fashioned liberal understanding of the state in England, in his mind, had 
already been heavily contaminated. He was too much of a realist to believe 
that the enterprise state could be rolled back completely. So his practical 
objective after 1945 was to ‘undo the work of the progressives’. In Notebook 18 
(March 1964), Oakeshott confessed to this: 
 
I, who hate practically every change in the world since I was old enough to 
notice, consort with progressives & am unable myself to leave alone the things 
I am concerned with. What do you make of this paradox? Mostly I suppose it 
is the undoing of the work of the progressives’ (2014, p. 474). 
 
This was not a unique project. Collini observes that ‘those who in the late 
1940’s engaged in the kind of fundamental criticism often alleged to be 
characteristic of “real” intellectuals tended to be conservative figures like T. S. 
Eliot or Michael Oakeshott’, who attempted ‘to undermine the self-righteous 
egalitarianism they saw as the official orthodoxy of the day’ (Collini 2006, p. 
137). 
 
The source of much of the confusion surrounding Oakeshott is due to the lack 
of recognition that his second doctrine had a practical objective and is not 
merely a philosophical argument. The doctrine could be deployed to slow 
down or “undo”, to some degree, the work of those who aimed to extend the 
enterprise state and continue its drift away from old-fashioned liberalism. 
 
 One of Oakeshott’s objectives in On Human Conduct was to restate the moral 
presuppositions of the tradition of old-fashioned liberalism in an ideal form. 
He supplied arguments for those who wished to redirect or “trim” (to use 
Oakeshott’s favoured expression) the state back on a course more in keeping 
with the tradition that he valued. I will return to this theme in Chapter Four, 
when I consider his account of the practice of politics in detail.35 If we accept 
                                                   
35  Efraim Podoksik effects a reconciliation between the liberal and conservative 
elements in Oakeshott’s thought in a manner not dissimilar to my own. He claims 
that Oakeshott’s thought as a whole is best understood as a ‘sort of liberalism’ 
(2003b, Chapter 3). Podoksik interprets Oakeshott’s political thinking as being 
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the interpretation of his work offered in this Introduction, there is then no 
real inconsistency between his two doctrines. 
  
 
Chapter 1. Oakeshott as a Moralist 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the political implications of 
Oakeshott’s interpretation of the human condition and his judgment of what 
is valuable in human conduct. This will be done by analysing several 
contrasting “ideal types” that he used to explain his viewpoint on these issues. 
The contrasts include a religious orientation to the world compared to a 
worldly orientation; work and play; individualism and collectivism; 
perfectionism and anti-perfectionism. Based on this analysis it is legitimate to 
read Oakeshott as a moralist or normative ethicist. That is, he held opinions as 
to how best we lead our lives and what is important to nurture in human 
conduct. His preference for a state constituted as a civil association can be 
seen to be grounded in his conclusions on these two issues: it is the form of 
association that is best suited to accommodate individuality, pluralism and 
liberty.  
 
Pluralism permeated Oakeshott’s work at several levels. First, there is the 
modal plurality where practical experience is distinct from the other modes of 
experience. Second, as will be explored in Chapter Two, there is a plurality of 
practices in which agents seek their self-sought satisfactions limited only by 
the adverbial considerations that give content to morality. Third, there is the 
morality of self-enactment within which agents pursue their own conceptions 
of self as well as their own substantive satisfactions. These pursuits are again 
only limited by the practices to which the agents subscribe. Fourth, there are 
numerous moral practices, just as there are numerous traditions and 
sensibilities (Flathman 2005, pp. 131-32). 
                                                                                                                                                 
rooted in two traditions of European liberalism, which he calls “Whig” and 
“Romantic” liberalism. He explains away the apparent tension between Oakeshott’s 
conservative and liberal writings as reflecting ‘a shift of emphasis in his writings from 
the “Whiggish” to the “Romantic” elements of his liberalism’ (ibid.). 
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Together with individuality and liberty, pluralism is the feature of human 
conduct he found most valuable. Moreover, civil association is the least 
sympathetic to uniformity, which, in general, he detested: ‘There should be as 
little as possible. Uniformities which emerge (i.e. electrical fittings or in the 
pitch of nuts & bolts) are better than those which are imposed’ (2014, p. 428).  
 
To suggest that Oakeshott sometimes wrote as a moralist raises an objection 
that was raised in the Introduction: Oakeshott claimed that a philosopher 
should have nothing to say on practical matters. If we should not conflate 
theory and practice, we should not mix up the business of theorising morality 
with recommendations about what to do. This is the business of the moralist: 
‘If thinking is to issue in valid practical conclusions it must be exclusively 
practical thinking and must set aside all interests and arguments not 
determined by the categories of practical experience’ (1933, p. 338).  
 
At one level, this claim is uncontroversial. Moral philosophers commonly 
distinguish meta-ethics, which investigates ethical concepts and assumptions, 
from normative ethics, which is prescriptive. The former focuses on such 
questions as, ‘What do we mean when we say that this action is right and that 
wrong?’ (ibid.). The latter refers to practical judgments, such as whether it is 
right to carry out action x or y in a particular situation where a decision is 
necessary. It is possible to agree that something is good, or that certain 
actions are right, without agreeing on the ultimate reason why something is 
good or bad, or an action is right or wrong. The answer to the first question 
has no bearing on the second. The distinction may well be sustainable. It is 
unusual, however, to claim that moral philosophy, properly understood, 
should be conducted only at the second-order level of meta- theorising.  
Mixing the two activities, attempting to derive valuations from beliefs about 
what is valuable and what is good, will, Oakeshott argued, ‘remain a hybrid 
and nondescript mode of thought’ (1933, p. 339). Moreover, it is a manner of 
thinking that cannot escape the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi at every step. The 
proper understanding of ethical thought is ‘the consideration of the world of 
practical experience from the standpoint of the totality of experience, the 
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attempt to define the relation of practical judgment to reality’ (ibid.  p.340). If 
this is the case ‘we must expect from it no guidance at all in our practical life, 
no practical conclusions at all’ (ibid., italics added). 
  
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Oakeshott’s argument in 
Experience and its Modes. In other works, however, he can be reasonably 
interpreted as writing as  a moralist who suggested guidance for our practical 
lives.36 He offered behavioural prescriptions based on his understanding of 
the human condition and the constraints of practical life. Oakeshott 
acknowledged, in response to D. D. Raphael, that most moral philosophers 
had a practical as well as theoretical aim. He cited Aquinas as being ‘both a 
philosopher and a preacher’ (1965, p. 181). In Experience and its Modes (EM, 
1933), arguably his most philosophical work, he admitted that ‘nearly always a 
philosopher hides a secret ambition, foreign to philosophy, and often it is that 
of the preacher. But we must not learn to follow the philosophers on the 
holiday excursions’ (1933, p. 1). We will see that there is much more of the 
preacher, or moralist, to Oakeshott than he cared to admit. If we consider the 
totality of his works, he took many “holiday excursions”. David Boucher, 
however, dismisses this kind of interpretation and argues that it is the 
tendency to ask ‘where Oakeshott goes on his holidays which has generated so 
much misinterpretation of his political philosophy’ (1991, p. 718). 
 
Oakeshott thought civil association to be morally superior to enterprise 
association as a way of organising a state. In On Human Conduct he asserted 
that civil association is ‘as rare as it is excellent’ (1975a, p. 180). In his essay 
‘Talking Politics’ he claimed that civil association is especially suitable for 
individualists: ‘Those disposed to choose their own destinations’ (1991, p. 
460). Civil association is, moreover, the form of association exceptionally 
suitable for a state ‘because it is the only morally tolerable form of 
compulsory association’ (ibid., italics added). Oakeshott considered the state 
                                                   
36 There are several collections of essays and book reviews. They include The Concept 
of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926-51, (ed. O’Sullivan 
(2007) and The Vocabulary of a Modern European State: Essays and Reviews 1952-
88 (ed. O’Sullivan (2008). 
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necessarily to be a compulsory association. Unlike a corporate enterprise, 
church or political party, most people cannot join or leave a state.  This was 
self-evident for him: ‘No European alive to his inheritance of moral 
understanding has ever found it possible to deny the superior desirability of 
civil association without a profound feeling of guilt’ (1975a, p. 321).  This begs 
the question of how he interpreted our “moral understanding”. This issue will 
be addressed in Chapter Two when we consider his theory of morality. These 
quotations demonstrate, however, that he made normatively based claims 
about the superiority of civil association. The basis of these claims will now be 
discussed. 
 
The Human Condition 
 
Like St. Augustine, Oakeshott frequently explained the world with reference to 
the fact of mortality. His musings on this subject occupy a significant part of 
the Notebooks (2014). In his 1929 essay, ‘Religion and the World’, he asserted 
that mortality is ‘the central fact of practical existence; death is the central fact 
of life’ (1993a, p. 44).  In EM, he spoke not of mere physical death but of the 
mortality of every feature of practical life: ‘The mortality of pleasures and 
pains, desires, achievements, emotions and affections’ (1933, p. 273). Given 
this unavoidable reality, he was profoundly pessimistic about the chances of 
success of those who attempt to find the perfectly good life. The never-ending 
quest for this ideal is ‘a battle with no hope of victory, a battle, in fact, in 
which final victory is the only irretrievable defeat (1993a, p. 44). 
 
Here, Oakeshott echoed Thomas Hobbes, who famously described the 
frustrations of practical life in terms of the impossibility of attaining what we 
aim for as a final state to be enjoyed in itself. Whereas Oakeshott spoke of the 
search for the perfect good, Hobbes spoke of the restless search for power. 
Hobbes claimed that this was ‘a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual 
and restless desire of Power after power that ceaseth only in Death (Hobbes 
1651, p. 45). The distinctive characteristic of practical life, for Hobbes and 
Oakeshott, is dissatisfaction. Practical life is predicated on the transformation 
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and variability of an existing state of affairs:  but ‘nowhere in practice is there 
uninterrupted progress or final achievement’ (Oakeshott 1933, p. 263, p. 291).  
  
Oakeshott mainly used the Notebooks to reflect on his personal 
preoccupations.  Mortality featured prominently: ‘Our first business is, I 
suppose to live, and the second to understand life’ (2014, p.  153). 37 
Oakeshott’s starting point was to recognise ‘that the actual conditions of life 
are always more or less unsatisfactory’ (2014, pp. 286-87). Neither belief in 
progress nor an ‘imaginative projection of ourselves into a more desirable 
condition’ can change this reality (ibid.). We must acknowledge this state of 
affairs as the essential character of the human condition ‘& from it we must 
derive our values; they must be the values of mortality’ (ibid., italics added).  
  
Given Oakeshott’s understanding of the human predicament, which Jacob 
Segal labels ‘the problem of finitude’, what are the values derived from the fact 
of mortality? (2003, p. 448) Oakeshott’s answer, as will be elaborated in the 
following section, is that it is wise to eschew worldliness in favour of a 
“religious” attitude: to immerse oneself in the transcendent pleasures of 
“play”. As will become apparent, this conclusion has political implications. It 
suggests that, as the human condition is necessarily characterised by 
dissatisfaction, given the mutability of desires and wants, politics 
consequently cannot, and should not, seek perfection, as such an enterprise is 
doomed to failure.  
 
Oakeshott’s alertness to the futility of seeking happiness in the satisfaction of 
never-ending wants may explain why he was largely uninterested in economic 
matters and the issue of distributive justice. He remarked in the Social and 
Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe that ‘the most questionable 
element of Liberal democracy … is what may be called its moral ideal: the 
plausible ethics of productivity’, which, he thought, was always the most 
vulnerable part of the doctrine (1939, pp. xx- xxi). In his review of Howard 
Selsam’s Socialism and Ethics (1943), he expressed his hostility to the view 
                                                   
37 A subject search of the Notebooks records 865 references to love, 272 references to 
mortality/immortality, 163 to Christianity, 206 to politics, and 92 to morality. 
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advanced by Keynesian liberals, free-market conservatives and New Labour 
that economic growth is the key objective of social policy and the prerequisite 
for all other social goals. The conception of the good life as ‘nothing other than 
the enjoyment by more and more people of more and more of everything’ is ‘a 
revolting nothingness, which only has to be successful in order to reduce 
human life to absolute insignificance’ (2007, p. 273). 
 
Religion and the World 
 
In both his early essay ‘Religion and the World’ (1933, RW) and his major 
work On Human Conduct (1975a), Oakeshott was concerned with a choice 
that must be made in human life. How should one orient oneself in the world; 
and, taking into account his analysis of the human condition, what constitutes 
the good life? Early in the Notebooks we note a distinction between 
purposefulness and purposelessness. In the context of the question of how we 
should employ ourselves, the young Oakeshott claimed in 1928 that we should 
make a virtue of ‘this purpose to be without a purpose, this accomplishment to 
achieve nothing’ (2014, p. 155). A career cannot save us as it yields only 
momentary satisfactions yet manifold frustrations. The solution to the 
problem of finitude is to live life in the present like ‘the art which may be 
practised for art’s sake’ (ibid.). We will see that this notion of purposelessness 
became a central feature in his accounts of morality, the rule of law and the 
state constituted as a civil association. 
 
In RW, Oakeshott presented the choice as to how one spends one’s time as 
being between worldliness and religion. He contrasted “worldly man” with 
“religious man”. Some commentators have observed the similarity between 
this and St Augustine’s allegorical distinction between the “two cities” of God 
and man. 38 For Augustine, those in the city of man are oriented primarily to 
satisfying physical pleasures and immanent fulfilment. These citizens are 
preoccupied with their desires. They attribute success to their own insight and 
                                                   
38 Glenn Worthington, ‘Michael Oakeshott and the City of God’ (2000); Wendell 
John Coats Jr., Oakeshott and his Contemporaries (2000); Elizabeth Campbell 
Corey, Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics and Politics (2006). 
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understanding, arrogantly praising themselves rather than God. A ‘self-
assertive egotism’, as Elizabeth Campbell Corey observes, is the motivating 
force that entails valuing worldly goods for their own sake ‘not as symbols of 
God’s love for man.’ (2006, p.  25). Members of the city of God, in contrast, 
prioritise spiritual virtues, and do not strive to accumulate material 
possessions as they focus their energy towards God. They “use” but do not 
“enjoy” goods, with the objective of achieving eternal life (ibid., p.  26). 
 
Oakeshott’s “worldly man” spends his life in the pursuit of immanent ideals. 
Fulfilment is deferred to the future; he esteems others wholly on the basis of 
their accomplishments. Religious man, on the other hand, does not postpone 
satisfaction, but is completely engaged in each moment. He lives in the 
present: ‘the present for the sake of the present - & the present for the sake of 
life, for the sake of freedom’ (2014, p. 193). Religious man finds meaning in 
current activity and lives life as an end in itself, rather than as a means to 
some future gratification. 
 
Love, friendship and contemplation, Oakeshott argued, are the religious 
man’s true orientation. Oakeshott found a negative feature of the modern age 
in ‘the radical irreligion of our civilisation’, by which he meant that love and 
friendship are not conceived to be central to life itself, but as subsidiary; a by-
product of life (2014, p. 212). He suggested that love should be the central 
feature of the orientation of religious man towards the world and claimed that 
love makes our existence intelligible: ‘For in love all contraries are reconciled’ 
(2014, p.  3).   
 
His preoccupation with the subject of love, both in theory and practice, has 
been brought into relief by the recent publication of the Notebooks. It was, 
however, already well appreciated by those close to him. Robert Grant, 
Oakeshott’s biographer, wrote of his love life in his controversial essay, ‘The 
Pursuit of Intimacy, or Rationalism in Love’ (2012, pp. 15-46). Grant claims, 
in response to a critical review by John Kekes, that Oakeshott had told him 
that the pursuit of love was of ‘central, all-trumping importance’ and that he 
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conceived and lived his life according to a philosophy of romantic love 
(2013).39  
 
This judgment is evidenced by the Notebooks. In 1931 Oakeshott claimed that 
the purpose of life is to seek out the Belle Dame: ‘My life has been spent on 
seeking her; indeed I think that the purpose of life is to seek her’ (2014, p. 
210). 40 Ten of the Notebooks exclusively concern matters of love. In the 
Notebooks he admitted that this had distracted him from his philosophical 
pursuits. As a young man, he wrote, there was ‘something wild in me’; and in 
old age he thought of himself of having been ‘born under a wandering star’ 
(ibid., p. 208). He ruefully observed in his later years that he had ‘wasted a lot 
of time living’ (ibid., p. 507).  
 
We can interpret Oakeshott’s two ideal types, religious man and worldly man, 
as representatives of two systems of values. Wendell John Coats Jr., like 
Corey, captures the contrast between his two ideal types, the worldly man and 
the religious man, as that between “use” and “enjoyment” (Coates Jr., 2000). 
The orientation of the worldly man is to view everything in terms of its real or 
potential utility. Worldliness consists of values that give priority to 
achievement and investment rather than enjoyment. Oakeshott despised this 
manner of thinking, which sacrifices the present to the future. It is an absurd 
orientation to the world given the contingency that surrounds any individual 
life: ‘it is impossible to believe that the purpose of life is to be found in the 
production of some work, in achievement, in activity’ (2014, p. 150). 
  
Oakeshott claimed throughout his work that each person is responsible for 
who he becomes.41 We make our own choices and conduct our lives on the 
basis of judgments we make by reflecting on our own experience of the world. 
Each of us is ‘wholly responsible for his own experience; each makes his own 
choices and conducts his own life on the basis of judgments he makes by 
                                                   
39 Kekes accuses Grant of ‘peddling often malicious hearsay from largely uncheckable 
sources. Oakeshott was very careful to separate his private life from his work. This 
should be respected, but Grant tramples on it’ (Kekes 2013). 
40 A reference to John Keats’ ballad ‘La Belle Dame Sans Merci’ (1819). 
41  Kierkegaard and later existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre made similar claims.  
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reflecting on his own experience of the world’ (1993b, 53). It follows for him 
then that there is a decision to be made between choosing the path of religion 
and that of the world. Anyone who shared his view of the human condition 
would have a religious orientation to the world. 
 
Oakeshott deployed the term “religion” in the idiosyncratic sense of living life 
in full in the present without consideration for the future. He was not religious 
in any conventional sense. Robert Grant claims that Oakeshott and his first 
wife were practising Christians in the 1920s, as well as having a deep interest 
in theology (2012, pp. 17-18). But even in the 1920s, his interpretation of 
Christianity was unconventional. He claimed in 1928, for example, that 
‘Christianity has rejected the ethical scheme propounded by Jesus. E.g. the 
moral outlook of Jesus would for example have countenanced sexual 
intercourse, but not if it led to children’ (2014, p. 147). Most Christians would 
consider this an extraordinary claim. There is little evidence, moreover, that 
he regularly practised religion or held any religious beliefs in his mature 
years.42  
 
Religion, for him, was not a matter of subscribing to a doctrine. It was neither 
dogmatic nor partisan; it was not a moral code; and it did not rely upon a 
polarity between the natural and supernatural. In Experience and its Modes, 
he contended that all experience is intermediated through the mind, and 
consequently there can be no equivalence between natural and supernatural 
experience. The world 0f religion is ‘no fantastic, supernatural world’ as ‘it is a 
spiritual world in which everything is valued, not as a contribution to some 
development and evolution, but as it is itself’ (1933, p. 30).  Religion is not 
judgmental in that it ‘does not endorse or prohibit any activities’ (ibid.). It 
does not prescribe a moral code but it indicates the manner in which life 
should be lived.   
 
                                                   
42 Grant records that Oakeshott claimed ‘he always attended chapel when revisiting 
Caius, of which he was an honorary life fellow. In his later years, however, visiting an 
ecclesiastical ruin with his pupil David Manning of Durham University, he asked Dr. 
Manning (who told me this story) to leave him alone briefly so that he could pray’ 
(2012 p. 39, n.12). 
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Subscribing to a religious scale of value means rejecting utility in favour of 
enjoyment and living life fully in the moment: ‘What matters is here and now’ 
(2014, p. 550). Oakeshott rejected the idea that the purpose of leading a 
religious life is a matter of earning future salvation: ‘A religion dominated by 
the notion of “salvation” is corrupt (& unchristian)’ (ibid.). Moreover, a belief 
in salvation is, moreover, a threat to order. He noted that of all the 
tribulations that have befallen mankind, the most awful have been the ‘wars of 
religions in which the thought of a future life predominates’ (2014, p. 303). 
 
A religious orientation is a balm to the frustrations inherent in living a life. 
The essence of practical life is change. We act to change “what is” into “what 
ought to be”. This results in a new situation, which in turn affects our view of 
“what ought to be”, leaving us with a new challenge. Even worse, he argued, 
‘we may even find that even the “ought not” of one moment is the “ought” of 
another’, so we might end up going around in circles (1933, p. 291).  
 
Religion is our only respite from the frustrating division between fact and 
value that we experience in practical life. It is not related to superstition or 
theology, but represents ‘practical life at its fullest’, so that it ‘is the 
consummation of all attempts to change or maintain our practical existence’ 
(ibid., p. 294). Oakeshott was conscious, however, of how problematic it is in 
practice to consistently undertake to transform the fact of ‘what is here and 
now’ into the world of value, ‘what ought to be’ (ibid.). Few have the energy 
and courage to overcome ‘the restraint of prudence or the impediment of 
doubt’ necessary to complete the task (ibid., p. 295). 
 
Oakeshott did not identify worldliness with the merely material. He did not 
argue that the material world should be rejected in its entirety and that the 
spiritual world should be embraced at any cost. He renounced the medieval 
Christian outlook that, ‘to be unspotted from the world’ meant to renounce 
pleasure (1993a, p. 29). This would require ‘the invention of a whole 
psychology’ to convince men that it is an option. The pursuance of ideals, 
moreover, does not salvage us from worldliness. It is futile to believe that 
one’s life can be measured ‘by one’s contribution to something thought more 
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permanent than itself - a race, a people, an art, a science or a profession?’ 
(ibid., p. 32).  Such an interpretation of religious life amounts to worldliness 
taken to the extreme. It is a delusion to think that the reality of the human 
condition can be hidden ‘in the greatness of an agent’s devotion to his aims 
and in his singleness of purpose (…) the iniquity of oblivion eclipsed by 
posthumous glory (1975a, p. 84, italics added). 
 
The example of Oakeshott’s use of the ideal types of religion and the world 
points to an important feature of his methodology. The ideal types are not set 
up as realisable objectives but as orientations. This is the case with all the 
ideal types that will be examined. In the case of religion and the world he 
recommended a religious orientation as being a more effective antidote to the 
problem of mortality. He was realistic enough, however, to recognise that 
recommending a religious attitude as an achievable objective would fly in the 
face of human psychology: ‘The revolution required to establish this view of 
life would, of course, be immense, for in many respects it runs directly counter 
to our established opinions’ (1993a, p. 33.). A religious attitude is an ideal that 
has its home ‘in the natural beliefs of youth, undimmed by the sordid 
demands of age (…) but the world is strong and the savour of the ideal fades 
away as the disposition to flag grows upon us’ (ibid., p. 34). 
  
Outright advocacy of the religious attitude as something that could be attained 
would further smack of a fanaticism that was utterly alien to his temperament. 
What Oakeshott despised was the worldliness implicit in a certain set of 
values, in particular, the style of deliberating that gives pre-eminence to 
utility, accomplishment and external outcomes. Religion favours self-
realisation, and worldliness a futile careerism.  Careerism typically requires 
that satisfaction be deferred to the future, and that present happiness be 
abandoned for the chance of greater future happiness. He believed that life 
should be led by the belief that its value is in the present: ‘Not merely in the 
past or the future (…) too valuable to be spent at the pleasure of others, too 
precious to be thrown away on something he is not convinced is his highest 
good’ (Oakeshott 1993a, pp. 34-35). This quotation flags his egoistical 
understanding of morality, which will be examined in Chapter Two. 
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In Religion and the World, Oakeshott was not writing as a philosopher, but as 
a moralist in that he was promoting an understanding of how we should live.  
The importance of Religion and the World here is that it can be read as a 
statement of Oakeshott’s practical philosophy: which is both stable over time 
and, as I will argue, relevant when interpreting his political works in that it 
undermines the idea of the state as an enterprise association whose purpose is 
to promote the material prosperity of its citizens.  
 
It may be argued that too much significance is being given here to Religion 
and the World. It was written in 1929, yet not published until after his death. 
He wrote, moreover, nothing substantial on the topic of religion in his later 
work. However, the editor of Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, Timothy 
Fuller, 43  claims that he and Oakeshott spoke often on religious topics, 
particularly in later life (1993a, p. 5). Fuller considers RW important to our 
understanding of his outlook. To live religiously, for Oakeshott, was to live 
without regret for the past or calculation of the future as this would result in a 
loss of self-understanding and the integrity of the self, which was of overriding 
importance to him.  Fuller claims that Oakeshott held this attitude throughout 
his life and that it permeates all of his writing, even though often elusively or 
in a concealed way.  
 
Based on Fuller’s first-hand testimony, we should allow the view that RW is 
an important statement of Oakeshott’s opinion as how to lead a good life.44  
                                                   
43 Professor of Political Science at Colorado College, where he has taught since 1965. 
Colorado College, a small liberal arts college, is an Oakeshottian outpost in the 
American west. In addition to Fuller, who has written and commented extensively on 
Oakeshott, other alumni who have written on Oakeshott include Paul Franco (1990) 
and Elizabeth Campbell Corey (2006). Oakeshott’s celebrated essay, ‘A Place of 
Liberal Learning’, was first presented as the Abbott Memorial Lecture at Colorado 
College in September 1974 (2001, pp. 1-34). Both the 2003 and 2006 conferences of 
the Michael Oakeshott Association were hosted by Colorado College. 
44  John Kekes would most likely have a different opinion. In his review of A 
Companion to Michael Oakeshott he comments on Fuller’s contribution that he 
‘writes as if he were Oakeshott’s St. Paul, having privileged access given to him from 
above, a truth he now condescends to share with lesser folk, although without 
supporting it with reasons’ (Fuller 2012, pp. 120-133; Kekes 2013). 
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The recent publication of the Notebooks (2014) supports this conclusion. The 
material in these regarding religion confounds the standard interpretation of 
Oakeshott’s thoughts on this topic: namely, that he had a keen interest in his 
youth that significantly lessened as he got older, although it enjoyed a slight 
revival in old age. The Notebooks demonstrate that religion was an almost 
continuous preoccupation. In particular, the tension between worldly and 
spiritual values and the problem of how to confront mortality. Luke O’Sullivan 
observes that the tension between worldly and spiritual values might even be 
said to summarise the main theme of the Notebooks (2014, p. xvi). 
 
In later writings, Oakeshott extended his conception of the good life as 
essentially “religious” to include culture, which he subsequently defined more 
precisely as “poetry”. In order of importance to the good life poetry is followed 
by the philosophy, science and history. In his essay on aesthetics, ‘The Voice 
of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ (VPCM), he described ‘poetic’ 
activity as consisting of a reflection on images with a view to ‘delight’ in them, 
which excludes the possibility that poetic activity, like religion, may have 
practical benefits (1991, pp. 488-541). This contradicts his assertion in EM 
that ‘art, music and poetry, in the end, are wholly taken up with practical life’ 
(1933, p. 297). 45 By “poetry”, he referred to all kinds of aesthetic experience 
and not just poetry: ‘I mean the making of images of a certain kind’ (1991, p. 
509).  Oakeshott can be identified with the intellectual movement known as 
“aestheticism” in England, or l’ art pour l’ art in France. Aestheticism denies 
the validity of a practical valuation of art and argues for the intrinsic value of 
aesthetic experience: the ‘love of things of intellect and imagination for their 
own sake’ (Pater 1967, p. 33).  
  
In his review of John Cowper Powys’s, The Meaning of Culture (1930), 
Oakeshott explained that three different notions of culture have shaped our 
idea of civilization. The first is the idea of culture as the uncritical acquisition 
                                                   
45 Glenn Worthington notes that this is the only example of Oakeshott publicly 
acknowledging that he had changed a previous judgment (2002, p. 291). In 
Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott explained that ‘The Essay on poetry is a belated 
retraction of a foolish sentence in Experience and its Modes’ (1991, p. x).  
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of knowledge of any sort or kind: ‘the pathetic, febrile eagerness for 
encyclopaedic information’ (2007, p. 58). The second is culture understood to 
be the ‘acquisition of “the best that has been thought and known in the world”’ 
(ibid.).  He claimed this view reflected the opinions of Matthew Arnold and T. 
S. Eliot.  A third interpretation, which he attributed to Epicurus, starts off by 
opposing the idea implicit in the first two interpretations that culture can be 
conceived in terms of acquisition. Oakeshott offered a personal criterion for 
culture grounded in an ‘improvident desire for freedom, integrity’ (ibid., p. 
59). The essential requirement is ‘an integrated self whose purpose is not to 
remember, adopt or assimilate, but to live a life contemporary with itself’ 
(ibid.). The past and the future are only relevant to the extent that ‘they come 
alive in the present’ (ibid.). What is valued in this conception of culture is not 
the product of experience ‘but the flower- something we know only in present 
enjoyment (…) death is not Outrun: it is denied, dismissed’ (ibid.).  
 
A cultural orientation towards the world, like the religious orientation, has 
three features that are relevant to his political thought. First, it is ‘besotted 
unto liberty’ as exemplified by one of his heroes, Michel de Montaigne; even 
though this might be ‘improvident’ (Oakeshott 2007, p. 59). Oakeshott 
regarded a quixotic attitude to risk as desirable for personal fulfilment. 
Second, he emphasised the integrity of the self as a pre-condition of human 
freedom. What he meant by “integrity of the self” will be further explored in 
Chapter Two. Third, the value of an immersion in culture, or poetry, is that it 
helps us live in the present, rather than the past or the future, and to that 
extent mortality becomes irrelevant. The real meaning of life lies not in the 
pursuit of external rewards, which enslaves one to the future and the past, but 
in the integrity of the self in the present. The adjectives that best characterise 
his outlook on the world, as described in this section, are libertarian, 
aesthetic, existential and anti-materialistic: all are pertinent to interpreting 







Work, Play and Modernity 
 
In a later essay, ‘Work and Play’ (2004), Oakeshott described religion as 
merely a practical cessation of worldly activity, a resignation from the 
‘treadmill existence’ of satisfying material wants, rather than an adventure in 
itself. 46 He continued, however, to disdain a life dedicated to worldly activities 
by contrasting the presuppositions underlying our attitudes to work and play. 
He explained that human beings are creatures of wants, disposed to thinking 
of the world as supplying material for satisfying wants. The world is seen as 
something to be exploited. It is something upon which someone may impose 
her own purposes: ‘It is almost an enemy to be conquered, and having been 
conquered, to be exploited’ (2004, p. 304). This had become the dominant 
attitude over the past four centuries. Oakeshott distinguished between wants 
and needs. The former is inexhaustible and only a rare individual is able to 
eschew wants and ‘to turn back to needs’ (ibid., p. 306). The business of 
achieving human happiness through the satisfaction of wants is what he called 
work.  
 
The mastery of the human race over its natural environment is a process that 
has accelerated over time as a consequence of technological development.  
Oakeshott claimed that two beliefs have taken a hold on us along with the 
acceleration of this process. The first was the belief that the exploitation of the 
world for the satisfaction of wants was not only characteristic of mankind but 
was also proper: ‘Indeed it came to be believed that this ought to be the 
                                                   
46 ‘Work and Play’ was first printed in First Things, 54 (1995). It was subsequently 
included in What is History? and other essays (Oakeshott 2004, ed. L. O’Sullivan). 
Worthington judges that the essay was probably written in the decade after 1938. He 
bases his claim on the fact that art is not explicitly distinguished from other 
theoretical worlds of experience, as is the case in ‘Leviathan: A Myth’, which 
Oakeshott published in 1948. Worthington acknowledges that a case can be made 
that ‘Work and Play’ was written in the late 1950s, as it reflects the philosophical 
mode of writing that Oakeshott adopts in ‘The Voice of Poetry’ (2002, p. 296 n. 36). I 
would incline to the second case. The anti-materialist tone is more relevant to the 
1950s economic boom than the austerity of the period 1938-1948. The important 
point, however, is that Oakeshott expressed the sentiments articulated in WP 
throughout his life as the Notebooks testify. 
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exclusive attitude and engagement to which all else should be subordinated’ 
(ibid., p. 307).47 
 
The pursuit of materialism became elevated to the status of a moral 
desirability, specifying how we ought to spend our lives. Subsequently, in his 
account, this first belief came to be partnered with an immense optimism 
about the triumph of this enterprise of exploiting the natural world to gratify 
human wants. The conjunction of the two beliefs led to the view that laziness 
and ineptitude in exploiting the assets of the world was not only sinful but 
also foolish. Furthermore, the materialistic obsession with the exploitation of 
the world for the satisfaction of proliferating wants has reached its zenith in 
the contemporary era. We are comfortable with the proliferation of wants and 
more confident of success.  (Oakeshott 2004, p. 308).  Characteristic of the 
modern age ‘is the faith and fervour’ with which the project is pursued. 
Everything else tends to be regarded as ‘subordinate to the happiness that 
comes from the satisfaction of wants’ (ibid.). 
 
The political ramifications of the belief that exploitation of the world for the 
satisfaction of wants is both right and proper are straightforward. If 
exploitation of the world for the satisfaction of wants is to be successful, then 
the state must be conceived as a managerial enterprise. John Micklethwait 
and Adrian Wooldridge point out that today the modern state is still more 
powerful than any in history, even after the cutbacks that followed the 
financial crash of 2008. They attribute this to the fact that voters have 
repeatedly voted for the state to do more, even though liberty has suffered: 
‘Freedoms have been given up, but the people have not gotten much in return’ 
(2014, ‘The Politics of Freedom’). The confidence of politicians and 
policymakers may have been dented by the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009. But it has not altered the reality that political success depends mainly 
                                                   
47 Oakeshott claimed that Sir Francis Bacon, 1st Viscount St Alban (1561-1626), 
English philosopher, statesman, scientist, jurist and essayist, was the father of the 
materialistic outlook (1991, pp. 18-19). Oakeshott claimed Bacon envisioned the state 
as a corporate enterprise for the exploitation of the earth. This idea was subsequently 
developed by Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen, Marx and the Webbs, among others. 
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on satisfying the wants of the electorate, which are understood largely as 
delivering increasing levels of material prosperity. 
 
But consistent with his analysis of the limitations of worldliness, Oakeshott 
claimed that happiness conceived as the satisfaction of material wants is both 
elusive and fundamentally unsatisfying. Someone who comprehends the 
world merely as the satisfaction of wants and whose satisfactions spawn new 
wants interminably ‘is a creature of unavoidable anxieties’ (2004, p. 309). It is 
the curse of the human condition that the temporary satisfaction of wants is 
the best that can be achieved. Each satisfaction creates new wants. The 
modern world is one ‘of getting and spending and making and consuming 
endlessly’ (ibid.). 
 
Throughout his life, Oakeshott was hostile to consequentialist and utilitarian 
thinking, especially when in the service of materialism. He wrote in 1924 that 
this manner of thinking ‘is the curse of our own day too’ (2014, p. 81). Forty 
years later, he observed that it reduces humanity ‘to a race of ants hurrying 
obediently from school to work, from work to pension, so painless a living that 
they will not know when they are dead’ (2014, p. 456). Human life has become 
vulgarised due to its almost exclusive pre-occupation with concrete 
achievements. Science is the exemplar of utilitarian thinking. Scientific 
achievement, for example, is valued because of its practical applications 
whereas it should be valued because its ‘only human value lies in the 
excitement of discovery’ (2014, p. 468). 
 
The antidote to the depressing consumerist tendency of the human 
personality consequent on the preoccupation with work lies in “play”, which 
avoids the defect inherent in “work”: seeking the interminable satisfaction of 
wants. Play differs from work in that it is not aimed at the satisfaction of 
wants, is not anxious to use the world, and offers satisfactions that are not, at 
the same time, disappointments: ‘A life unimpeded by this fatal, but seductive 
mistress - achievement, purpose, destiny, progress’ (2014, p. 244).  
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In his conception of play, Oakeshott highlighted the feature of non-
instrumentality or purposelessness. This idea is central to his accounts of 
morality, aesthetics, the rule of law, the essence of liberal learning and the 
moral superiority of the state construed as a civil association.48 Reflecting on 
J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, he argued in the Notebooks that ‘all that is 
necessary for a [happy life] is to be without this sense of purpose’ (2014, pp. 
243-44.)49 If there is nothing to be achieved, there can be no failure. It is the 
only invulnerable state: ‘Interest centred upon nobody’s destiny, upon no 
future aim, no purpose’ (ibid.). 
 
The antithesis of non-instrumentality is utilitarianism: all activities are valued 
in terms of their consequences. Play is a non-instrumental activity: ‘In its 
proper character a game is an experience of enjoyment that has no ulterior 
purpose, no result aimed at, and begins and ends in itself’ (Oakeshott 2004, p. 
310). Game playing can, of course, often look more like work than play: it can 
satisfy wants, whether in the form of prizes, status enhancement, or financial 
gain. Oakeshott’s point, however, was that, properly speaking, play differs 
from work in the manner in which it is performed. Play is conducted in a 
leisurely manner: ‘Without the anxieties and absence of cessation that belong 
to the satisfaction of wants’ (ibid., p. 311). So a game may be undertaken either 
in the spirit of work or play. But only play begins and ends in itself.  
 
In the category of play, he also included philosophy, science and history: they 
aim to explain the world, whereas work seeks to change the world. The most 
perfect example of play, according to him, is the activity of poetic imagination: 
‘A dream enjoyed for its own sake’ (ibid., p. 312). Poetry as an aesthetic 
experience captures the world as it is experienced in moments of 
contemplation, where contemplation is understood to involve images that are 
                                                   
48 Oakeshott was greatly influenced in his understanding and appreciation of the idea 
of “play” by the Dutch historian, J. Huizinga’s book Homo Ludens (1996, p. 110, n. 
12.) Huizinga argued that previous eras of civility in Western Europe were only 
possible due to a point of view that rejected the notion that everything should be 
understood in an instrumental or manipulative manner. 
49 Oakeshott’s note: Mill, Utilitarianism p. 13, first published in Fraser’s Magazine, 
64 (1861), 391-406, reprinted in CW, x. 203-59. 
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wholly separated from other concerns. In play Oakeshott contended that 
humans believe they ‘enjoy a freedom and an illumination that the satisfaction 
of wants can never supply’ (ibid., p. 313). 
 
Oakeshott considered education to be the activity most at risk from utilitarian 
thinking. The modern tendency, he argued, is to regard it as work, rather than 
‘acquaintance with the activities of Homo Ludens that was once considered 
the better part of education’ (ibid., p. 314). His concern about the degrading 
effect of the utilitarian attitude towards education is amplified in his 1975 
essay, ‘A Place of Learning’. Learning should not be a limited undertaking in 
which what is learned is learned just to the point where it can be put to some 
instrumental purpose. Learning should be undertaken for itself: ‘It is the 
engagement and its own standards of achievement and excellence’ (1989, pp. 
10-11). 50 
 
Noel O’Sullivan notes the mood of despair that characterised Oakeshott’s late 
essay ‘The Tower of Babel’.51 He suggests that it can be explained by his  
concern that what he valued in education, social life and the politics of civil 
association was unlikely to last for much longer in an age which has become 
almost completely wanting of any appreciation of the significance of play 
(2001). The utilitarian tendencies Oakeshott construed in the development of 
public education particularly offended his sensibilities. Rather than being a 
release ‘from the current vulgarities of the world’ it ‘is now education is merely 
instruction in the current vulgarities’ (Oakeshott 2014, p. 442).  
 
Oakeshott’s concerns echoed many of those found in the writings of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. He obliquely acknowledged this in his review of Janko Lavrin’s 
Nietzsche (1948), suggesting that we should recognise in Nietzsche’s writings 
                                                   
50 One of several essays he wrote on education, collected as The Voice of Liberal 
Learning (1989). 
51  There are two essays entitled ‘The Tower of Babel’. The first was originally 
published in 1948 and is included in Rationalism in Politics (1991). The second dates 
from 1979 and is included in On History (1999). Oakeshott may have read the 
theologian R. Niebuhr’s essay of the same name in which he takes the Biblical 
account of the origins of the world’s languages as a metaphor for human pretension 
([Genesis 11: 1-9] Niebuhr 1938, pp. 27-50). 
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a deep and original analysis of an existential crisis in European culture to 
which we remain oblivious: ‘The world in which Nietzsche detected the crisis 
was as insensible of its predicament as we are of the speed at which the earth 
is whirling through space’ (2007, p. 225). 
 
The Notebooks reveal, to a greater degree than previously appreciated, his 
antipathy to modernity: the ‘modern world and its emphasis on security and 
plan’ (2014, p. 303.)52 The degradation of education was symptomatic of 
wider ailments. The world had become one of ‘violent stimuli’ in all forms of 
the media that he felt was corrupting to the minds of youth (2014, p. 346). 
  
In the 1930s he was especially critical of the contribution of science to the 
degradation of civilisation. He believed that a civilisation dominated by 
science ‘is a menace to civilized life’ (2014, pp. 305-6). In fact, it is worse than 
a menace. He claimed it had already eradicated from mankind both the 
expectation and the desire for a civilized way of living. Science has distorted 
our moral sense and has left us with a civilisation ‘based on false hopes, 
desires & values: a radical perversion of human life’ (ibid.).  
 
Oakeshott was at his most intolerant in his criticism of the inventions of 
science: ‘What do people want with all this electricity rushing up & down the 
country - telephone & telegraph’ (2014, p.  328). He was perplexed as to why 
we need to have faith in progress as it does not bring relief from our state of 
imperfection and puts us on the wrong track: ‘Unless we leave this track we 
never may find salvation in mortal life’ (ibid., p. 339).  
 
His intolerance extended to popular culture. The Beatles exemplified for him 
the awfulness of popular culture: ‘The indescribable vulgarity of “Sergeant 
Pepper”’ (2014, p. 519). 53  Oakeshott’s dislike of modernity and faith in 
                                                   
52 It is evident from the Notebooks that Oakeshott read most of Nietzsche’s works as a 
young man and was still reflecting on these in his mature years (2014, [1922] p. 4 n.1; 
[1926] p. 107; [1929-1930] p. 164 n.1).  
53 Oakeshott did not typify the critical reaction. Time Magazine declared it ‘a historic 
departure in the progress of music’ and the New Statesman praised its ‘elevation of 
pop to the level of Art’ (Spitz 2005). 
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progress was more than aesthetic disdain. It anchored his political thought. In 
practical terms this disposition led his assault on rationalism in politics, which 




The next antinomies to be discussed are those of perfectionism and anti-
perfectionism. Oakeshott’s scepticism as to the value of progress was reflected 
in his antipathy to perfectionism in morals and politics. He claimed it was a 
historical fact the implementation of utopian ideals always results in disaster 
and it was necessarily so: ‘They must always do so. “Truths” always kill: errors 
are better, they are sometimes merciful’ (2014, p. 408). 
 
He elaborated the dangers of perfectionism in his essay ‘The Tower of Babel’ 
(1999, pp. 179-210).  In it, he tells of how the human race got into trouble by 
deserting play and unworldliness, and the consequences of losing what he 
described in the Notebooks as ‘the power to let well alone. The thoughtless 
exploitation of invention’ (2014, p. 323). 
 
In the introduction to the essay Oakeshott summarised the biblical tale of 
Noah and the flood.  The inhabitants of the world had unlimited wants and a 
fierce desire to gratify them and they consequently destroyed the world in 
pursuit of ‘their perverse and insatiable desires’ (1999, p. 181). In their 
relations with one another they were motivated by ‘greed, envy, fear and 
violence’ (ibid.). The God of Israel was so appalled by this depravity that he 
decided to start again by flooding the earth and ensuring that the one family 
of virtue, that of Noah and his three sons and their wives, should survive.  
 
The central character of ‘The Tower of Babel’ is Nimrod, grandson of Noah’s 
son Ham: ‘The spoilt child of his father’s old age (…) Perhaps Nimrod as a 
teenager can be discerned as the first of the Hell’s Angels - noisy and 
disruptive’ (ibid., p. 183). Nonetheless he was admired for his daring and he 
developed an extensive following of sycophants who submitted to his 
leadership. Nimrod was both proud and insecure. He saw God as an 
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immanent threat that might cause his ruin. He therefore resolved to destroy 
God by building a tower to heaven, from where he could be destroyed. The 
end of the tale is, of course, well known. God nullified Nimrod’s endeavour by 
‘‘‘confounding the tongues’’ of Nimrod and his followers so that they could not 
understand each other (ibid., p. 160).  
 
Oakeshott updated the biblical story to capture those aspects of modernity he 
disliked.  It is the same story, even if ‘the mis-en-scene is different and the 
banalities of modernity qualify the heroism of ancient impiety’ (ibid., p. 191). 
The re-telling takes place in a modern day Babel, whose citizens are fully 
involved in the pursuit of materialism. Babelians are fickle characters and are 
readily distracted by novelty: ‘The general atmosphere is one of moderate 
vulgarity’ (ibid.). There is widespread dissatisfaction within society. There is a 
lack of purpose and self-discipline. Babelians are a wayward people who 
resent government, not as independent, passionate people might do, but ‘in 
the manner of spoilt children’ (ibid.). They are constantly looking for more of 
what they want, and of a better quality. They feel disadvantaged and are prone 
to resent those who have more worldly goods. Nimrod is aware of his 
unsatisfied wants even more than his subjects. He blames the condition of 
unsatisfied wants on God’s miserliness: ‘Are we not the victims of a cosmic 
conspiracy?’ (ibid., p. 194)  
 
Nimrod persuades the Babelians that they must banish God, so that they may 
take the goods of heaven for themselves in order to completely satisfy their 
wants. While the Babelians would not normally agree to such a project, greed 
gets the better of them and they agree to build a tower to heaven. The project 
leads to a revolution in their way of life as greed overcomes both laziness and 
common sense. 
 
The project begins with great energy and commitment. But soon it becomes 
an all-consuming activity. It results in the total mobilisation of resources, as in 
war. The amenities and comforts of civil society start to degenerate. Private 
convenience is subordinated to the public good, which terminates the state of 
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Babel as a civil association.  The inhabitants begin to acquire ‘a communal 
identity in place of their former distinct individualities (ibid.).  
 
Oakeshott provides several amusing examples of this transition from a civil 
society of free individuals to a mobilised, purposive society. Bumper stickers 
proclaim such messages as ‘Take the waiting out of wanting”.54 A new A-level 
in Tower Technology is established and a degree in Tower Studies is added to 
the university curriculum. All conduct comes to be recognised only in its 
relation to the enterprise: ‘The words “good” and “bad”, “justice” and 
“injustice” acquire restricted meanings appropriate to the circumstances: to 
each is affixed the adjective “social”’ (Oakeshott 1999, p. 199). As the 
obsession takes hold, new mental diseases appear that relate to the obsession 
with towers.  
 
Delight in the project diminishes as the years go by. The progress of the tower 
dominates conversation so ‘imagination and language [become] 
impoverished’ (ibid.). The quality of Babel’s social life deteriorates. Its citizens 
do nothing but work and talk about the common purpose. There is no art or 
literature, only apprehension about the status of the enterprise and anxiety for 
its finalisation. In time, the physical resources of the region are depleted.  The 
tower builders resort to cannibalising those of the Babelians themselves. The 
inhabitants are left to live in tents and caves while they wait for the day they 
can conquer heaven and seize its treasures. Nimrod takes to ascending to the 
summit of the tower and remaining there for hours on end. The Babelians 
suspect he is looking to make a private deal with God. In the end, on hearing 
an alarm, the Babelians rush up to the tower, which cannot support their 
weight, and it collapses to the ground, killing them all.  
 
Years later, an archaeologist comes across an inscription on a stone, a forlorn 
comment on the engagement: 
 
                                                   
54 This was an advertising slogan promoting the Access credit card, c. 1973, the 
precursor of MasterCard in the United Kingdom. The slogan was widely parodied as 
the epitome of consumerist vulgarity and the desire for instant gratification. 
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Those who in fields Elysian would dwell 
Do but extend the boundaries of hell (Oakeshott 1999, p. 210). 
 
The tale of how Babel came to be destroyed contains several elements that are 
important to understanding Oakeshott’s moral outlook. 
 
The tale is a warning of the consequences of greed and the emptiness of a life 
oriented only towards worldly achievement. Babel is a parody of the modern 
world as he understood it. The modern world relentlessly encourages 
consumerist desires. For most people these are impossible to fully satisfy. 
Even if immediate wants are satisfied, the populace will soon develop new 
wants for more of everything, and of a higher quality. In this sense we are 
slaves to consumerism at the expense of of individuality and civility. 
 
The central idea in the tale is the recognition that the world is imperfect, but it 
is falsely assumed that it can be fixed by human remedy. Oakeshott viewed 
this as both an impious and imprudent assumption. An attempt to better our 
condition once and for all, manifest in the mind-set of the Babelians as they 
embark on their project, is a fundamentally unsound activity. It assumes 
limitless knowledge on the part of humans, as well as the existence of a God 
who is both flawed and malicious. That the tower project ends in disaster 
indicates the futility of the search for perfection.  
 
Nimrod is the worse kind of political leader. The implications are reflected in 
Oakeshott’s comments on statesmen and leadership in the Notebooks:  
 
We often blame statesmen for lack of enthusiasm, or cynicism, or 
scepticism - they ought to be sceptical & even cynical - A man without a 
measure of these qualities is without the basis of really sound judgment 
- blind enthusiasm never accomplished anything single-handed. A 
sceptical people is a sad spectacle, a sceptical statesman is a necessity 
(2014, p. 105). 
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 These sentiments infuse his essays on the practice of politics, which were 
collected as Rationalism in Politics (1991), and which we will discuss in 
Chapter Four.  
 
There are, however, suggestions of a more positive thesis in Oakeshott’s 
telling of this story. We can discern a different moral understanding in sharp 
opposition to the Babelian personality. He intimates an alternative “religious” 
or “aesthetic” notion of the world that is better suited to the human situation. 
This requires us to accept the world as it is, and our place in it with an elegant 
modesty, not a permanently dissatisfied sense that it could be made better. 
The constant pursuit of change and improvement will produce neither 
relaxation nor satisfaction. Moreover, the pursuit of perfection comes at the 
cost to individuality, which he perceived as degrading the moral character of 
the Babelians. It is a debasing business to force all citizens into pursuing a 
single, all-consuming purpose. The upshot of this common enterprise is to kill 
the diversity, or individuality, from which civil dialogue springs. So we can 
read The Tower of Babel as a morality tale in which disaster is wrought on its 
citizens due to an exclusively worldly orientation- an obsession with work to 
the detriment of play, which is destructive of the individuality of human 
beings.  
 
Romanticism and the Idea of the Gentleman 
 
Steven J. Wulf summarises Oakeshott’s ethical values as ‘civilized self-
cultivation, personal integrity, restraint from mean endeavours, and a 
nonchalance concerning risk’ (2007, p. 249). He argues that whereas these 
may constitute an uncommon list of virtues they bring together several 
models of the gentleman which had long been praised in Victorian and 
Edwardian British literature and school culture.  
 
Wulf also highlights a notably romantic element in Oakeshott’s outlook, an 
assessment that is reinforced by a reading of the recently published 
Notebooks. In his Introduction to them, Luke O’Sullivan argues that ‘his 
interest in Romanticism was not purely academic; in his youth in particular he 
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treated it as a living tradition which had a major impact on his approach to 
life’ (O’Sullivan 2014, p. xi). There are elements in his thought that are 
reflective of a early nineteenth century thinking that can be traced back to 
Keats, Wordsworth and Shelley. 55 His dislike of modernity, the tirades against 
applied science, the empty material and acquisitive tendencies of modern 
civilisation and our obsession with productivity all point in this direction.  The 
Notebooks evidence that Oakeshott read the work of the romantic poets and 
was influenced by them, especially Shelley who, together with Wordsworth, is 
usually identified with hostility towards industrial society and its intellectual 
apologists.  
 
In his study of Romanticism, Economics and the Question of Culture (2001), 
Philip Connell summarises the nineteenth century romantic cultural critique 
as being apprehensive of modernity, suspicious of science, and hostile to the 
unfeeling logical thinking of political economy. The romantics considered that 
the prevailing contours of nineteenth century intellectual life were organised 
in the vigorous tension between two opposing sensibilities: ‘Romantic, 
conservative, Idealist and “cultured” on the one hand’; and, ‘utilitarian, 
progressive, materialist and philistine on the other’ (2001, ‘Conclusion: The 
Politics of Romanticism’).  
 
On the basis of the description so far of Oakeshott’s orientation to the world 
“romantic” is an apt description of his outlook.  The significance of this for my 
thesis is considerable. It excludes the possibility that he could be easily 
assimilated to any of the prevailing popular political ideologies. With the 
possible exception of environmentalism, all of the others are utilitarian, 
progressive and materialist. This suggests that the best interpretation of his 
work as a whole is as a nostalgic paean to a way of life, and its political 
arrangements, which I have called old fashioned liberalism, that he felt were 
fast disappearing.  
                                                   
55 ‘Wordsworth and Coleridge’s 1798 Lyrical Ballads are considered the originary 
moment of English Romanticism’, and ‘the tradition of Romantic anti-economism in 
British social criticism begins with the response to Malthus’s essay on population on 
the part of the “Lake School” of poets comprising Wordsworth, Coleridge and 
Southey’ (Connell 2001, Chapter One). 
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In his 1948 review of C. E. M. Joad’s Decadence, he remarked that ‘he thinks 
that the douceur de vivre disappeared in 1914 (I should have put it at 1906)’ 
(2007, p. 239, italics added). The reference to 1906 as a turning point is of 
significance. According to Micklethwait and Wooldridge, the Webbs had, by 
this time, converted most educated opinion to the view that the state was 
obligated to provide a national minimum of welfare and education (2014, 
Chapter Three). 56 The Liberal party won a large majority in the House of 
Commons on 8th February on a platform of welfare reform. So Oakeshott’s 
remark can be seen as a reference to the death of “old-fashioned liberalism”. 
The Trades Disputes Act, which legalised picketing, and the Workingmen’s 
Compensation Act, which allowed for damages to be paid in the event of 
industrial accidents, were both enacted by the government headed by Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman in that year; as was the introduction of free 
school meals for needy children. These legislative acts presaged the welfarism 
sponsored by the subsequent Liberal administration of Herbert Asquith and 
championed by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. The 
introduction of a National Insurance scheme in 1908 to provide old age 
pensions, the 1909 budget against poverty, and national insurance for the sick 
and unemployed (1911) arguably marked the point at which the 
transformation of the state from a civil association to an enterprise 
association, or welfare state accelerated.57 After the election of the Liberal 
Government of 1906, there was growing agreement about the desirability of 
increased public expenditure, particularly for the purposes of social welfare. 
 
The virtues Oakeshott most esteemed can be connected to the romantic ideal 
of the gentleman: ‘“Physical” courage, nerve, respect for tradition & contempt 
                                                   
56 Sidney Webb (1859-1947) and Beatrice Webb (1856-1943), leading lights in the 
Fabian Society, co-founders of the London School of Economics and Political Science 
and the New Statesman. 
57 Virginia Woolf made a strikingly similar observation on this period in her essay on 
the advent of modernism: ‘On or about December 1910 human character changed. I 
am not saying that one went out, as one might into a garden, and there saw that a 
rose had flowered, or that a hen had laid an egg. The change was not sudden and 
definite like that. But a change there was, nevertheless; and since one must be 
arbitrary, let us date it about the year 1910’ (1924). 
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for convention, a proud sense of personal honour, an indifference to death: an 
aristocrat’; to which we should add, a romantic outlook (Oakeshott 2014, p. 
507). The Notebooks, moreover, fill out the historical roots of Oakeshott’s 
veneration of this character type. They begin with the Aristotelian ideal of the 
good man as a distant precursor of the English gentleman. Luke O’Sullivan 
suggests that it is likely that he came to appreciate the importance of character 
in understanding action and the importance of play and conversation as 
indispensable elements of civilised life through his study of Aristotle’s Ethics 
(2014, p. xiv). Oakeshott described the gentleman as ‘the standard of Hellenic 
Life and Culture’ (2014, p. 48). 
 
The Notebooks demonstrate that the traditional version of the aristocratic 
character, or gentleman, that Oakeshott admired, came from France in the 
seventeenth century, as much as from England in the nineteenth century. The 
essential characteristics of a gentleman are captured by what he called 
Prud’homie. He defined this as ‘the moral characteristic of “integrity”, 
“probity”’ (2014, p. 461). He quoted from Pierre Charron’s De La Sagesse: 
‘true Prud’homme  is free, candid, manly, generous, cheerful, pleasant, self-
possessed, constant, it walks with a firm tread, is bold and confident, pursuing 
its own path’ and  ‘not changing its gait & pace for wind or weather’ (ibid).58 
 
The essence of the gentleman is that he understands the importance of 
holding fast to one’s own identity: ‘The greatest thing in the world is to know 
how to belong to oneself’ (de Montaigne, quoted in Oakeshott 2014, p. 483). 
Of Oakeshott’s near English contemporaries, the radical novelist D. H. 
Lawrence was the best exemplar of this attitude (O’Sullivan, L., p. xxiv).  
 
The virtue to which Oakeshott devoted most attention in the Notebooks is 
courage, which he thought was closer to being a hereditary virtue than any 
other. Lord Nelson was referenced too as an historic exemplar.59  Oakeshott 
                                                   
58 Pierre Charron (1541-1603), theologian and philosopher, was a contemporary of 
Oakeshott’s sceptical hero, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592): ‘One of the two most 
remarkable men to have lived’ (Riley, op. cit., 33). The other being S. Augustine. 
59 Horatio, 1st Viscount Nelson, KB (1758-1805), another of Oakeshott’s heroes, died 
in action at the Battle of Trafalgar, 21st October 1805 (2014, pp. 364-70). Among 
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claimed that Nelson was not driven by ‘exterior success’ or ‘tangible ends’ but 
by ‘interior success’ - ‘honour’, ‘reputation’, ‘fame’ (2014, p. 364). He noted 
Aristotle’s claim that ‘courage is no mere matter of discipline, but is an energy 
of the individual soul - a quality of character’ (2014, p. 45). The antithesis of 
courage is the ‘safety-first’ attitude as a guide to life ‘it is all very well in 
getting off a bus!’, but which he considered ‘immoral’ (ibid.). 
 
Shirley Robin Letwin, Oakeshott’s colleague at the LSE, close friend, literary 
executrix and dedicatee of On Human Conduct, wrote in her book The 
Gentlemen in Trollope (1982) that the first attempt to formulate the concept 
of the morality of the gentleman was Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct (1982, 
p. 276). 
  
She listed three gentlemanly virtues, which are intimated in Oakeshott’s work. 
First, a gentleman equates virtue with integrity. This is a consequence of his 
understanding of what it is to be human. As an aversion to self-contradiction 
is the basis of integrity, ‘and a gentleman understands himself to be one 
among others like himself, his respect for his own integrity entails respecting 
the integrity of others’ (ibid., p. 67).  
 
Second, a gentleman is both diffident and courageous. Diffidence reflects ‘a 
pervasive awareness of the limitation of all human reason’ (ibid., p. 70). 
Projects to change the world to correspond to some image of perfection are 
viewed as ridiculous or hazardous: ‘To be constantly active on behalf of the 
future is not, for a gentleman, a virtue, but a vice’ (ibid., p. 69). A gentleman 
values courage because he recognises that ‘a man swayed by every hostile 
voice will soon reduce his life to absurdity’ (ibid., p. 70).  
 
Thirdly, a gentleman recognises that honesty is a pre-requisite for respect of 
oneself and others. Honesty means that one is clear about what one knows 
and does not know. As integrity is prized, all actions and utterances must be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oakeshott’s planned but unrealised projects was a biography of Nelson (2014, p. 
126). 
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consistent with the sense of self. Honesty further requires that a gentleman 





Furthermore, the morality of a gentleman is based upon a commitment to 
robust agency and freedom: the ingredients of individuality. We can 
understand the motivation behind Oakeshott’s advocacy of nomocracy, or 
civil association - the rule-based, non-purposeful conception of the state – as 
being the form of the state most conducive to the demands of individuality. In 
OHC he described the association as a civitas peregrina; an association of 
adventurers, not of travellers to a shared destination. Each adventurer 
responds ‘as best he can to the ordeal of consciousness’ in a world that 
consists of others like him (1975a, p. 243). Each is ‘the inheritor of the 
imaginative achievements (moral and prudential) of those who have gone 
before’ (ibid.). All are related in a diversity of prudential practices ‘but here 
partners in a practice of civility’ (ibid.).  
 
Oakeshott’s commitment to robust individuality has been widely 
acknowledged. Ian Tregenza observes that it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion many commentators have reached regarding Oakeshott’s 
preference for this [civil] type of association ‘on account of it privileging a 
contingent, historic disposition to cultivate individuality’ (2003, p. 215). We 
should note, however, that Oakeshott had a different conception of 
individuality from Rawlsian liberals. The latter strip away the particularity of 
individuality to draw normative conclusions from the rational preferences of 
what Michael Sandel calls “atomised” or asocial individuals (1982). 
Communitarians criticise Rawlsian liberalism as lacking the conceptual 
resources to appreciate the constitutive nature of communal attachments that 
undermine the conclusions drawn from hypothetical rational preferences.60  
 
                                                   
60 For communitarian criticism of liberalism, see Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (1982), Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983), and Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981). 
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For Oakeshott, the individual and society were two sides of the same totality. 
In an early essay, ‘Some Remarks On the Nature and Meaning of Sociality’, 
this was expressed in Idealist terms. He argued that society can be examined 
from two sides: ‘We may see it as made up of individual selves, and we may 
see it as being the substance of those selves (1993a, p. 46). Both sides are 
abstractions: ‘The whole is like a medal which, [though] we can ordinarily see 
but one side at a time, is essentially made up of both’ (ibid.) Individuality is 
expressed in determining one’s own place within society: ‘Only through his 
particular station and the faithful performance of its particular duties, can 
[man] take hold of this thing called “humanity”’ (2010, p. 112).  
 
Individuality emerges from the society of other men and can only be 
expressed in the context of that society. There is a clear distinction between 
the social and the personal, but they are not incompatible: because social life 
is the context within which private life flourishes. This position was repeated 
in Oakeshott’s 1949 review of J. D. Mabbott’s State and the Citizen (1948). He 
claimed to understand a “private individual” as an institution: a social, indeed 
for the most part a legal, creation, whose desires, emotions, ideas, intelligence, 
are social in their constitution’ (2007, p. 256). The individual would collapse 
‘like a body placed in a vacuum’ if he were detached from the social world 
which is the precondition of his existence (ibid.). Oakeshott felt that Mabbott 
made a mistake in attempting to specify the limits of state action. This was 
based on a false notion of individualism by drawing lines around the “private 
individual” and invoking a false distinction between social and non-social 
goods. 
 
Michael Minch observes that ‘it is difficult to find [Oakeshott] addressing the 
concept of individuality without theorizing it as a moral term or considering it 
in a moral context, for purposes of moral understanding’ (2000, Section 2: 
Before On Human Conduct). Individuality permeated Oakeshott’s account of 
morality and the interpretation of freedom that grounded his preference for 
civil association.  
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In order to specify what he meant by “individuality”, I will focus on his 
discussion of the subject in two of his essays: ‘The Moral Life in the Writings 
of Thomas Hobbes’ (Oakeshott 1975b) and ‘The masses in representative 
democracy’ (1991); and in On Human Conduct (1975a). Hobbes was an 
especially important reference for him. The significance of Hobbes is that he 
was, according to Oakeshott’s controversial interpretation, the first 
philosopher to provide a satisfactory account of the morality of individuality 
and the state; understood as a non-purposive civil association regulated by the 
rule of law: ‘In Hobbes, we may recognize a writer who was engaged in 
exploring that idiom of the moral life I have called the morality of 
individuality’ (1975b, p. 83). In this aristocratic idiom of morality, ‘a man’s 
identity is what he understands himself to be’ (2014, p. 478). Morality is not 
obedience to rules, but a man’s loyalty to his identity. All morality consists in 
loyalty, honour and pride. Oakeshott controversially claimed that Hobbes was 
writing for those whose main interest is to understand human beings ‘more 
concerned with honour than with either survival or prosperity’ (1975b, p. 
133).61 
 
He observed on several occasions that ‘what we are is … what we believe 
ourselves to be’ (1975b, p. 81). This idea is central to his account of freedom 
and morality. In The Voice of Liberal Learning (1989), he explained this 
further. The inherent freedom of an individual consists not only in his skill in 
making assertions that express his self-perception. It consists ‘in the world’s 
being for him what he perceives it to be and in his being what he comprehends 
him to be. A human is “free” (…) because he is in himself what he is for 
himself’ (1989, p. 4). A moralist who does not accept this risks falling into 
absurdity. It is important to recognise that the variety of moral conduct 
present in our civilisation is primarily differentiated ‘not in respect of their 
                                                   
61   Skinner remarks that Oakeshott ‘was widely understood as an illuminating 
commentator on Hobbes and I must say I found him virtually unreadable on that 
subject’ (Skinner 2002b). J. H. Muller is another writer who points out that 
‘Oakeshott - without, one might say much textual evidence - now unearthed (or 
bluntly put: invented) a Hobbesian man too proud to settle for “gilt-edged security” 
(2010, p. 324). 
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doctrines about how we ought to behave, but in respect of their interpretation 
of what in fact we are’ (1975b, p. 81).  
 
Oakeshott argued that there are three idioms for expressing our 
understanding what we are. These have been evident in the history of 
European morality over the last thousand years. He described these as ‘ideal 
extrapolations of what has actually been felt’, which means they have not been 
actualised in their purest form (ibid., p. 83). They are first, the morality of 
communal ties; second, the morality of individuality; third, the morality of the 
common good. Oakeshott used the expression moral idiom to indicate that 
the particular idiom is art, a construction of human beings, and not a product 
of natural necessity: ‘It is the product not (of course) of design, but of 
numberless, long-forgotten choices’ (ibid., p. 82). 
 
In a society where a morality of communal ties prevails, persons are 
recognised ‘solely as members of a community and all activity whatsoever is 
understood to be communal activity’ (ibid., p. 81). Distinct individuals who 
are willing and capable of making choices for themselves are unknown. The 
circumstances in which such individuals can thrive are not in place. Good 
conduct is understood as making an appropriate contribution to the 
unchanging activities of the community.  It appears that individual choice 
does not exist in such communities: ‘What ought to be done is 
indistinguishable from what is done; art appears as nature’ (Oakeshott 1975b, 
p. 82). Morality appears as a detailed ritual: ‘it is the product, not (of course) 
of design, but of numberless, long-forgotten choices’ (ibid.). 
 
In a society where a morality of individuality dominates, human beings are 
identified, ‘because they have come to recognize themselves in this character’, 
as distinct and autonomous individuals. They are associated not in executing a 
common undertaking but in an ‘enterprise of give and take, and 
accommodating themselves to each other as best they can’ (Oakeshott 1975b, 
p. 82). Individual choice is paramount; most of happiness is connected with 
its exercise. Approved conduct is ‘that which reflects [the] individuality 
understood to be characteristic of human beings’ (ibid.).  
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According to Oakeshott, the idea of individuality emerged first in Italy. He 
quoted Jacob Burckhardt in his 1961 essay ‘The masses in representative 
democracy’ (1991, pp. 363-83). Burckhardt wrote that at the end of the 
thirteenth century Italy began to ‘swarm with individuality’:  ‘The ban laid on 
human personality was dissolved; a thousand figures meet us, each in his own 
special shape and dress’ (1991, p. 365).62 The modern individual subsequently 
moved northward, as circumstances favourable to the exercise of individuality 
emerged. He considered, moreover, the emergence of individuality to be the 
‘event of supreme and seminal importance in modern European history’ 
(ibid., p. 382).63 
 
The emergence of the modern individual generated an appropriate moral 
vocabulary. A disposition to make choices was celebrated, and self-
determination was commended as a positive good. Freedom was elevated to a 
necessary aspect of human dignity. Conduct was judged in its contribution to 
the cause of human freedom. This morality, according to Oakeshott, ‘received 
its classic expression in the Essays of Montaigne (...) a reading of the human 
condition in which man’s life is understood as an adventure in personal self-
enactment’ (1975a, pp. 240-41). This understanding paralleled the emergence 
of a new age of human nature that Oakeshott described as protean: ‘A 
character distinguished from all others on account of his multiplicity and of 
his endless power of transformation’ (1991, p. 366). 64  
 
Human individuality was a postulate of moral philosophy in modern Europe 
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Oakeshott listed Locke, Kant, 
Smith and Burke as well as Hobbes as ethical individualists (Oakeshott 1993b, 
pp. 47-72). Individual autonomy is a presupposition of their moral theorising. 
                                                   
62  Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S.G.C. 
Middlemore (London: Penguin Books, 1990, p. 98). 
63 Oakeshott’s assertion that a deep change in social attitudes occurred at this time 
has plenty of historiographical support according to Luke O’Sullivan (2000, p. 145). 
He references A. Black (1988, pp. 98&ff; 1980, p. 145); Q. Skinner (1978, p. 3); W. 
Ullman (1966, p. 5, p. 32) and A. MacFarlane (1978, pp. 52-54). 
64 Proteus was a god of the sea in Greek mythology - ‘the Old Man of the Sea’ - 
Homer. A metaphor for pluralism. 
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Significant questions about individual obligation and relationships are always 
considered from the perspective of the autonomous individual. For Kant, for 
example, moral activity consists in the mutual recognition of individuals 
understood as ends in themselves, not merely as means to satisfying our 
wants; and interference in the choices of other individuals is considered a 
denial of moral autonomy (Kant 1997, p. 41). 
 
The third idiom, morality of the common good, or collectivism, springs from a 
completely different reading of the human character. Although humans are 
acknowledged as separate centres of being, moral approval is given to conduct 
that suppresses individuality whenever it conflicts, not with the individuality 
of others, ‘but with the interests of a “society” understood to be composed of 
such human beings’ (1975b, p. 82). In this idiom, morality is the art through 
which the condition known as the social good or the common good is 
maintained. Not all people, Oakeshott admitted, welcome the opportunity to 
make their own choices. Such a person he called the individual manqué or 
non-individual: ‘Those who (…) are disposed to prefer substantive 
satisfactions to the adventure and risk of self-enactment (1975a, p. 276).65 He 
made clear his contempt for the individual manqué: ‘We need not speculate 
what combination of debility, ignorance, timidity, poverty or mischance 
operated in particular cases to provoke this character’, and what prevents the 
individual manqué from enjoying the rights of individuality are not his 
circumstances, but his character. He came to demand rights of a certain kind 
that are incompatible with those appropriate to individuality. The enjoyment 
of happiness replaces the right to pursue it. Security is prioritised over 
personal choice and ‘having to meet the vicissitudes of life from his own 
                                                   
65 Oakeshott read Jose Ortega Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses in the 1930s (2014, p. 
292 n. 16). Ortega Gasset claimed that mass man of today has two fundamental 
psychological traits: ‘The free expansion of his vital desires, and therefore, of his 
personality; and his radical ingratitude towards all that has made possible the ease of 
his existence. These traits together make up the well-known psychology of the spoilt 
child’ (1964, p. 58). According to David Manning and Ysanne Carlisle, Ortega Gasset 
felt that the alliance of technocracy and democracy had all but destroyed the spiritual 
foundations of two thousand years of Western civilization. (Manning and Carlisle 
1995, p. 485). 
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resources’ (ibid., p. 378). As this state of affairs is impossible unless it 
imposed upon everyone, the rights pertaining to individuality must be 
removed. 
The political consequences of the emergence of a collectivist morality are 
pernicious. In response to the ‘misery of guilt’ felt by the individual manqué, 
there emerges a certain type of leader: ‘A man more disposed to mind other 
people’s business because he lacked the skill to find satisfaction in minding 
his own’ (Oakeshott 1991, p. 374). The moral language of the individual 
manqué and their leaders is not one of liberty and self-determination, but of 
equality and solidarity, the nucleus of which is the concept of human 
circumstance represented as the common good.  
Oakeshott had no sympathy for the collectivist moral idiom. He described the 
individual manqué in utterly contemptuous terms. The characteristic of mass 
man is ‘a moral, not an intellectual, inadequacy’ (ibid., p. 380). He cannot 
cope with making his own choices. He is dangerous due to his submissiveness. 
He is an unmistakably ‘derivative character, an emanation of the pursuit of 
individuality, helpless, parasitic and able to survive only in his opposition to 
individuality’ (1991, p. 380). 
This line of thought is broadly in the tradition of Nietzsche. Keith Ansell-
Pearson claims that for Nietzsche, the danger was that society would ignore 
culture and let philistinism to take over. In this case society becomes made up 
of a ‘herd of “last men and women”’ who are preoccupied with material 
happiness ‘and who cannot conceive of anything higher or nobler (uber) 
beyond themselves’ (1994, p. 6). In ‘The Masses in Representative 
Democracy’, Oakeshott claimed that anti-individuality had established itself 
as one of the dispositions of the modern European moral character well before 
the nineteenth century and that this disposition was evident enough for it ‘to 
be recognised unequivocally by Sorel, and to be identified by writers such as 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Burckhardt as the image of a new barbarism’ 
(1991, p. 376). 
 
Oakeshott’s contempt for the individual manqué, or mass man, is obvious. 
Adjectives such “parasitic”, “helpless”, “debility”, “timidity” are frequent. 
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Oakeshott undoubtedly esteemed the morality of individuality, as it allows 
individuals the opportunity to exercise their autonomy and enjoy the 
adventure and risk of self-enactment.  
 
This chapter has sought to highlight the values and ideals that informed 
Oakeshott’s conception of the good life and his orientation to the world. The 
relevance of this to his political theory will become evident.  His advocacy of 
the merits of civil association can be understood as a normatively grounded 
attempt to specify the form of civil society most suited to the ethics of a 
gentleman, as described by Letwin. Chapter Two turns to an examination of 
Oakeshott’s account of morality and how it links with his advocacy of the 
merits of civil association. 
 
 
Chapter 2 - Morality and its Presuppositions 
 
A morality of individuality 
 
Within the secondary literature, relatively little attention is paid to 
Oakeshott’s theory of morality, as noted by Michael Minch: ‘[His] theory of 
morality (…) is woefully unattended’ (2009, Introduction). Such neglect is 
unfortunate as his account of morality informed his preference for civil 
association and his understanding of justice, which will be examined in 
Chapter Three. Oakeshott did not construct a formal moral theory, but much 
of what he wrote related to general principles of morality. In the first ‘Tower 
of Babel’ essay he claimed that his task was to consider ‘in particular the form 
of moral life in contemporary Western civilisation’ (1991, p. 467). He focused 
on explaining what was concrete in our historical experience of moral life. In 
OHC, in contrast, he offered an account of morality as it pertained to his 
theoretical understanding of human conduct (1975a, pp. 60-81). 
 
Oakeshott defined moral practice as activity ‘which may be either good or bad’ 
and ‘refers to conduct where there is an alternative’ (1991, p. 466). That is, 
freedom is a postulate of morality. He repeated this in his essay ‘The Moral 
Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes’.  He wrote that moral life ‘appears 
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only when human behaviour is free from natural necessity; that is where there 
are alternatives in human conduct’ (1975b, p. 80). Whatever morality is, it 
necessarily presumes freedom, because choice presumes freedom: ‘The 
freedom without which moral conduct is impossible is freedom from a natural 
necessity which binds all men to act alike’ (ibid.). It follows that whatever 
restricts choice is immoral. But moral conventions, like laws, limit choice by 
ruling out certain actions if we subscribe to moral convention and law.  How 
he reconciled morality and freedom will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
Oakeshott’s understanding of morality will be examined under four heads. 
The first is the role of the self in his account. The second is his preference for a 
traditional, or “habitual”, morality over one based on rules. The third is his 
account of the relation between his understanding of “freedom” and the moral 
sphere. The fourth is his claim that morality is not instrumental or purposeful, 
but “adverbial”. To varying degrees, his interpretation of these ideas explains 




As a preliminary to understanding his morality of individuality, it is essential 
to note how he conceived the “self”, a conception he derived from the British 
Idealist tradition. Idealists identify reality with experience. Experience is self-
authenticating. There is nothing external to experience, no external reality to 
corroborate it. Everything in experience is an idea, a part of awareness. The 
world is understood as a mental construct. Things exist but never 
independently of the mind. The self brings coherence to all that is known in 
experience and it is the starting point for Oakeshott’s understanding of 
“individualism”. We can understand the world as composed of selves who 
have constructed their identities out of their experiences. The self always 
participates in defining its world. The self constructs a world, making 
meaning a convention: ‘In thought there is nothing analogous to the painter’s 
colours or the builder’s bricks - raw material existing apart from the use made 
of it’ (1933, p. 19).  
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There is no such thing as shared or communal knowledge. Ultimately, each 
individual constructs what he knows. The self is both the starting point in 
experience and the entity that makes experience coherent. Stuart Isaacs 
claims that Oakeshott developed from Bradley a way of situating the 
individual as ‘sovereign in moral discourse. This standpoint is tied to 
Oakeshott’s general philosophical position that privileged the individual in 
practical experience’ (2006, p. 34). We can see that his reverence for 
individuality was rooted in something more than mere prejudice.  
 
Oakeshott argued that a presupposition of moral practice is the integrity of 
the self. The concept of self-realisation to preserve the integrity of the self was 
a central concern of British Idealist moral thought. As noted, this was the 
dominant mode of ethical thought between 1870 and 1890 and it was very 
influential for another 20 years after that. For F. H. Bradley, whom, as we 
have noted, Oakeshott cited as an intellectual influence, the starting point for 
understanding morality was the question, “What is the end of morality?” 
Bradley wished to reject the validity of the question, as it implies that moral 
activity is a means to an end, and that the end is the justification for morality 
(Bradley 1876, 64). Instead, he wanted to demonstrate that morality is an end 
in itself. In Ethical Studies, he answered his question by claiming that the 
ultimate end for man is self-realisation: ‘If the life of the normal man be 
inspected, and the ends he has in view (as exhibited in his acts) be considered 
they will roughly speaking be embraced in one main end or whole of ends’ 
(ibid., p. 70). The one main end for Bradley was self-realisation. 66   
 
Through self-realisation, we make real the intimations and insights we have 
regarding ourselves by talking and behaving in ways that reveal our individual 
character. All that we do is part of the process of self-realisation.  Each 
performance is an effort to find out one’s native aptitude and talents, and 
actualise them. At the centre of self-realisation is the idea that a self is ‘always 
                                                   
66 Bradley came to the conclusion that self-realisation could not be achieved through 
morality alone, as religion is the concrete whole of which morality is an abstraction: 
‘That in morality only is to be, in religion somewhere and somehow really is’ and to 
realize yourself ‘you must resolve to give up your whole self, your entire will, into the 
will of the divine’ (1876, pp. 324-325). 
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in the making’ (Milne 1962, p. 29). Self-realisation is not something that can 
ever be achieved in its entirety. It is a never-ending process of making choices 
and performing actions that reveal an agent’s self-understanding. 
 
Oakeshott developed this argument in the first essay in On Human Conduct 
(1975a, pp. 1-107). He articulated his theory of moral conduct by drawing a 
distinction between “self-disclosure”, where agents realise themselves in their 
actions, and “self-enactment”, where they realise themselves in their motives. 
In his account, we hear the echoes of earlier Idealist arguments. Both aspects 
of moral behaviour - self-disclosure and self-enactment - are derived from the 
Idealist idea of self-realisation. An agent morally discloses his actions by being 
consistent with rules, laws and other conventional moral practices. Oakeshott 
called this self-disclosure. The upshot of actions can be assessed by the 
success or otherwise of what they were intended to achieve. The morality of 
self-disclosure evaluates the actions of agents in their relations with one 
another as they ‘procure their imagined and wished for satisfactions’ (1975a, 
p. 70). “Good” and “bad” conduct is judged by its conformity with the moral 
rules in place, the authority of which is accepted by agents. There is little 
scope for the expression of individuality beyond the interpretation of moral 
conventions. Behaving morally in this sense is little different than following 
the rules of etiquette. 
 
But moral conduct may also have a motive without a specific end. Oakeshott 
called this self-enactment.  In his concept of self-enactment, we can find a 
description of how moral individuality is exercised. Self-enactment refers to 
actions understood in terms of what motivates them.  By motive he meant the 
sentiment in which an action is performed such as ‘greed, fear, passion or 
resentment’ (ibid., p. 72). These sentiments, analytically at least, are distinct 
from the way in which an action is performed. They potentially offer a way to 
ameliorate the frustrations and disappointments of self-disclosure, by 
permitting an agent to manifest an attitude towards the world that does not 
depend on the successful pursuit of satisfactions.  
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Oakeshott noted that other philosophers had made the distinction between 
disclosure and enactment without describing it in such precise terms, but 
disagreed as to its moral significance. Utilitarians, such as J. S. Mill, tended to 
evaluate the moral worth of conduct solely in terms of its outcomes. Aristotle, 
in contrast, was concerned with the “virtue” of actions as distinct from the 
moral quality of their outcomes; while Kant assigned primacy to the motive of 
actions in judging their moral worth.  
 
Oakeshott considered self-disclosure and self-enactment as two distinct 
considerations that are present in all human activity. Each is recognised in 
terms of a language of moral conduct The distinct considerations respectively 
concern ‘justice and guilt on the one hand’ and ‘honour and shame on the 
other’ (1975a, p. 71, n. 1) Self-disclosure distinguishes an agent’s conduct in 
seeking what he wants from conduct in respect of an agent ‘thinking as he 
chooses to think and enacting or re-enacting himself as he wishes to be’ (ibid., 
p. 72). 
 
He argued that a major difference between self-disclosure and self-enactment 
is that the former is ‘infected with contingency’ (ibid., p. 73).  It is an agent’s 
reaction to an incidental situation and as such its outcome will be influenced 
by other agents who will have their own objectives the performance may will 
be defeated or, at least, compromised. Oakeshott was again describing the 
tyranny inherent in the very nature of practical life and the frustrations that 
will accrue to those agents who, while conforming to prevailing moral rules, 
judge themselves solely in terms of the outcomes of their projects. A morality 
of self-disclosure does nothing ‘to modify the interminability of doing’ (ibid., 
p. 74 
 
But where the activity of agency is self-enactment, where the forethought is 
not what is expected to be realised, but the disposition with which it is done, 
conduct is liberated from its attribute as a response to a contingency and 
emancipated from its liability to experience frustration in adverse 
circumstances. The reason is that what an agent chooses to think and do 
relates to his self-perception and self-respect for himself, to the integrity of his 
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character, and not to his understanding of a contingent situation which 
obliges him to act.  Moreover, Oakeshott argued, through self-enactment 
‘doing is delivered, at least in part, from the deadliness of doing’ (ibid., p.74). 
 
With respect to the sentiments or motives behind our conduct, morality 
specifies the ‘conditions of worthy self-enactment’, the character of which ‘will 
depend upon the quality of these sentiments in terms of their subscription to a 
moral practice’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 75). The language is that of “virtue”, and 
virtuous self-enactment means learning to use the language as it should be 
spoken. Morality should not be thought as obeying commands to act 
according to certain sentiments but as ‘responding to an invitation to choose 
and to cultivate some sentiments rather than others in which to act’ (ibid.). No 
one principle underlies virtuous conduct beyond the consideration that it 
cannot virtuous unless it is chosen. That is, it implies reflectivity on the part of 
an agent.  
 
Oakeshott specifically counselled the reader not to confuse virtuous with 
altruistic conduct. The latter, he controversially claimed, refers to 
considerations regarding actions from the viewpoint of their consequences 
whereas virtuous conduct is indifferent to consequences. And it is this 
indifference to consequences which constitutes the release of conduct ‘from 
the bondage of contingent circumstance’ (1975a, p. 76). So self-enactment 
refers to how we evaluate our actions in terms of their motives. Others cannot 
make this evaluation as they do not have access to our considerations as to 
what constitutes virtuous self-enactment. It is ‘the requirement of thinking 
about himself as he should while doing what he ought: Conduct which notably 
fails to observe this is shameful’ (ibid.). 
 
What is striking in his account of morality as self-enactment is, once more, the 
radical individuality of his argument. He offered no way of judging which 
kinds of ‘self-enactments’ are better, and appeared to think that making 
judgments of the self-enactments of others is an error. The individualistic 
perspective is built in to his theorising of human conduct. If human conduct is 
understood in terms of the relationship between intelligent agents, the notion 
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of individuality is a postulate of human conduct. It is, as Podoksik notes, 
theoretically necessary, and not merely contingent in Oakeshott’s account of 
human conduct (Podoksik 2003b, Chapter 3). The contingency is the 
emergence of human conduct in the first place: ‘A historic disposition to 
transform this unsought “freedom” of conduct from a postulate into an 
experience’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 236). 
 
Oakeshott’s account of the practical life is dominated by his view of the 
actions of the self. Morality is concerned with self-realisation or, as expressed 
in OHC, with self-disclosure and self-enactment. In self-enactment, an agent 
can develop and reveal his individuality by freely choosing sentiments on the 
basis of which he acts. But we have neither a right nor a duty to promote the 
moral perfection of others.  We cannot promote the good of others without 
destroying the freedom inherent in agency. This argument clearly anticipated 
his advocacy of civil association on the grounds of protecting the freedom 
inherent in agency, and respecting and encouraging individuality. 
 
If the end of man is self-realisation, this raises the question of whether the 
state has any role in promoting the self-realisation of individuals. Most early 
Idealists attempted to calibrate the role of the individual agent as a distinct 
moral individual and her responsibility as a member of a community. T. H. 
Green and Bosanquet, for example, used the idea of self-realisation to ground 
a ‘politics of responsibility to set against triumphant laissez faire’ (Quinton 
1971, p. 6). They hoped to rid society of obstacles to the realisation of self, 
such as squalid social conditions, the evils of drunkenness and dangerous 
working practices. Idealists, Liberal Socialists and Social democrats of the late 
Victorian era were in agreement that classical Liberalism had resulted in 
deplorable social and economic conditions that the improvement in the 
conditions of many working people was viewed as a humanistic duty (Boucher 
and Vincent 2012, p. 102).  
 
Both Oakeshott and Bradley, along with McTaggart, were out of tune with the 
British Idealist philosophical tradition on this point. Most Idealist 
philosophers clearly felt that philosophy was integrally related to practical life 
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and should be directed to improve the condition of society. According to 
Boucher and Vincent ‘It is difficult to think of any later twentieth-century 
British philosophical movement that had such a positive effect on practical 
affairs as British Idealism’ (ibid., p. 128). As an Idealist who was an outsider to 
the Idealist tradition of social activism, Oakeshott again demonstrated his 
idiosyncrasy.  
 
This can best be explained by his reverence for individuality and his view, 
earlier articulated by Kant, that neither the individual nor the state has any 
business in promoting the good of others. As morality presupposes the 
recognition of individual personality Oakeshott argued that one cannot 
promote the good of others without destroying their freedom ‘which is the 
condition of moral goodness’ (1991, pp. 367-368). 67  We will see in Chapter 
Three that this argument is at the heart of his conception of law, properly 
speaking, as being non-instrumental and his claim that civil association is the 






Moralities of habitual conduct and reflective thought 
 
Oakeshott’s account of human conduct was entirely consistent with his 
particular reading of European history: individuality was the most important 
development in modernity. It was, however, a contingent achievement with no 
guarantee of survival. Oakeshott understood moral life to be where we freely 
make our choices, but act in conformity with a historically developed practice 
                                                   
67 Kant was clear on the civil implications of a morality that gives priority to freedom 
and individuality. In Theory and Practice, he wrote that the concept of justice [an 
external right] is derived from the concept of freedom in the external relations 
between persons. It has nothing to do with the natural end of man, the achievement 
of happiness, or with the means of attaining this end. Consequently, the goal of 
happiness must not interfere as a determinant of the laws of justice: ‘A government 
might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the people’ but ‘such a 
government is the worst conceivable despotism’ (1974, pp. 73-74). 
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recognised as authoritative by its participants. He had a strong preference for 
a morality based on habitual conduct over one based on general rules.  
 
In 1948, the first of two essays entitled ‘The Tower of Babel’ set out two 
opposing ways of understanding moral life. He claimed not to address the 
practical question of ‘what kinds of human enterprise should be designated 
right and wrong?’, or the meta-ethical ‘what is the ultimate nature of moral 
criteria?’. Rather, he offered an explanation of the two ideal types of moral life 
that he considered to have been historically present in western civilization 
(1991, p. 467). Oakeshott’s methodology paralleled his account of 
individuality: he opposed two ideal types that he claimed to have been ever 
present in our culture in recent centuries, although neither has ever been 
actualised in its ideal form. 
 
He described first type of moral life as ‘a habit of affection and behaviour; not 
a habit of reflective thought, but a habit of affection and conduct’ (1991, p. 
467).  In our everyday lives we do not consciously apply rules but act 
according to a certain habit of behaviour as our conduct is almost unreflective.  
It amounts to following a tradition of conduct in which we have been brought 
up. Morality is analogous to a vernacular language and is characterised by its 
stability, large or sudden changes are not considered desirable. Its stability 
‘derives from its elasticity and its ability to suffer change without disruption’ 
(ibid., p. 470).  
 
The second form of the moral life is determined not by unreflective habit, but 
‘by the reflective application of a moral criterion’ (1991, pp. 472-473). It 
appears in two common varieties: first as ‘the self-conscious pursuit of moral 
ideals’, and second ‘as the reflective observance of moral rules’ (ibid.). The 
purpose of this form of moral life is to specify the desirable objects of 
behaviour, to set them out distinctly and unequivocally and show their 
relations to one another.  
 
Oakeshott pointed out some of the dangers associated with this form. The 
continual scrutiny of behaviour tends to damage moral habit, and moral 
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reflection may come to constrain moral sensibility. More dangerously he 
claimed that moral ideals necessitate perfection, which may be an activity 
fitting for individuals, but not for societies. The pursuit of any ideal will lead 
to disillusion and consequently this form of the moral life is hazardous in an 
individual, but ruinous in a society. It may be a gamble worth taking for an 
individual: ‘For society it is mere folly’ (1991, pp. 475-477). 
 
This is a profoundly conservative point of view. Arguably, he committed the 
fallacy of ignoratio elenchi by drawing a normative conclusion from an 
historical account of the moral tendencies within Western culture. He 
denounced the pursuit of ideals once more in the conclusion of ‘The Tower of 
Babel’. He felt that the pursuit had come to dominate our moral life and the 
price of this is ruin ‘to a settled habit of behaviour’ (1991, p. 487). 
 
Such comments can only be read as a dogmatic assertion of the superiority of 
a morality of habitual behaviour over one of ideals. Oakeshott’s argument 
paralleled his critique of ideology in political practice and lends support to 
those who seek to portray him as a Burkean conservative; 68 someone who 
valorises tradition over rationalism, where the latter is understood as an 
attempt to extract general rules from the study of a practice, whether moral or 
political. In the essay ‘Political Education’ (1991, pp. 43-69), for example, 
Oakeshott claimed that goals of political activity can only be evaluated in 
relation to a traditional manner of behaviour, a theme that will be elaborated 
in Chapter Four (1991, 56).  
 
Oakeshott was resolutely anti-perfectionist in his preference for a morality of 
habitual behaviour: by claiming that the pursuit of ideals will result in 
disasters for society. But, his preference for a morality of habitual behaviour 
entailed no particular moral practices. He stressed the importance of 
contingency in how our practices develop, so there is no guarantee that things 
will turn out well (1975a, p. 56). A morality of habitual behaviour, however, 
                                                   
68 Like Oakeshott, Burke’s preference for habitual morality over the pursuit of ideals 
permeated his work. ‘We [the English] know that we have made no discoveries, and 
we think there are no discoveries to be made, in morality …’ (1887, W3, p. 345). 
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could well endorse practices such as slavery, racism and systematic anti-
Semitism, which people later consider abhorrent. He was arguably implicitly 
endorsing moral relativism. As moral practices vary between societies, and if 
there is no ideal viewpoint from which to criticise them, one moral practice 
has as much legitimacy as the next.69 
 
The charge of moral relativism is supported by several observations in the 
Notebooks. He observed that Aristotle came to a different conclusion from 
that reached by Plato & Spinoza, both of whom placed morality in the 
intellectual sphere. Oakeshott felt ‘Aristotle was wrong in taking popular 
opinion on a psychological point; but right when he refers moral judgments 
to current practices and opinion’ (2014, p. 33, italics added). He later noted: 
‘The judgments of ordinary people are a register for the morality of the whole 
- for morality is essentially a thing of community’ (2014, p. 117). He also 
posited the impossibility and wrongness of radically challenging the 
civilisation of which we are a part: ‘No one can hope to devise a way of living 
wholly different from & better than (& liveable) the way of living which 
belongs to his civilization’ (2014, p. 280). He believed that the most that can 
be done by an individual is to understand the inconsistencies that may have 
arisen in the civilisation to which he belongs: ‘Set them right in his own mind 
- &, if he is fortunate, in his own life’ (ibid.). 
 
As will be argued in Chapter Four, Oakeshott made a similar argument 
regarding the futility of ideological attempts to break free from an existing 
political tradition. 
 
The upshot, then, of his account of morality is that it is tradition-dependent 
and particularistic. It is foolish, he argued, to break away from tradition by 
attempting to formulate general moral rules. But moral traditions dominated 
by the mentality of the individual manqué will not value individuality and the 
                                                   
69 In Ethics, J. L. Mackie explains that those who argue that morality is subjective 
often ground their belief on the ‘argument from relativity’, which is based on the 
observation that moral codes vary from one society to another, and also that moral 
beliefs can differ between different groups within a community’ (1977, 36). 
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love of freedom at the heart of his personal value system. So there is a tension 
between his reverence for individuality and his preference for a morality of 
habitual conduct, whether conducive to individuality or not. 
 
 Freedom and Morality 
  
In OHC, Oakeshott dropped the language of tradition in favour of the generic 
term “practice” to describe all human relationships with a determinate or 
stable shape. 70  He made a critical distinction between understanding a 
practice and a process (1975a, pp. 12-19). A practice is perceived as a ‘going-
on’, conceived as an expression of human intelligence. Practices are intelligent 
responses to understood situations. Oakeshott aimed to demonstrate that 
attempts to understand human actions, as if abstract patterning allowed them 
to be assimilated to the processes and systems by which we understand the 
natural world, were profoundly mistaken. The human world is fundamentally 
different from the natural world. It is one where intelligent agents freely 
interact, rather than one where material things interact with one another in 
conformity with the laws of physics.  
 
At the heart of Oakeshott’s theory of human conduct was this distinction 
between understanding a practice and a process. Practices are always 
intelligent responses to understood situations, and every human response to a 
situation is predicated on understanding a practice. Sports or politics are 
practices, for example, which must be learned in order to participate in the 
practice itself. A process, by contrast, is not in itself an exhibition of 
intelligence. Processes may be rendered intelligible by identifying their causal 
conditions, such as tidal movements or the rotation of the planets. The 
practice/process distinction broadly maps on to the distinction between the 
human and natural sciences in his thinking. Oakeshott was not sympathetic to 
                                                   
70  Steven B. Smith notes that a word search reveals that “tradition” only appears 
twice in OHC. On page 24, Oakeshott speaks of the analysis of a poem in relation to a 
‘literary tradition’; on page 286, he uses it to note the unlikeness of Russia and the 
West (Smith 2012, p. 151). 
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those social sciences, such as sociology and psychology, which have tried to 
impose the process idiom onto the interpretation of human conduct.  
 
The conflation of practices and processes was a fundamental category error in 
his view. He illustrated the absurdity created by the conflation of process and 
practice.  When a geneticist, for example, gives an explanation of human 
conduct, or behaviour, as ‘the inescapable consequences of the genetic 
individuality of the persons concerned’, he says nothing more than that 
everything is done by the genes, and ‘this theorem is itself his genes speaking’ 
(1975a, p. 15, n.1). The attempt to understand human conduct as a process 
ignores its key characteristic: that of a reflective, intelligent being freely 
initiating actions and reacting to the actions of others. 
 
Some commentators claim that the central thread running through OHC is the 
idea of freedom. Ken Minogue wrote that ‘the idea of freedom is nowhere 
explicitly treated, but clearly underlies everything he has to say’ (1975, p. 11). 
According to Noel O’Sullivan, another ‘Oakeshottian’,71 the main feature of 
Oakeshott’s temperament was ‘a love of freedom so radical and 
uncompromising that it imbued his conservatism with existentialist, and even 
anarchist, sympathies’ (1993, p. 101). This may be the case, but it is not easy to 
discern directly the significance of freedom to Oakeshott, as his explicit 
references to the concept were limited. In OHC, for example, he refers directly 
to freedom on only six pages. 
 
In his account of human conduct, freedom is described in a very formal sense, 
where “human freedom” is taken to be a different phenomenon from “civil 
freedom”.  The idea of conduct, to which he referred, is that ‘of an agent 
disclosing and enacting himself in performances whose imagined or wished-
for outcomes are performances of other agents or other performances of 
                                                   
71 Paul Kelly lists Oakeshott’s influence on a number of Politics departments in terms 
of “Oakeshottian” scholars such as Elie Kedourie (1930-2013) at LSE; W. H. 
Greenleaf (1927-2008) at Swansea; Bhikhu Parekh and Noel O’Sullivan at Hull; 
Preston King at Sheffield; and Robert Eccleshall at Belfast (2010, p. 2). 
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himself’ (1975a, p. 36). Oakeshott claimed that human conduct postulates a 
‘free agent’ (ibid.). 
 
He expressly asserted that he was not bothered with teleological or 
metaphysical explanations of freedom. He was concerned ‘not with the quality 
of being substantively “self-directed” which a person may or not realize and 
which, when a high degree of it is realized, is rightly called “self-
determination” or “autonomy”’ (ibid., p. 37). Oakeshott was concerned to 
consider how freedom relates to the exercise of agency. He concluded that 
conduct presupposes freedom. He identified “doing” ‘as response to a 
contingent and wished-for outcome’, which postulates ‘reflective 
consciousness’ (1975a, p. 36). When alternatives are before an agent he must 
be capable of choosing between them and deciding on a course of action: ‘In 
short conduct postulates a “free” agent’ (ibid.)  
 
It may be useful to describe him as a “compatibilist”, as he believed that one 
can talk of freedom of action without the need to engage in the free will 
debate.  His position is similar to that of David Hume, who denied it was 
necessary to posit a metaphysical notion of the will being causally free to 
speak intelligibly of freedom of choice. Freedom, rather, consists merely of 
agents’ observable exercise of choice between different options. Hume 
referred to this as “freedom of spontaneity”. Liddington concludes that 
Oakeshott’s ‘freedom intrinsic to agency’ should be interpreted as the absence 
of causation (1984, p. 299). 
 
 The key concepts in this Oakeshott’s formulation of freedom are “reflectivity” 
and “contingency”. 72  The human agent is “reflective consciousness” and 
freedom is presupposed by an agent’s self-understanding that he is free to 
make choices, not by the existence of metaphysical “free will”. Freedom is not 
awareness per se, but awareness of a situation; as long as it is identified to be 
the agent’s situation, it always calls for a reaction from him. There is a 
decision to do this rather than that.  
                                                   
72 For an in-depth discussion of freedom, reflexivity and contingency, see Efraim 
Podoksik’s ‘Freedom as Recognized Contingency’ (2003a). 
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A contingent relationship is a sequence of related intelligent events where 
what a subsequent event is recognized to be contingent on a preceding event. 
They belong together and compose an ‘intelligible continuity of conditionally 
dependent occurrences’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 104). Contingency is not an 
accidental relationship, but one between two episodes in which the latter 
achieves significance in the context of the former, but is not determined by it. 
That is, contingency like freedom is a postulate of human conduct. Reflectivity 
and contingency, then, presuppose and depend on each other, for ‘in an 
agent’s understanding of his situation its contingency is postulated’ (ibid., p. 
41). This means that a conscious agent must find his situation to be one in 
which he is supposed to make a performance that has not been determined: a 
human agent always has a choice. Even a slave may decide to obey or disobey 
orders and be punished as a consequence, but this is still his decision. 
Oakeshott does not, of course, mean that the slave is socially free - but he is 
free in comparison to an inanimate object.  
 
Whether or not we consider this a satisfactory account of freedom, its 
significance is that it sets the stage for Oakeshott to advocate the virtues of 
civil association on the ground that freedom of choice, emblematic of what it 
means to be human, is protected. As freedom is a presupposition of morality, 
and morality is intrinsic to our humanity and therefore to all human 
association, it is of irreducible importance for him. His fundamental 
commitment to strong agency, individuality, freedom and self-enactment had 
clear political implications and it also helps explain his distance from most 
contemporary liberal theory, with its intent to shape outcomes, such as a 
fairer distribution or the recognition of rights. If freedom is the essence of 
humanity, free people who cherish their freedom and individuality above all 
else will create governments with limited ambitions, which are unlikely to 
violate people’s freedom. 
 
Oakeshott’s narrative suffers, however, from shortcomings exposed in various 
forms of libertarianism. He largely ignored the interdependent relationship 
between liberty and equality. In Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, he 
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admitted: ‘I think in the end it is impossible to keep the concepts of liberty 
and equality apart’ (Oakeshott 1993a, p. 131). But he never fully expressed his 
view of their interdependency, or elaborated the idea of equality except in the 
formal sense of equality under the rule of law.  
 
Of course, such freedom is subject to the requirements of moral practice, but 
as he claimed that moral practice, properly understood, is non-instrumental, 
we have a potential reconciliation of freedom and morality, a claim that will be 
examined in the following section.  
  
Morality as a non-instrumental practice 
 
Oakeshott claimed that practices are either moral or prudential, a distinction 
that is also fundamental to the moral philosophy of Kant. A practice is that 
which joins persons in conduct. A profusion of practices may overlap but ‘a 
common tongue and a language of moral converse’ are the two most 
important practices in terms of which agents are related to one another are 
(Oakeshott 1975a, 59). A practice may be identified as a set of ‘considerations, 
manners, observances, customs, standards, canon’s maxims, principles, rules 
and offices’ that specify procedures or denote obligations or duties that relate 
to human activities (1975a, p. 55). Practices can be either a prudential or 
moral-adverbial qualification of choices and performances. The claim that 
moral rules are “adverbial qualifications” of performances, and not 
prescriptions, was a fundamental feature of his moral theory.  
 
By “adverbial”, he meant how we undertake performances once we have made 
our choices: ‘Moral rules are abridgements [which] concentrate into specific 
precepts considerations of adverbial desirability’ (1975a, p. 66). A rule does 
not tell an agent what choice he should make, but specifies the conditions the 
agent should subscribe to when making choices. The criminal law, he claimed, 
which may seem to be prescriptive by explicitly forbidding actions, ‘does not 
forbid killing or lighting a fire’ for example, it only prohibits ‘killing 
‘“murderously” or lighting a fire “arsonically”’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 58, n. 1).  
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Moral conduct is governed by the rules of moral practice.  Oakeshott defined 
moral conduct as ‘agents related to one another in the acknowledgment of the 
authority of a practice’ (ibid., p. 60). He called it a “practice” as the conditions 
of a practice have the generic characteristic of generality. Moreover, ‘a 
morality is the ars artium of conduct; the practice of all practices; the practice 
of agency without further specification’ (ibid.). It is the over-arching practice 
beneath which all other practices are subsumed. 
 
Agents are linked to one another in conduct as aspirants of desired-for 
satisfactions and producers of such. The rules of prudential practices are 
designed to promote the success of transactions. They are instrumental to the 
achievement of the wished for satisfactions. He cited such examples as the 
rules for making pastry, office routines and a railway service that runs to a 
strict timetable.  
 
In contrast, moral practice is not concerned with outcomes. It is concerned 
with how agents interact and impact one another irrespective of the particular 
wants they may be pursuing. Morality applies to all human actions; no agent 
is outside its purview. In this sense, it is the practice of agency without further 
specification; whereas prudential practices are further subject to the 
specification of prevailing moral rules. 
 
In Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott distinguished between a morality of 
affective behaviour and one of reflection. In On Human Conduct, he made a 
further distinction between the practice and rules of morality. The practice of 
morality is like that of a living language. Both can certainly facilitate the 
achievement of our ends and purposes, but language as a whole has no end or 
purpose. To ask what is the point of a language is self-contradictory. The same 
is true of morality - and both it and language are constitutive of individuality: 
‘There is room for the individual idiom, it affords opportunity to 




Oakeshott gave short shrift to those who claimed that the terms of a moral 
practice are to be comprehended in terms of an unspecified ‘social’ 
relationship: such as providing the means for achieving the ‘common good’ of 
those thus related (ibid., p. 61). Nor did he accept that they are conditions for 
achieving human excellence. Nor are agents with regard to moral 
considerations ‘recognized as role performers in the greatest of human 
enterprises: the good life’ (ibid.). Of course, agents may relate to one another 
in pursuit of a common purpose or promotion of a common interest; in this 
case, the practice is correctly understood as instrumental to the common 
purpose, but it is not a moral relationship.  
 
Oakeshott made two observations that anticipated his analysis of the civil 
condition. First, a moral relationship is constituted in terms of choice and it 
survives as long as the choice is not revoked. The implication is that a moral 
practice does not threaten the freedom inherent in agency: it does not dictate 
what we choose to do, only how we perform having made our choice. In that 
sense it is an “adverbial” consideration that does not compromise the freedom 
implicit in agency. In Chapter Three we will see that Oakeshott made the same 
claim of laws, properly understood: laws merely qualify performances, they do 
not direct. 
 
Second, he claimed that “human excellence” or the “human good” are not 
substantive purposes. They are not purposes to be achieved as the upshot of 
performances. They are not purposes that an agent might elect to follow in 
preference to the fulfilment of some other want ‘of which he might or might 
not choose to be related with others in achieving (…) like joining an expedition 
to climb Mount Everest’ (1975a, p. 61). 
 
Moreover, “the common good” is not a substantive satisfaction that an agent 
may or may not choose to join together with others to procure, ‘like getting in 
the harvest’ (ibid.). Properly speaking, such ends are not purposes to be 
attained at all: ‘If morality is a practice concerned with “human excellence” 
then it is not a set of conditions instrumental to the achievement of a purpose’ 
(ibid., p. 62). Morality is a practice without any extrinsic purpose: ‘It is a 
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relationship solely in respect of conditions to be subscribed to in seeking the 
satisfaction of any want’ (ibid.).  
 
 
The significance of Oakeshott’s account of morality 
 
His account of morality was idiosyncratic: ‘In the end Oakeshott’s idea of 
moral experience defies categorization. It is his alone’ (Smith 2012, p. 147). In 
his memoir, Our Age, Noel Annan portrayed him as “deviant” from the 
conventional wisdom of the 1920-1950 period (1991). 73  The secondary 
literature does not adequately capture the “deviancy” to which Annan refers. 
Oakeshott’s understanding of morality was unconventional by contemporary 
standards. He presented morality simply as a vernacular language, not a 
system of obligations. In his review of Edgar Frederick Carritt’s Morals and 
Politics (1935) he referred to moral obligation and its relation to politics in an 
offhand fashion: ‘A true theory of politics must begin by doing homage to 
“moral obligation”. It would appear, however, that moral obligation (…)  is 
rather a datum of a theory of politics’ (2007, p. 124, italics added).74  
 
Oakeshott was an advocate of the morality of individuality to the almost total 
exclusion of engaging in issues of the morality of the common good, which is 
unusual in contemporary political discourse. He sidestepped issues associated 
with altruism and a more positive understanding of social obligation. Such 
issues are central to the question of social justice. He focused on the moral 
behaviour of individual selves to the almost complete neglect of the positive 
role of the self in the community. 
 
In particular, he ignored the question of whether government can or should 
do anything to promote self-realisation. To the extent that he answered this 
                                                   
73 Annan considered Oakeshott together with F. R. Leavis and Evelyn Waugh as the 
three main deviants of “Our Age”- those who attended either Oxford, Cambridge or 
the LSE between 1919 and 1951 
74 See T. M. Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other? (1998); and Michael Sandel’s 
‘What Do We Owe One Another? Dilemmas of Loyalty’ (2009, pp. 208-243), as 
recent discussions of the issue. 
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question at all, his moral writings can be interpreted as suggesting that the 
state should do nothing other than provide the conditions for individual 
initiative and choice. His account of morality intimated a procedural, rules 
based understanding of political authority, which will be elaborated in the 
next chapter. 
 
What marked out individual morality for him is the disposition to make one’s 
own choices in a manner consistent with self-respect, not the quest for 
hedonistic self-gratification or the approval of others. In the Notebooks, he 
explained that the greatest error in the interpretation of moral theory in 
recent centuries has been the conflation of “self-interest” with “selfishness”: 
‘Nonsense about ‘psychological hedonism’- there can be no such thing’ (2014, 
p. 467). He argued that both Kant and Hobbes were asking the same question: 
‘Who is to be satisfied in moral conduct?’ The answer was not God, social 
conscience or humanity but the self: ‘One’s own good opinion of oneself. Self-
respect: It is the morality of ‘honour’ (ibid.) Later in the Notebooks Oakeshott 
reiterated his view: ‘Self-interest is not a psychological, but a moral doctrine 
(…) “self-interest” is an identification of morality with “honour”’ (2014, p. 
479). Such an understanding of morality flows from the gentlemanly virtues 
that he was disposed to value, which we examined in Chapter One. 
 
The distinction between self-interest and selfishness in practice, however, was 
less clear cut for him. Luke O’ Sullivan observes that ‘he seemed to have done 
his best to live a life of radical moral individualism, though not, it must be 
said, without imposing considerable costs on some of those around him, 
particularly the women in his life’ (O’Sullivan, L. 2014, p. xxv). This is not to 
sit in judgment on him, but to suggest that his understanding of morality 
implicitly denied the demands of altruism which Bernard Williams describes 
as a customary disposition to regard the interests of others as making some 
claim on one, and, in particular, ‘as implying the possibility of limiting one’s 
own projects’ (1993, p. 250). There appear to have been few self-imposed 
barriers to the pursuit of Oakeshott’s projects.  A number of his friends and 
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colleagues, such as Kenneth Minogue, have attested, however, to his personal 
generosity and quality as a friend (2007). 75  
 
In Chapter One, we noted that the character that Oakeshott most admired was 
the courageous individualist who is prepared to take risks and defend his 
opinions and manner of living. The opposite character is the anti-individual 
who seeks to substitute the idiom of individual morality with a dull 
collectivism. He tried to live his life as a courageous individualist. There was, 
he wrote as a young man, ‘something wild in me’; in old age, he thought of 
himself as having been ‘born under a wandering star’ (2014, p. 208 and p. 
511). Andrew Sullivan claims that ‘he was in love with the individualism 
within himself’ and suggests that this was the real source of his political 
conservatism in that a calm and limited political order allows individuals such 
as Oakeshott to ‘pursue the extreme and the risky and the quixotic’ (Sullivan 
2010).  
  
Sullivan’s suggestion is supported when we consider Oakeshott’s unique and 
controversial interpretation of Hobbes. He interpreted Hobbes as addressing 
both the needs of the courageous individualist, whom he also called a ‘proud 
man’, in addition to the ‘tame man’, through the ‘moralization of pride’ 
(1975b, p. 128). He speculated that a possible motive for peace as the impulse 
for men to join together in civil association, other than the fear of ignominious 
death, which motivates the tame man, could be one that protects both men. It 
is conceivable, he argued that the predominant passion of the courageous 
individualist is pride rather than fear. Civil association allows the proud man 
to express his individuality but ‘he is a man who would find greater shame in 
the meanness of settling for mere survival than in suffering the dishonour of 
being recognised a failure’ (Oakeshott 1975b, p.128). Pride provides an 
                                                   
75 See The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott (1993), ed. A. J. Norman. Josiah Lee 
Auspitz tells of the parson at Oakeshott’s funeral who, having consulted the local 
villagers in Acton, reported that ‘the deceased was a kind man, a cheerful man, very 
helpful, generous, unpretentious (…) he compared him to St Francis, an analogy he 
found so gripping that he henceforth referred to him as Francis rather than Michael 
as the coffin was lowered into the earth’ (ibid., p. 2). In the same volume, Jeffrey Hart 
claims that he ‘established modesty as a philosophical principle, and extended it to 
many other modes of discourse’ (ibid., p. 82). 
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adequate motive for peace, but is insufficient due to the dearth of such noble 
characters: ‘especially in pursuers of wealth, command, and sensual pleasure; 
which are the greatest part of mankind’ (ibid.). 
 
 Oakeshott’s ethics can best be described as aristocratic, elitist or 
‘gentlemanly’, as elaborated by Letwin. They are inherently opposed to the 
pursuit of wealth and sensual pleasure, and the assumption of rights and 
entitlements and instant gratification, which are characteristic of the modern 
era. His description of Hobbes could equally apply to himself: ‘He [Hobbes] 
felt constrained to write for those whose chief desire is to understand human 
beings more properly concerned with honour than with either survival or 
prosperity’ (1975b, p. 33). When we further reflect on the manner in which he 
disparaged the individual manqué and the moral idiom of the common good, 
we can reasonably expect that “the proud man” will prefer a state that allows 
him to pursue his projects, unhindered by the distractions and demands of 
common purposes: he will thus favour a state organised as a civil association. 
 
In Chapter Two we have seen that Oakeshott’s formal account of morality has 
normative implications. The first is the domination of the self in his moral 
theory to the exclusion of addressing the question of what we owe to others. 
This grounds his radical individualism. Second is his claim that freedom is a 
postulate of human agency and the basis of human dignity. Third is his 
preference for a morality of habitual conduct and fourth is his argument that 
morality is a non-instrumental practice. 
 
His account of morality underpins his political theory. If freedom is the 
essence of human individuality and a presupposition of morality, this suggests 
that those political systems that seek to constrain our choices more than the 
demands of conventional moral practice are immoral. A state that pursues a 
policy of the collective good is both misconceived and immoral, as it implicitly 
constrains the choices of citizens over and above the “adverbial” constraints of 
morality. Whatever the merits of this argument, which will be considered in 




On the face of it there appears to be an inconsistency between his preference 
for a morality of habitual conduct and individuality. This is a conservative 
position, in the Burkean sense, of recommending gradual change over radical 
reform. But, as specific moral practices are contingent, they could be inimical 
to individuality. It places Oakeshott in the contradictory position of 
advocating a morality of individuality, while implying that we should accept 
any conventional morality that contingency has established, even if that be 
expressed in the idiom of the common good, which he clearly despised. The 
inconsistency is eased, but not eliminated, by the distinction that he made 
between self-disclosure and self-enactment. Self-enactment is how we 
autonomously reveal our individuality to ourselves as we alone are the judge 
of what constitutes virtuous action. Moral practice merely prescribes how we 
disclose ourselves to others as we go about our business. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Teleocracy, Nomocracy and the Rule of Law 
 
What is the state for? 
 
A primary aim of this thesis is to evaluate Oakeshott’s answer to what he 
considered the preoccupation of political theory in recent centuries: what is 
the state for? Is it to provide for liberty or social security, or both? For Hobbes 
the state existed to provide security. For Mill and Thomas Paine the answer 
was liberty. For the Fabians it was social welfare.  The continuing relevance of 
these questions was highlighted by the financial crisis of 2008, which required 
huge state support to save the banks. This demonstrated that governments in 
the West are stretched in their ability to meet their accumulated social welfare 
and security commitments: ‘The state has become bloated and overwhelmed. 
Even if it were run by the world’s most efficient technocrats it would still be a 
gigantic mess; supersized by ambition and pulled hither and thither by 
conflicting aims’ (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2014, Chapter 9).76   The US 
                                                   
76 In the introduction to English History 1914-1945, A. J. P. Taylor wrote that ‘until 
August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly 
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Presidential election of 2012 was debated with this question very much in 
mind. Members of the “Tea Party” wing of the Republican Party, such as 
Congressman Ron Paul, argued that to believe truly in liberty is to divorce it 
from any desired social and economic outcome, which implies a very different 
conception of the state than we have today (Paul 2011). It is, in Oakeshott’s 
terms, to conceive the state as a civil association, not an enterprise 
association. 
 
Oakeshott’s lifetime preoccupation with the question of what the state is for 
has thus become even more relevant, and is likely to remain so until its 
commitment can be calibrated with what its citizens are prepared to pay for it. 
His standing as one of the leading twentieth-century political philosophers is 
justified by his remorseless focus and systematic approach to answering the 
question. Oakeshott provided a comprehensive moral answer to the question 
that intimated a similar conclusion to Paul’s: a purposeful state necessarily 
compromises freedom. He attempted to purge our understanding of the state, 
conceived as a nomocracy, or civil association, of any substantive economic or 
distributive considerations. As we examine his argument, we will see that it is 
only consistent in practice with a minimalist state. His analysis brought into 
focus the trade-offs in terms of loss of liberty that is entailed by any 
substantially purposeful conception of the state.  
 
In Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, the Harvard Lectures (1993b), 
Oakeshott claimed that the question of the proper scope of governmental 
power is often conflated with the basis of political authority: ‘Whether it is the 
constitution of government or the activities of government’ (1993b, p. 12). He 
claimed that the reflection and discussion that appears to refer to authority is 
actually concerned with the activities of governments. He contended, 
                                                                                                                                                 
notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could 
live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He 
could travel abroad or leave his country for ever without a passport or any sort of 
official permission. The Englishman paid taxes on a modest scale: nearly £200 
million in 1913-14, or rather less than 8 per cent of the national income. The state 
intervened to prevent the citizens from eating adulterated foods or contracting 
certain infectious diseases’ (1965, p. 1).  
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moreover, in his Lectures in the History of Political Thought that ‘there is no 
necessary connection’ between what we suppose a government should be 
doing and what we believe about the basis of its authority (2006, p. 483).  
 
Consistent with his claim that our political orientation is largely a matter of 
disposition, he acknowledged, however, that there will probably be a fairly 
close link between what we suppose a government should be doing and ‘what 
sort of collectivity of human beings we understand a “state” to be’ (ibid.). The 
kind of state favoured by freedom-loving individualists will be very different 
to that which appeals to security-loving anti-individualists. Agents who are 
not disposed to relish the opportunity to foster their individuality and enjoy 
their freedom will be more satisfied by governments conceived as teleocracies. 
These may not pursue a single over-arching purpose but rather the 
‘ramshackle body of purposes (solvency, conquest, racial homogeneity, 
international prestige, the relief of poverty or unemployment, the promotion 
of trade or religion), none of which is sovereign’ and which is typical of 
modern states (Liddington 1984, p. 305).  
 
This chapter explores and evaluates Oakeshott’s claim that a nomocratic state, 
or government under the rule of law, is to be preferred by individualists, like 
himself, who enjoy making their own choices. He argued that a nomocracy 
allows its associates to exercise the freedom inherent in agency and, 
moreover, is the only properly form of moral association. The implications of 
this conception of the state for our understanding of justice and political 
authority, and what it intimates for his preferred ‘shape of an office of 
government’, will also be spelled out (2008, p. 243). The following section 
describes his ideal states of teleocracy and nomocracy, which correspond to 
what he later called universitas/societas or, in the English translation, 
enterprise/civil association.  
 
Although his terminology changed over time, the distinction remains the 
same. Teleocracy/universitas, or enterprise association, conceives of the state 
as purposeful; whereas societas/nomocracy/civil association conceives it as 
essentially purposeless, grounded in civitas, the relationship of civility. Before 
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evaluating the logic of Oakeshott’s argument for the superiority of nomocracy, 
or societas, we need to understand the method of investigation that he 
pursued. This is somewhat contentious, as it is based on an abridgement of 
modern European political history that may not be historical by his standards 
and may commit the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi: the confusion of categorial 
modes of thought that results in irrelevance. Throughout his career Oakeshott 
insisted on the distinction between the “historical past” and the “practical 
past”: ‘The world of history has no data to offer of which practical experience 
can make use; and to conceive it as offering such data is to misconceive its 
character’ (1933, p.  158).77  
 
Oakeshott’s Analytical Method and Interpretation of Modern 
European History 
 
In the third and final essay of On Human Conduct, Oakeshott outlined the 
programme of enquiry that he proposed to follow in his account of civil 
association and the rule of law. His concern was ‘to consider what has been 
thought about the character of a modern European state and about its office 
(that is, the engagements not the constitution) of its government’ (1975a, p. 
189). He did not claim to be giving a realistic portrayal or descriptive 
sociology of actual legal systems, or of actual states, but to be clarifying the 
ambiguities inherent in the experience of living in a modern state through the 
method of opposing ideal characters. An ideal character is not to be identified 
with ‘an ambiguous going-on like the Kingdom of Denmark’ (ibid., p. 121). In 
his 1983 essay ‘The Rule of Law’, he speculated about whether this product of 
the imagination is anything ‘more than a logician’s dream’, or whether it is a 
‘possible practical engagement’ (1999, p. 162). He further insisted that much 
in modern history has opposed nomocracy and ‘the circumstances of modern 
Europe have always made it impossible for any state (except, perhaps, 
Andorra) to achieve this condition without qualification’ (ibid., p. 176).  
                                                   
77   The Cambridge historian Sir Herbert Butterfield anticipated Oakeshott’s 
argument: ‘The study of the past with one eye on the present is the source of all the 
sins and sophistries in history. It is the essence of what we mean by the word 
“unhistorical”’ (Butterfield 1931) 
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Moreover, in spite of his obvious preference for a nomocratic state, or civil 
association, in his essay ‘The Concept of Government in Modern Europe’, he 
acknowledged that ‘it is more important for us to know with exactitude where 
we stand before trying to improve our position’ (2008, p. 104). Whereas his 
preference for civil association is clear he did not think it either practical or 
desirable to think it could be realised in its ideal form. If either teleocracy or 
nomocracy were to take over completely, he argued, we would find ourselves 
in a worse situation from both the practical and intellectual point of view: ‘It is 
more important not to delude ourselves about what we currently think than to 
think in a different manner’ (ibid., pp. 104-105). 
 
Thus, whereas I claim that Oakeshott’s account of the presuppositions of 
nomocracy revealed his preferences and disposition (as described in Chapters 
One and Two), it would be wrong to read him as the unashamed advocate of 
civil association, which he considered to constitute an unrealisable utopia. We 
will return to the upshot, if any, of his account of the state in Chapter Four, 
when we evaluate his account of practical political activity. 
 
Oakeshott’s key historical, or empirical, claim was that every modern state 
and everything associated with it is ambiguous – in terms of politics, 
government and law (1975a, pp. 231-232). In the case of law, the ambiguity is 
whether law is a system of prescriptive conditions that are indifferent to the 
satisfaction of wants, which we subscribe to when we choosing what to do or 
say, or ‘is it a set of prudential managerial conclusions specifying a common 
purpose and the manner in which this purpose shall be contingently pursued?  
(1975a, p. 231). 
   
The same ambiguity is present in our understanding of the purpose 
government and purpose of politics. Oakeshott claimed this ambiguity ‘has 
imposed a particular ambivalence upon all the institutions of a modern state’ 
(ibid., p. 201). He saw his job as a philosopher was to make clear this 
ambiguity and to clear up the muddle caused by the coming together of two 
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currents of thought that he presented as a tension between individualism 
(societas) and collectivism (universitas). 
  
He had already developed this understanding of European history by 1939. He 
articulated it repeatedly for the rest of his career. It would be too much of a 
digression, and a dissertation in itself, to engage in a formal examination of 
the plausibility of his narrative of modern European history, from which he 
abstracts his concepts of societas and universitas. However, as this is central 
to his theory of civil association, I will point out certain features, which bear 
on its plausibility. In this, I draw heavily on O’Sullivan’s ‘Oakeshott on 
European Political History’ (2000); and Oakeshott on History (2003), which 
are the most comprehensive discussions of Oakeshott’s historical work in the 
secondary literature. 
 
It should be remembered that Oakeshott was not a professional historian. He 
read history as an undergraduate and was a member of the History Faculty at 
Cambridge. As a historian, he was, however, a ‘comparative amateur’ 
(O’Sullivan 2000, 133). He is better remembered for his contribution to the 
philosophy of history, both in Experience and its Modes (1933) and several 
essays that are collected in On History and Other Essays (1999).78 O’Sullivan 
notes that a major difference between his works and those of contemporary 
professional historians is that Oakeshott’s technique of the ‘bird’s-eye view’ 
offers a much more sweeping vision that  assimilate a broad span of events in 
a shorter space (2000, p. 133).79 
  
                                                   
78 An analysis of Oakeshott’s philosophy of history is included in Boucher (1984a, 
1984b and 1989). 
79 O’ Sullivan refers to J. G. A. Pocock, Q. Skinner, S. Collini, and J. Burrow as the 
‘professionals’ in this context, the so-called “Cambridge School”. If Skinner is typical, 
they evidently had little regard for Oakeshott as a historian. He was asked in an 
interview, ‘What was the influence of British idealism and especially such figures as 
Collingwood and Oakeshott on the early development of what came later to be called 
the “Cambridge School”?’ Skinner responded that ‘Oakeshott’s work was of no 
philosophical influence at all’ as ‘Oakeshott seemed a figure of the past and we 
rejected his anti-rationalism and political conservatism outright’ and ‘nothing 
prepared my generation for his apotheosis under Thatcherism, nor the high esteem 
in which his philosophy continues to be widely held’ (2002). 
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This, then, raises the question of whether Oakeshott’s abridgement of history 
is a useful basis from which to develop an account of civil and enterprise 
association. It might be argued that the professionals’ work manifests a 
certain limitation of vision. An alternative explanation is that ‘Oakeshott was 
able to produce his view of la longue durée only because he neglected the 
critical apparatus that is nowadays demanded of historical work’ (O’Sullivan 
2000, p. 134, n.9) Nonetheless, as O’Sullivan points out, Oakeshott’s 
classifications of civil association and enterprise association had a 
bibliographical pedigree: their genesis and development could be traced in the 
ideas of F. H. Maitland (1850-1906) (who was influenced by the German 
historian, O. Gierke) (1841-1921); and J. N. Figgis (1866-1919). Oakeshott 
would certainly have been exposed to Maitland as a history undergraduate at 
Cambridge; and Gierke greatly influenced Maitland. In his work on Natural 
Law (1868-1913), Maitland described European, especially German, history as 
a continual battle for dominance between two contrasting types of association. 
The first was typified by the medieval guild which was ‘communal, consensual 
and protective of its members (O’Sullivan 2000, p. 136). The second was 
‘ruthlessly individualistic and absolutist’ (ibid.). Oakeshott’s distinction 
between societas and universitas resembled this opposition, although it is 
formulated somewhat differently. 
 
The commentators who have taken a serious interest in Oakeshott’s account of 
the history of political thought have tended to see the character types of the 
“individual” and “anti-individual”, discussed in Chapter Two, ‘as the weakest 
link in his chain of reasoning’ (O’Sullivan 2000, p. 149). 80  This duality 
underpins the identification of societas and universitas as the ideal types that 
correspond to the dispositions of the individual and anti-individual. David 
                                                   
80  Anderson excoriates Oakeshott on this point: ‘Although Oakeshott was trained as 
a historian, and in one compartment of his mind always knew more about the actual 
detail of the European state than Hayek, Strauss or Schmitt, his normative theory of 
the state takes leave of its realities as a historical structure more completely than 
anything they proposed (...) Oakeshott lamented that the European state had come to 
be predominantly shaped as an enterprise association, but his theory left him with no 
historical explanation for why this aberration should have occurred. All he could offer 
was a psychic diagnosis (...) all of Oakeshott’s imposing erudition ends in the bathos 
of this small parable of the divided soul of economic man’ (1992, pp. 23-24).  
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Boucher, who is otherwise sympathetic to Oakeshott, points out that he could 
not draw on the resources of philosophy to ground his opposition of civil and 
enterprise association because of Oakeshott’s insistence that philosophy ‘does 
not make, recommend or circumscribe its subject’ (1991, p. 722). 
Consequently, Oakeshott had to establish the validity of his ideal characters by 
locating their appearance and development in European history.  Boucher 
describes Oakeshott’s narratives of the emergence of the “rationalist” and 
“mass man” and demonstrative political discourse as ‘selective, foreshortened 
and over-schematic accounts of identities, which are deemed to have come 
into existence and changed over time’ (ibid.). But, Boucher concludes that 
these accounts do not satisfy the criteria, nor conform to the practices that 
Oakeshott had identified as the ‘differentiae of the historical mode of enquiry’ 
(ibid.). 
 
So his account of the development of European thought is distinctly 
unhistorical. In Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott claimed that the hope of 
the historian is to avoid the condensation of a process which defines a new 
shape too soon, too late or gives too precise a definition and to ‘avoid the false 
emphasis which springs from being over- impressed by the moment of 
unmistakable emergence’ (1991, p. 18). 
 
  By basing his historical account of modern Europe and his political 
theorising upon the emergence of the “individual” in renaissance Italy, 
Oakeshott yielded - by his own admission - to the impulse to look for a more 
general explanation of the ambivalence between the “individual” and “anti-
individual” and between societas and universitas than a historical 
understanding can offer (1975a, p. 323). Oakeshott’s claim, which is 
fundamental to his account of the state, that hidden in human character there 
may be two potent and opposing dispositions, neither of which is powerful 
enough to overcome the other, is simply not verifiable by historical evidence. 
Yet in On Human Conduct, he stated that the efficacy of his views about the 
two prevalent dispositions ‘depends upon the identification of these 
dispositions as historic self-understandings and not universal psychological 
types’ (ibid., p. 325). 
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The second problem is that if his political philosophy is grounded on his 
critique of history, he is guilty of the logical infelicity he claimed to most 
despise: namely, the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi or irrelevance. If History is an 
activity seeking to know the past for its own sake, it is incapable of confirming 
or denying the conclusions reached in any other mode. In On History, 
Oakeshott said, for example: ‘It [history] is an autonomous mode of 
understanding, specifiable in terms of exact conditions, which is logically 
incapable of denying or confirming the conclusions of any other mode of 
understanding’ (1999, p. 3). Boucher tries to rescue him with the tendentious 
claim that we should not be misled into thinking that the ideal characters 
which Oakeshott extracts from European history have anything to do with 
history at all: ‘They are philosophical constructions philosophically conceived 
and “on the analogy of human history”’ (Boucher 1991, p. 723). But this 
contradicts what Oakeshott explicitly claimed to be doing. In ‘The Masses in 
Representative Democracy’, for example, he claimed to be engaging ‘in a piece 
of historical description’ when explaining ‘who this “mass man” is and where 




Teleocracy and Nomocracy81                                                            
 
In his Lectures in the History of Political Thought (2006), Oakeshott opposed 
two ideal conceptions of the state that answer the question of what a state 
should do in radically different ways. They are ideal ‘in being abstracted from 
the contingencies and ambiguities of actual goings-on in the world’ not in the 
sense of being a desired perfect state of things (1975a, p. 109). He called these 
ideal conceptions, or analogies of government, teleocracy and nomocracy, 
                                                   
81 The primary sources for Oakeshott’s work on law and justice are the Lectures 
(2006); the second chapter of On Human Conduct (1975a); his lengthy essay, ‘The 
Rule of Law’ (1999); and the two essays that comprise, ’The Vocabulary of a Modern 
European State’ (2008). 
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each of which conveys a belief about the business of government, not about 
the authority of government (2006, p. 470).  
 
In On Human Conduct (1975a), Oakeshott used the terms societas/civitas 
and universitas and, in the English translation, civil association and 
enterprise association, to explicate these analogies. In utilising Roman terms, 
he distanced himself from contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy 
by rejecting its vocabulary. He believed this had become amorphous, 
misleading and burdened with ideological baggage. He felt that Roman terms 
were less likely than their modern counterparts such as ‘“state”, “citizen”, 
“law”, “public concern”) to be mistaken for the characteristics of historic and 
ambiguous associations’ (1975a, p. 109).  
 
The use of the Latin terms is significant. Oakeshott admired the Roman 
political experience above all others in European history. He claimed that the 
Romans demonstrated a real flair for government and politics (2006, 176). 
David Boucher contends that it is more useful to assimilate him to the 
Republican tradition than to argue about whether he was a liberal or 
conservative in terms of political persuasion (Boucher 2005, p. 94). 
 
These opposing ideal states, offer different answers to the question, ‘What 
should government be doing?’ They do not address the different question of 
‘whence comes the authority to rule?’ (2006, pp. 469-470). Oakeshott defined 
a teleocratic  state as imposing a single end or purpose upon its subjects, or on 
their activities. 82  In opposition, government can be understood as a 
nomocratic activity: ‘Which provides rules for the conduct of its subjects, but 
rules which do not themselves impose any single and premeditated end or 
purpose on that conduct’ (ibid.,  p. 471).  
 
                                                   
82  Alexis de Tocqueville anticipated this as long ago as in the 1830s. He foresaw a 
future ‘in which associational life has died’, where the citizen ‘exists only in himself 
and for himself alone’ (loc. 14683), and ‘above this race of men stands an immense 
and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to 
watch over their fate (...) authority (...) [that] seeks to keep them in perpetual 
childhood’ (2000, Chapter 6).  
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The opposition of teleocracy and nomocracy is one of the highlights of 
Oakeshott’s contribution to political theory. It is the tool he used to justify his 
view that nomocracy, or civitas/civil association is a morally superior mode of 
political association. Most political theorists and practising politicians, 
however, would question whether nomocracy is even a useful concept. Most 
tend to presume that the state is an association of individuals with a shared 
purpose, or purposes. William Galston writes, for example, that ‘every 
political community is an enterprise association’. He does not bother to 
defend his explicit rejection of the state conceived as a nomocracy (1991, p. 3). 
George Osborne claimed in his 2014 Budget statement that ‘the central 
mission of this government is to deliver economic security' (14th March, p. 
2014). This mission was reiterated in the 2015 Budget statement.83 These 
examples suggest that Oakeshott’s presupposition that the state can be 
conceptually conceived as purposeless is, for many, a problematic idea. 
 
Teleocracy presupposes that agents are joined in purposive action: ‘Agents are 
joined in seeking to procure the satisfaction of a chosen common want or to 
promote a common interest’ (1999, p. 133). Teleocracy is the model for most 
human activities whether running a firm, educating children or promoting a 
political objective. In this mode of association, there is only what he 
summarised as ‘Purpose, Plan, Policy and Power’ (ibid. p. 135). Oakeshott 
pointed out that those who favour the teleocratic model often speak in terms 
of emergency, war and necessity, and argue that the specified end is not just 
desirable, but essential to the welfare of everyone. It is ‘not insignificant that 
the rhetoric of teleocratic belief is always liberally sprinkled with military 
analogy’ (2006, p. 496).84 The near continuous state of war in early modern 
Europe encouraged the idea of the state engaged in the pursuit of a purpose, 
as war is both a purposive and managerial activity. ‘(1975a, p. 273).  
 
                                                   
83 ‘Our goal is for Britain to become the most prosperous major economy in the 
world, with that prosperity widely shared. So we choose economic security’ (Osborne 
2015). 
84 For example, “War on Poverty”, “War on Cancer”, “War on Drugs”, “War on 
Women” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
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Oakeshott’s objection to the teleocratic model, or enterprise association, was 
its denial of the freedom inherent in the concept of personhood, by ‘severing 
the link between belief and conduct that constitutes moral agency’ (1975a, p. 
152). The teleocratic state is thus a ‘moral enormity’, as it compromises the 
moral autonomy of its citizens (Ibid., p. 158). 
 
Elizabeth Corey gives a modern example of the moral enormity of teleocracy. 
She suggests that it is difficult to envision an episode ‘that more perfectly 
illustrates Michael Oakeshott’s notion of teleocracy than the Supreme Court 
decision, in a 5-4 vote, that President Obama’s signature piece of legislation, 
the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), was constitutional’ (Corey 2014, 1). In 
pursuit of the goal of universal healthcare, this controversial Act compels all 
working American adults to purchase private health insurance. Insurers are 
compelled to provide this irrespective of the health history of the insured. The 
healthy, in effect, are compelled to subsidise the sick and purchase insurance, 
whether they want to or not. Americans are compelled to perform substantive 
actions of a kind they may not approve of; in the service of an end they have 
not chosen. As Corey remarks, ‘to paraphrase Oakeshott, there is only one 
thing worse than hearing the dreams of others, and that is being forced to live 
them yourself” (2014, p. 2).  
 
Oakeshott claimed that the teleocratic understanding of the state has 
remained remarkably stable over the past five hundred years, albeit with 
significant alterations in terms of the nature of the goal pursued. He identified 
three main kinds of end. First, in the religious version, the state is conceived 
as a religious and cultural organisation in pursuit of salvation, and the ruler is 
understood to be the manager of the salvation of the associates. He argued 
that this idea of the state as a corporation, whose end was to seek the salvation 
of souls, was the outcome ‘of that blending of what may be called the authority 
to rule and the authority to educate’ (1975a, p. 286). Calvinist Geneva 
represented the most fully actualised version of this conception of the state. 
De Maistre was, according to Oakeshott, the only theorist to offer a formal 
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account of the conception of the state as an integrated temporal-spiritual 
community, joined together to pay off the debts of sin. 85 
 
A second version of the teleocratic state was understood to be a productive 
enterprise. This conception owed much to the residue of lordship that still 
attached itself to the office of government in the states of early modern 
Europe. The state, here, was ‘recognised to be, and not merely to have, an 
“economy”’ (1975a, p. 288). The purpose of the state in this version was the 
maximum exploitation of its resources.  Oakeshott claimed Francis Bacon 
provided a reasoned account of this version of teleocracy (ibid., p. 287).  
 
The third version, which Oakeshott claimed was a combination of the first 
two, considered the state as the manager of ‘enlightened’ conduct. It 
combined the relics of lordship, which informed the economic version, and 
tutorial authority, which informed the religious version. The purpose of the 
state in this model is understood as the promotion of the “common good”, or 
the virtuous life: ‘The enlightened state identified itself as a development 
corporation in which virtue and cupidity were to constitute a single 
engagement directed or managed by a lord and his agents’ (ibid., p. 299). The 
writers associated with this idiom were not theorists, but administrators. The 
Cameralists, who he claimed were the pre-eminent thinkers associated with 
this conception, understood the necessary connection between the notion of 
the state as a teleocracy and a greatly enlarged government machine.86  
 
Nomocratic government, in contrast to teleocratic government, is an activity 
that provides rules for the conduct of its subjects, but rules which do not 
enforce any specific and deliberate end or purpose upon that conduct. 
Nomocracy means that government is ‘understood as the rule of its subjects 
                                                   
85 Joseph-Marie de Maistre (1753-1821), a conservative Catholic philosopher whom, 
according to Oakeshott, ‘is concerned with events from the standpoint of Providence’ 
(2008, p. 201). 
86 Cameralism was a German science of administration, a predecessor of the modern 
science of public administration. The first academic chairs were established at the 
Prussian Universities of Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder in 1727 (Wikipedia 
2/20/2014). 
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by means of “law”’ (2006, pp. 483). It is underpinned by two beliefs: first, the 
conviction that the correct task of government is to be the protector of a 
structure of legal rights and duties that subjects observe as they select their 
ends, ‘while still remaining a single association’ (ibid.); and second, the belief 
that a proper task of government is to protect the interests of the association 
in relation to other associations. 
 
The subjects of government are thus free to set their own ends, but morally 
and legally obliged to pursue these within the rules that constitute the 
association. The association is nothing more or less than the system of rules 
itself: there is no over-arching purpose to which the associates are dedicated. 
In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott refined his terminology. Nomocracy 
became the civil condition: ‘I propose to use the word civitas for this ideal 
condition, cives for the personae related in this manner, and respublica for 
the comprehensive conditions of association’ (1975a, pp. 108-109). 
 
He argued that the major distinction between these two dispositions of 
thought rests in the fact that for the believer in nomocracy, ‘how a 
government acts is a more important consideration than what it does’ (2006, 
p. 484).  For the believer in teleocracy it is unimportant how a government 
behaves so long as what it does promotes the chosen purpose. Oakeshott 
likened the function of the government of a nomocratic state to that of the 
‘governor’ of an engine, whose ‘function is not to make it go, but is merely to 
control the speed at which its parts move in relation to one another’ (ibid., p. 
488). The government exists to stop civil associates damaging, restraining or 
bumping into one another as they pursue their chosen objectives. 
 
In his ‘Lectures in the History of Political Thought’, which Oakeshott delivered 
annually at the LSE in the late 1960s, he advanced a claim that undermined 
his characterisation of nomocracy as essentially purposeless. He argued that 
to believe in nomocracy is not to attribute merely a negative office to 
government. A nomocratic government is the constant guardian of the 
admitted goods of the society (2006, p. 488). “Admitted goods” is a notion 
borrowed from Aristotle, which refers to the values that members of a state 
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hold in common. In a nomocratic state, Oakeshott claimed, the most precious 
of these admitted goods is the freedom of citizens to make choices for 
themselves. Chief among their antipathies is interference with this freedom 
(ibid., p. 485).  
 
But to be the guardian of “admitted goods” of a society is, arguably, to endow 
the state with a telos, and thus to question whether a nomocratic state is even 
a conceptual possibility. He avoided this conclusion by pointing out the 
normative beliefs that compose a tradition are not self-consistent and can 
often be in opposition. They are incommensurable: ‘They cannot properly be 
thought of as a norm or a self-consistent set of norms or “principles” capable 
of delivering to us an unequivocal message about what we should do’ (1965, p. 
90). But in making this point he begged the question of why a teleocratic state 
must only be conceived as having a single overarching aim, and not a plurality 
of aims, some of which may be inconsistent.  In his later works, such as On 
Human Conduct (1975a) and ‘The Rule of Law’ (1999), an abridgement of the 
lectures Oakeshott gave on this subject over the years, there is no reference to 
“admitted goods”. It is merely stipulated that a nomocratic state has no telos. 
We will see that the coherence of his account of civil association is critically 
dependent on this stipulation. 
 
He was keen to avoid any possible confusion between nomocratic belief and 
what is sometimes called laissez-faire. He claimed that this expression and its 
companion laissez-aller are not beliefs about the proper purpose of 
government. They are terms invented in the eighteenth century that were 
devised to counsel that there were some matters that a teleocratically inclined 
government should avoid doing if its chosen end is material prosperity. The 
belief in nomocracy is not connected to the belief that the proper business of 
government is to do as little as possible. Such a belief ‘belongs only to the 
lunatic fringe of modern European political thought’ (2006, p. 488).    
 
Oakeshott’s position marked a clear distinction between him and other 
twentieth-century advocates of nomocracy and the rule of law, for whom 
economic efficiency and prosperity were part of the rationale for a rule of law 
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grounded state. Hayek, for example, argued that the rationale of the liberal 
principle of the Rule of Law is ‘our ignorance of the precise results of formal 
laws as a method of social control’ (Hayek 2004, pp. 78-79). He offered two 
arguments to support this claim. The first is economic. The state should limit 
itself to establishing rules that apply to general situations. Only the 
individuals involved in each instance can fully know the precise circumstances 
and adapt their actions to them. If individuals are to use their knowledge 
effectively in making plans, they must be able to predict actions of the state 
that may affect these plans. But if the actions of the state are to be predictable 
they must be according to rules that are fixed independently of the concrete 
circumstances, which can neither be foreseen nor taken into account 
beforehand. Hayek’s second argument is essentially Oakeshott’s moral 
argument, which will be examined in the next section, that only general, 
formal laws preserve freedom of choice. 
 
 Freedom and the Rule of Law 
 
In Chapters One and Two, we noted that Oakeshott considered the birth of the 
ideas of freedom and individuality in Western Europe as the most 
praiseworthy of historical episodes. We saw how these values informed his 
account of the good life and underpinned his conception of morality. His 
veneration of individuality, moreover, reflected his estimation that freedom is 
the essence of human conduct. He regarded freedom as the precondition for 
all other goods. Freedom alone can give the opportunity for constructing a self 
that is uniquely one’s own: ‘Even if that means going to hell’ (O’Sullivan 2013, 
p. 8).  
 
According to O’Sullivan, Oakeshott had a particular fondness for the late 
medieval story about the love of Aucassin and Nicolette. In it Aucassin 
proclaims that if his love for the pagan Nicolette condemns him to hell, this is 
no bad thing, as hell is where anyone at all interesting has always gone. 
Likewise, when Oakeshott was once asked whether he would not in the end 
position salvation above freedom, were salvation to be possible, ‘he smiled 
and said that salvation was not an appropriate concern for human beings. 
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When asked why, he replied that it would be undignified’ (O’Sullivan 2013, p. 
8).87 
 
 Oakeshott’s love of freedom as the opportunity to create a self uniquely one’s 
own, regardless of the pain which this may at times bring  motivated him to 
demonstrate the moral superiority of the state conceived as a nomocracy. 88 
He developed his account of the nature of civil authority to make it consistent 
with the maximum exercise of human freedom, by which, as we have noted, 
he meant the opportunity to enact our lives according to our own choices and 
so to express our individuality. His project in writing on civil association can 
be interpreted as an attempt to answer the fundamental question of how is it 
possible to reconcile political authority and the exercise of individuality? The 
starting point in evaluating his response to the question is an understanding 
of his claim that laws, when correctly understood, do not constrain freedom. 
 
 
Liberty and Law 
 
Two principles normally regarded as embedded in the modern liberal state are 
the ideas of liberty (or freedom), and the rule of law. Both are, in W. B. Gallie’s 
terms, “essentially contested concepts” (1956). There is widespread agreement 
that both are good things. Boucher describes them as examples of ‘hooray 
words’ (2005, p. 91). They are amorphous in meaning but nevertheless strike 
the right chord when spoken: their ‘evaluative content is positive and 
                                                   
87 O’Sullivan observes that ‘an important feature of the English tradition was that, 
unlike the Roman, personal freedom was not subordinated to political freedom. 
English life permitted, in consequence, the untrammelled enjoyment of the 
Epicurean conception of life with which, so far as he can be categorized at all, 
Oakeshott sympathized most deeply’ (2013, p. 10).  
88 As far as political freedom is concerned, Oakeshott was impressed by the Romans, 
the Normans, the Vikings, and above all, the English, in whose conception of the 
common law he found ‘a living method of social integration, the most civilized and 
most effective method ever invented by mankind’ (2007, p. 219). Anderson finds this 
judgment remarkable given the fact ‘that their states (the Romans and Normans) 
were among the most ruthlessly single-minded and successful “enterprise 
associations” of all time, machines of conquest and colonization without peer’ (2005, 
p. 24).  
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laudatory, while its descriptive content is less clear beyond trite sounding 
vagaries’ (ibid.). 
 
Consequently, there is much controversy over what freedom means in 
practice. Freedom, or liberty, can be understood in terms of what Isaiah Berlin 
called “negative liberty”, which can be defined as the absence of constraint 
from other agents or the absence of external impediments: ‘I am normally said 
to be free to the degree which no man or body of men interferes with my 
activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man 
can act unobstructed by others’ (1969, p. 172). A freedom-respecting 
government is a non-interfering one. Crucially, this understanding of liberty 
means a government cannot preserve or increase individual liberty by any 
means other than non-interference. 
  
Others, however, use a notion of “positive’ liberty” associated with the ideas of 
autonomy, self-direction and self-fulfilment. T. H. Green, commonly 
considered to be the father of modern reform liberalism, claimed that ‘the 
ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human 
society alike to make the best of themselves’ (1881). Rousseau famously 
contended that men can be politically ‘forced to be free’ as ‘man is born free, 
yet everywhere he finds himself in chains’ (1973, p. 165). If it is positive liberty 
that we seek to maximise, this suggests an active role for the state. If this idea 
is taken to the extreme, according to Berlin, positive liberty could result in 
totalitarianism as it is a licence for governments to interfere in the lives of 
their subjects in order to better themselves.  
 
The negative/positive distinction remains ‘the most salient in the recent 
history of liberal freedom’ (Flikschuh 2007, Introduction: II).89   For our 
purposes, we need to appreciate that Oakeshott’s understanding of freedom 
                                                   
89  The positive/negative distinction should not be conflated with Benjamin 
Constant’s early 19th century distinction between “the liberty of the moderns” and 
the “liberty of the ancients”. Flikschuh explains that, ‘for Constant the liberty of the 
moderns marks the triumph of individualistic commercial society over the pre-
modern non- individualistic	 understanding of a socio-political community as an 
organic unit’ (2007, Chapter 1:1). 
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placed him firmly in the camp of negative liberty from the point of view of the 
rule of law, although he never used the term to describe his position. 
Oakeshott was accepting of human imperfection. He believed that 
perfectionist projects associated with protagonists of positive freedom were 
folly.  
 
Like freedom, the rule of law is a contested concept. It has been a topic of 
continuous discussion since at least the 1830s. The liberal concept of the 
Rechtsstaat was developed by German jurists, such as Rudolph Gneist, to 
characterise what the Germans understood as the legal order found in Britain 
(Turner 2014, p. 1). In her study of ‘Competing definitions of the Rule of Law’, 
Rachel Kleinfeld Belton claims that to ‘read any set of articles discussing the 
rule of law the concept emerges looking like the proverbial blind man’s 
elephant - a trunk to one person, a tail to another’ (2005, p. 5). Belton gives 
five meanings of “the Rule of Law’. 1) Making the state abide by law; 2) 
Ensuring equality before the law; 3) Supplying law and order; 4) Providing 
efficient and impartial justice; and 5) Upholding human rights (2005, 7). 
Moreover, it is ‘a rhetorical trope for politicians worldwide’ (ibid.).  
 
Judith Shklar argues that it would not be very demanding to demonstrate that 
the expression “the rule of law” has become empty thanks to ideological 
exploitation and general over-use: ‘It may well have become another one of 
those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the public utterances of 
Anglo-American politicians. No intellectual effort need therefore be wasted on 
this bit of ruling-class chatter’ (1987, p. 1). Oakeshott was conscious of the 
potential of the rule of law as a tool of vacuous ideology: ‘As with all such 
shorthand expressions, it is ambiguous and obscure’ (1999, p. 119). 
 
His challenge was to reconcile law and freedom. If freedom is understood in 
the negative sense as an absence of constraint and a universal feature of the 
law is that it is inherently coercive, there is an inevitable tension between 
freedom and rule of law. Liberal commentators typically tend to manage this 
tension by admitting that law and freedom are contradictory, but assert that 
rule of law is ultimately conducive to the realisation of freedom. Conservative 
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liberals such as Montesquieu and Tocqueville, for example, tended to refer to 
‘moderate’ liberty as distinguished from licence (Podoksik 2002, p. 2). 
 
In his essay, ‘The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law’, Hayek exemplified the 
dilemma of those committed to both freedom and the rule of law: ‘While a 
great deal of silly and harmful legislation would still be possible under the 
Rule of Law, it is at least not likely that oppressive legislation would be passed 
under it’ (1955, p. 47). An “elective dictatorship” such as the UK Parliament, 
can theoretically enact whatever laws it wishes: ‘I will admit that some liberal 
fanatics might wish to enforce general rules which others would feel very 
severe restrictions of their liberty’ (ibid.).90 This would be the “Rule by Law”, 
which affords little protection to freedom in itself. On Hayek’s reading then, 
the rule of law does not constitute freedom, but is a means of promoting 
freedom. That is, the rule of law and freedom are mutually supportive, but not 
identical. The rule of law may be said to be instrumental to freedom. 
 
It is rather the conventions that have grown up regarding law in the UK that 
protect freedom, and not the rule of law itself.  Lord Justice Bingham lists 
eight features normally associated with the rule of law. Law should be 
accessible, clear and predictable; questions of legal right and liability should 
ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of 
discretion; laws should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective 
differences justify differentiation; law must be an adequate protection of 
fundamental human rights; means should be provided to resolve disputes, 
without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay; ministers and public officers 
must exercise the powers conferred upon them reasonably; adjudicative 
procedures provided by the state should be fair; the rule of law requires 
compliance by the state with its obligations in international law (2010). Most 
of these features are open to a range of interpretations. 
                                                   
90 The phrase “elective dictatorship” was popularised by Lord Hailsham in the 1976 
Richard Dimbleby lecture. In his response to the Queen’s Speech on 27th May 2015, 
Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell reminded the government that it was elected by 
only 25% of the electorate although it had an overall majority of seats: ‘I urge the 
Government to take a common sense approach to a situation that could, if we are not 
careful, develop into an elective dictatorship’ (2015)  
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In his post-war work, Oakeshott spoke of the advantages of the rule of law, in 
a manner similar to Hayek, in terms of its instrumental value to the 
preservation of freedom. In ‘The Political Economy of Freedom’ (1991), he 
claimed that experience has shown that government under the rule of law is 
economical in the use of power and consequently uniquely suited to uphold 
freedom (1991, p. 390). The rule of law is ‘itself the emblem of that diffusion of 
power which it exists to promote’ (ibid.). It is particularly appropriate to a free 
society because the rule of law, by means of the application of settled rules 
according to due process which bind both governors and governed, is the 
greatest ‘single condition of our freedom’ (ibid.). Oakeshott claimed that the 
contingent developments in the modern era such as two major wars, 
population growth, and the concentration of the resources of power in the 
modern state made the rule of law even more salient to the preservation of 
freedom. These ‘have all given the old notion of “teleocracy” a new apparent 
appropriateness’ (Oakeshott 2006, p. 482). 
 
He noted that the difference between teleocracy and nomocracy as regards 
the rule of law is not that teleocracy necessarily means the absence of law. It 
means only that what ‘may be called roughly the rule of law’ is understood to 
have no autonomous virtue, ‘but to be valuable only in relation to the pursuit 
of a chosen end’ (ibid., p. 472). A chosen end could be, for example, the 
efficient implementation of government policy. So the rule of law could be 
harnessed by a totalitarian regime for its purposes. 
 
In his later work, Oakeshott went further than merely emphasising the 
instrumental value of the rule of law to the preservation of freedom. Not only 
did he argue the virtues of both freedom and the rule of law, but he also 
claimed that they are indivisible. Freedom is not promoted by the rule of law 
but is intrinsic to it. As Podoksik points out, he was not the first thinker to 
make such a claim. Both Rousseau and Hegel did likewise, but when the 
overlap is pushed to the point of identity, ‘they are suddenly perceived as 
illiberal thinkers, and rightly so. Liberals need the idea of an alliance of 
freedom and the rule of law, but they usually cannot tolerate their identity’ 
(2002, p. 3). Oakeshott was unusual in asserting their identity without being 
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accused of leaving the liberal tradition. We should thus examine the structure 
of his argument to understand his distinctive position. 
 
The Reconciliation of Freedom and Law 
 
There are two ways of solving the apparent opposition between freedom and 
the rule of law. On the one hand, one can specify the idea of freedom so that it 
will correspond to the idea of law, or vice versa, so that law need not be 
understood as a constraint. It is normal for those theorists who claim an 
identity of freedom and the rule of law to reject the idea of negative freedom. 
If law is seen as freedom-enhancing in the sense of enabling autonomy, there 
is no necessary contradiction between freedom and the law. Prohibition of the 
sale of alcoholic beverages will reduce drunkenness and indigence, enhancing 
the effective autonomy of drunkards. This is, of course, at the cost of reducing 
the freedom of choice of all agents, which is why most liberals recoil from this 
argument.91 
 
Oakeshott took another route to reconcile freedom and the rule of law. He 
conceived of civil liberty in terms of an absence of constraint. Yet, remarkably, 
he claimed that laws do not constrain civil freedom. How can this be the case? 
As we noted in Chapter Two, when he analysed human conduct, he 
distinguished two aspects of it. First, an action is a performance intended to 
evoke a certain response from other agents. Second, an action can be 
understood with reference to the practice to which it subscribes. A practice 
consists of the considerations that must be observed when undertaking a 
specific action, if the action is to be executed properly.  
 
                                                   
91 Rousseau is a good example of the dangers to liberty of a positive understanding of 
freedom: ‘It is this notion of the two selves which really does the work in Rousseau’s 
thought. When I stop a man from pursuing evil ends, even when I put him in jail in 
order to preventing damage (…) I do it because that is what his own better, more real 
self would have done if only he had allowed it to speak (…) this is what [is meant by] 
Rousseau’s famous phrase about the right of society to force men to be free’ (Berlin 
2003, pp. 46-47). 
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But practices do not specify an agent’s substantive choices of purposes and 
actions. There are many practices in society, the two most important instances 
of which are common language and common morality. Any one specific 
performance may refer to several practices, such as the language in which it is 
spoken, or the rules of a game. The key point for Oakeshott was that practices 
do not command. Instead, they “adverbially” qualify the performances of 
agents who follow their own choices.  
 
All human actions can be understood in relation to two aspects, a substance 
and a form, both of which are present in every actual performance. Whereas 
they are analytically separable, in practice they are not. The substantive aspect 
denotes that action is understood as a choice to do one thing rather than 
another, in order to obtain a specific satisfaction. The choice constitutes the 
freedom inherent in agency. With reference to the formal aspect, action is 
understood as performed under the aegis of a practice or practices. Thus, 
action is always a performance intended to realise a specific substantive 
outcome undertaken under the general conditions of a practice that in 
themselves are irrelevant to the character of the specific action involved, or 
the desired upshot.  
 
To pursue their shared objective in contingent circumstances, the members of 
a teleocracy adopt certain procedures for arriving at decisions. They nominate 
those responsible for taking decisions and may agree a set of rules that will 
facilitate the achievement of their common objective. The distinguishing 
characteristic of this type of association is not its rules but its objective, and 
the manner of its pursuit in contingent circumstances. The rules of a 
nomocracy, or civil association, are viewed, in contrast to those of a 
teleocracy, as not having an extrinsic purpose. They constitute the very terms 
of the association, regardless of the individual goals that its members may 
wish to pursue. They are “moral”, in Oakeshott’s unusual use of the term, in 
the sense of being non-instrumental, or non-prudential, rules, which are part 
of a practice that has no purpose.  
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A civil association, or association under the rule of law, is a moral association. 
Its uniqueness is that it is a deliberately alterable system of law that specifies 
the considerations to be taken into account to maintain a distinct idea of 
civility. But these considerations ‘are not commands to be obeyed but 
conditions to be taken into account and subscribed to in choosing 
performances (…) a practice of “just” conduct’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 182).   The 
requirements of the laws of civil association are general rules, not specific 
commands. They entail subscription to their conditions in any self-chosen 
action.  
 
The rules are both equal and general as they specify neither particular persons 
nor places. Furthermore, as Oakeshott claimed, a nomocracy has no purpose; 
there is no need to demand associates’ approval of the purpose of the 
association, because there is no purpose to approve of. Members of a 
nomocracy are free in a fundamental way that members of a teleocracy are 
not, as a result of the formal character of nomocracy. The substantive 
performances in a teleocracy are constrained by its purpose, whereas, because 
a nomocracy has no purpose, its associates’ substantive freedom is not 
compromised. 
 
As the rules of a civil association are not commands, they do not require 
performances of specific actions. In this sense, laws do not contradict 
freedom. For Oakeshott, ‘the freedom of citizens arises not in the silence but 
in the generality of the laws’ (Coats 1989, p. 49). Agents always act according 
to their self-chosen purposes. They are only obliged to subscribe to the general 
conditions of conduct specified in civil rules. This is the same feature of 
“adverbiality” noted in Oakeshott’s specification of morality. As the rules 
prescribe how a self- chosen act is performed, not what is to be performed 
‘the appearance procedures and rules may have of excluding (forbidding), or 
more rarely of enjoying, substantive choices and actions is illusive’ (1975a, p. 
58 n.) 
 
His reconciliation of freedom and law in a nomocracy thus depends on two 
foundational premises. The first is the stipulation that a nomocracy is a non-
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purposive association; the second is that laws, correctly speaking, are 
“adverbial” in nature. Most commentators deal with his two arguments 
separately. But it could also be argued that they amount to a single argument 
approached from two different perspectives. He claimed that civil freedom is 
‘the condition of being associated solely in terms of the recognition of the 
authority (...) of the adverbial conditions of conduct’ (1975a p. 184). Thus what 
is recognised is not authority per se, but the authority of conditions that are 
always adverbial. In the civil association, only those laws that leave space for a 
choice in undertaking an action are recognised as authoritative.  
 
 Underlying this argument is a claim that the character of a law is determined 
by how citizens perceive it. When a law is understood as a command, it will be 
perceived as connoting some ulterior purpose. When it is perceived as a 
formal law characterized by generality, such a purpose will be understood to 
be absent. In a similar manner, if an association is perceived as having a 
purpose, its laws will be viewed as composed of substantive commands. When 
an association is perceived as non-purposive, its laws will not be viewed as 
limiting freedom. Thus he conceptualised the relationship between law and 
liberty in an unusual way. The freedom of the citizen is not, as rights-based 
libertarians such as Robert Nozick argue, in “minimal government”, but in 
being governed in a particular way, adverbially not purposefully (1974). 
 
For Oakeshott, “freedom” was not a concrete attribute, but an abstraction that 
cannot be present independently of the perceptions of agents. The case of 
traffic laws is often referenced in discussions on freedom by supporters of 
positive freedom who appeal to our intuitions against what they perceive as a 
liberal view of ‘negative’ liberty. Charles Taylor, for example, claims that we 
do not view traffic laws as violating our freedom as their observation is in our 
collective interest. He argues that we grant more significance to some desires 
and objectives than others. Some wants can be distinguished as more 
‘rational’ or more ‘authentic’ than others, and for this reason, it is justifiable to 
speak of ‘positive’ liberty (2006, pp. 141-162).  
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Oakeshott would probably agree that traffic laws do not violate our freedom, 
but he would not agree that this can be explained in terms of the rationality of 
our preferences. He would say that laws restricting movement on roads do not 
violate freedom, whereas laws limiting the right to emigrate do violate it, 
because that is how citizens perceive them. 
 
Podoksik argues that the above interpretation of freedom supplies the link 
between Oakeshott’s advocacy of it and his emphasis on the importance of 
tradition. Only an appreciation of the cultural traditions and values of a 
particular society can show which choices and life goals are regarded as 
important by its members and therefore, which rules will be seen as a 
limitation on freedom (2002, p. 10). It is thus plausible to conclude that 
citizens will not see their freedom as constrained by traffic laws. We often 
think that there can be laws that do not impinge on our freedom.  We 
understand these laws as formal, not substantive, establishing rules and not 
demanding actions. Furthermore, we do not view traffic laws as substantive, 
because we do not see them as entailing a common purpose. We do not 
attribute a purpose to these laws, because we do not consider that they 
necessitate concrete acts.  
 
One possible objection to this argument is that although laws may not restrict 
freedom, actions most certainly are restricted. I cannot light a fire 
“arsonically”. Thus, civil freedom cannot mean the lack of restraint on actions. 
The response, however, is that no action is perceived as restricted in a 
nomocracy. A citizen who recognises the authority of law perceives himself to 
be acting within its framework, and does not imagine illegal action as a 
possible choice. So, the stipulation to drive on the left-hand side of the road is 
viewed by a driver as the frame of reference within which he attempts to fulfil 
his objectives while observing the terms of civility. Civil laws can then be 
viewed as akin to natural limitations. I should not view my inability to fly 
unaided to a destination of my choice as a restriction of my freedom, as my 
inability to fly is a fact of the human condition. Civil laws are a fact of the 
condition of civility. They can be recognised in this manner, however, only if 
they are not seen as promoting some goal. Laws should not be viewed as 
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restricting the fulfilment of our ambitions, or designed to frustrate our 
choices.  
 
A critical analysis of the postulates of Oakeshott’s concept of the 
Rule of Law 
 
The originality of Oakeshott’s contribution to our understanding of a society 
based on the rule of law and its relationship to freedom consists of three 
features. The first was his contention that under the name of “law”, states 
have promulgated an ‘ambiguous, heterogeneous collection of rules and rule-
like instructions’ (1975a, p. 128). But not all such rules are the sort of “law” 
that is appropriate to the civil condition. They are an ambiguous mixture of 
rules of all sorts: ‘Of moral precepts, of imperatives and directives which were 
not rules properly speaking’ (ibid.). Consequently, it is very difficult to 
distinguish the law appropriate to the civil condition. 
 
The second feature is his construal of the rule of law as a mode of government 
characterised by non-purposive laws rather than, as is now common, a set of 
constitutional constraints on the purposive action of government. For 
Oakeshott, a citizen had civil freedom to the extent that non-purposive laws 
govern him. He lacks civil freedom in so far as he is subject to purposive laws 
and orders. This controversial claim is fundamental to his advocacy of the 
virtues of the state conceived as a civil association.  
 
The third feature is that his notion of justice was limited to government in 
accordance with the Rule of Law alone. This is consistent with his morality of 
individualism, which ignores the issue of what we might be obliged to do for 
others in society. Justice, like morality, is concerned with following the rules 
of civility.  This begs the question as to whether the Rule of Law, as Oakeshott 
conceived it, is sufficiently robust to provide for a just social order, or whether 
it is applicable only to robust individuals who accept no responsibility for 
maintaining a communal life that acknowledges social obligations to others in 
order to secure their wellbeing.  
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The three features, delineated above, taken together give coherence to 
Oakeshott’s claim that nomocracy, or civil association, is the only moral form 
of the state, and intimate a specific answer to the question of what a state 
should do (1975a, p. 124). The coherence and stability of his argument are 
undermined, however, to the extent that any of the three features are found 
wanting. This will now be addressed. 
 
Rules and Commands  
 
The distinction between non-instrumental rules of conduct and commands to 
assignable agents is fundamental to Oakeshott’s exposition of the virtues of 
government under a Rule of Law. He argued that rules must be distinguished 
from ‘pieces of advice or commands or mere prohibitions’ (1975a, p. 125). The 
idiom of these is prudential as they are developed from considerations of 
consequences: but a rule relates to the appropriateness of conduct, not its 
expediency. A rule is ‘an authoritative assertion and not a theorem’ that asks 
only for agreement in performances related to it. (ibid.).  
 
An agent may decide not to conform to a rule but ‘that is to neither deny nor 
revoke its status as a rule: rules assert norms of conduct’ (ibid.). A rule is not a 
command due to its feature of generality: it relates ‘indifferently and 
continuously to all’ (Oakeshott 1999, p. 140). Commands, in contrast, are 
addressed to specific persons. Agents are not obliged to undertake specific 
actions by the existence of authoritative rules, but to conform, in their actions, 
to the rules. The Highway Code, for example, does not command us to drive 
our vehicles, but, should we so choose, it obliges us to drive on the left hand 
side of the road.  
 
Oakeshott’s account of the source of authority of rules and our obligation to 
subscribe to them will be examined in due course. We should note at this 
point, however, that he claimed that the reasons for recognition of authority 
having nothing to do ‘with the approval or disapproval of the conditions 
prescribed’ (1975a, pp. 126-127). His reasoning was that authority could be 
separated from approval as rules ‘do not warrant, enjoin, or prohibit 
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substantive actions or utterances’, but are merely adverbial qualifications of 
self-chosen performances (ibid.). 
 
Oakeshott drew an analogy between law and games such as chess, tennis or 
cricket.  He claimed that a game is ultimately defined by its rules. The players 
are related in terms of the mutual obligation to respect the conditions which 
themselves comprise the game (1999, p. 137). This obligation cannot be 
avoided for reasons of disapproval or of conscientious opposition to what the 
rules stipulate. The obligation ‘may be symbolically expressed in deference to 
their custodian: an umpire or a referee’ (ibid.). As the rules are constitutive of 
the game, we are obligated to subscribe to them should we freely choose to 
play. 
 
 The feature of non-instrumental laws is the key difference between agents 
associated under the rule of law and those associated in a purposive 
association. Law, properly understood, like morality can never tell us what to 
say or do, ‘only how we should say or do what we wish to say or do (…) moral 
rules prescribe the obligation to observe adverbial conditions in performing 
self-chosen actions’ (ibid., pp. 144-145). Freedom is preserved by this 
‘adverbial’ quality of rules, as distinct from commands. “Adverbiality” is not 
simply a matter of more or less, but of mode. Oakeshott believed that the rule 
of law, conceived as adverbial qualifications to actions, reconciled the claims 
of law with liberty. 
 
Oakeshott crafted the term ‘lex’ to identify the subset of laws promulgated by 
authority, which are general and non-instrumental. “Laws” drafting every 
male over the age of 18 or requiring taxes to be paid would be examples of 
general orders, as they lack the adverbial quality of true rules. According to 
him, the laws integral to rule by law consist at best of a circumscribed slice of 
the prescriptions laid down as law by a modern sovereign authority.92  
                                                   
92 The most egregious type of legislation that purports to be law, but which is not so 
according to Oakeshott’s conception, is so-called “declamatory legislation”. This has 
no practical effect and is not intended to do so. The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010 
was passed by the last Labour government, and obliged the government to cut the 
budget deficit by half this year. As John Kay points out, ‘there was never any realistic 
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The substantive point of the distinction between rules and commands is that 
freedom of choice depends on the extent to which we are governed by 
regulations, which have the nature of rules rather than orders. Shirley Letwin 
noted that this distinction has been lost in the ‘confusion generated by the talk 
of open and closed societies or, more or less, strong and weak government’ 
(2004, p. 334). Letwin’s interpretation of Oakeshott is that how free we are to 
lead our own lives depends not so much on the number of laws but on 
whether they are rules rather than orders and that although all laws are 
expressed in terms that give them the appearance of rules, increasingly many 
purported laws are in fact orders. Orders determine performances, whereas 
laws merely qualify them.  
 
But, arguably, the “adverbial” nature of true rules does little, in practice, to 
limit or shape the activities of government. John Gray has noted that ‘laws 
may be adverbial in appearance but, nonetheless, repressive of liberty in 
practice. Oakeshott’s formal requirement that laws be adverbial in form 
‘provides no security whatsoever against their restraining liberty’ (1995, p. 
210). Most commands can be expressed adverbially. A prohibition on the sale 
and consumption of alcoholic beverages could be expressed as a general law 
obligating citizens to drink “healthily”. As Liddington observes, the adverbial 
quality of lex is counter-intuitive and contradictory: ‘If a law prohibiting 
murder can be a procedural law, what would not count as a procedural law?’ 
(1984, p. 313). All prohibitions can be construed as procedural: ‘Why may not 
a law prohibiting (say) bourgeois education be said to qualify rather than 
determine the performance of learning and teaching’ (ibid.). With regard to 
Oakeshott’s example of laws prohibiting fire-raising and larceny not 
necessarily restricting freedom Liddington reasonably asks why we should 
suppose that a law prohibiting private property necessarily restricts it? 
(Liddington 1984, p. 313). 
                                                                                                                                                 
prospect that this target would be met, and it has not been met’ (Kay 2014). Other 
examples include the 2008 Climate Change Act, which set a supposedly “legally 
binding” obligation to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2050; and the 2010 Poverty 
Act, which requires that child poverty be eliminated by 2020.  
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Yet the adverbial quality of rules, correctly understood, is a fundamental 
feature of Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law.  The adverbial quality of 
rules alone is certainly insufficient to reconcile freedom and law in 
philosophical terms.  The nature of general rules leaves individuals free to 
perform particular actions, but the rules often forbid certain types of action, 
such as lighting fires “arsonically”. But, they do so for a purpose. For this 
reason, formal rules can still severely restrict liberty and cannot readily be 
understood as non-purposive. 
  
Instrumental and non- instrumental rule 
 
Although Oakeshott claimed government under the rule of law means formal, 
not minimal, government, it is hard to see how a nomocracy, in practice, 
could mean anything other than minimal government. He further 
circumscribed lex in ways that lead to this conclusion. A second key 
distinction in his understanding is that between an instrumental and non-
instrumental rule. Only the latter qualify as laws that are compatible with 
freedom. This distinction was not novel. It is implicit in Kant’s distinction 
between moral and utilitarian motives. The novelty lies in Oakeshott’s use of 
the distinction with regard to law. 
 
This distinction was rejected by theorists such as Locke and Bentham. They 
understood law as an instrument for providing certain satisfactions, as befits 
an enterprise relationship. An enterprise association, or teleocracy, is a mode 
of relationship in which agents associate to ‘procure the satisfaction of a 
common want or to promote a common interest’ (Oakeshott 1999, p. 133). 
Enterprises such as ‘the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge’, 
‘the Anti-Blood Sports League’, and ‘the Licensed Victuallers Association’ have 
rule books and regulations, ‘but these are no more than the prudential 
disposition of the available resources, instrumental to the pursuit of the 
common purpose’ (ibid., pp. 133-134).  
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In the previous discussion of Oakeshott’s account of morality, we noted that 
the distinction between a non-instrumental and an instrumental practice 
revolved around the defining feature of a moral (as distinct from a prudential) 
practice. No use can be made of a moral practice, unlike, say, the practice of 
shoe-making. He used the same distinction to qualify association lived under 
a rule of law from association lived as an enterprise. The obligation to 
subscribe to non-instrumental rules constitutes a moral relationship. For 
Oakeshott, it is the normative basis of the superiority of civil over enterprise 
association. Only civil association under the rule of law is compatible with the 
moral autonomy of citizens in a state where membership of which is 
compulsory. But what can we make of the distinction between instrumentality 
and non-instrumentality with regard to law? 
 
His basic idea is that rules of law are not concerned with the consequences or 
expediency of conduct, but its propriety. Non-instrumental rules of law allow 
members of a community to formulate their own projects and pursue them as 
they wish without interfering with one another. They do not define ends to be 
followed, and they do not grant advantages. Rules of law are concerned with 
what is right, not what is useful to do. And being right is an end in itself, not a 
means to anything else. Moreover, rules of law have no role in promoting the 
substantive purposes of individuals. Oakeshott repeatedly reminded us that a 
rule of law ‘is not concerned to promote or to obstruct the pursuit of interests’ 
(1999, p. 154, p.  41). It is the essence of law not to be involved with the worth 
of different interests. It is not concerned with satisfying basic wants or with 
the promotion of prosperity or the eradication of waste: ‘The equal or 
differential distribution of reputed benefits or opportunities, with arbitrating 
competing claims to advantages and satisfactions or with the promotion of 
things recognized as the common good’ (ibid., p. 153).  The factors we must 
take into account when deliberating the ‘propriety’ or rightness of law must be 
‘moral, non-instrumental considerations’ (ibid., p. 154). 
 
Shirley Letwin argued that the distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental rules is even more important to Oakeshott’s argument than that 
between rules and orders. To conceive of the law as an interconnecting set of 
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non-instrumental rules reconciles law with morality. This is impossible for 
those ‘who insist on a connection between law and morality [and] equate law 
with a body of instrumental rules designed to achieve a certain pattern of life 
or goal to which everyone in the community can be directed’ (2005, p. 340). If 
morality is perceived as having a given purpose, then the law must comprise 
directives to achieve that purpose: it follows that ‘to allow freedom of choice, 
law must be divorced from morality. But no such consequence follows from a 
preference for non-instrumental rules’ (ibid.). 
 
But, it is difficult to understand laws as being non-purposive. The common 
sense view is that all laws are instrumental and designed to achieve some 
purpose, or purposes. Laws necessarily restrict men’s freedom, and for 
various reasons. Unlike morality, which, according to Oakeshott, is a 
vernacular language that evolves over time - and being moral is merely a 
matter of participating in a particular historic moral practice - much law is 
positively enacted, amended and cancelled. So he implicitly begged the 
question of what is in the minds of legislators in this process and, in 
particular, whether it is conceivable for laws to be made and interpreted 
without implicit or explicit appeal to consequences and purposes.  
 
William Galston argues that ‘every specification of a limit reflects a 
substantive judgment, at the margin, about the relative importance of safety 
and efficiency’ (2012, p. 238). Joseph Raz claims that ‘conformity to the rule 
of law is essential for securing whatever purposes the law is designed to 
achieve’ (1979, p. 224). The purposes are of two kinds: ‘Those which are 
secured by conformity with the law itself and those further consequences of 
conformity with the law or of knowledge of its existence which the law is 
intended to secure’ (ibid., p. 225). So Raz argues, for example, in the case of a 
law that prohibits racial discrimination in government employment, that the 
direct purpose is the establishment of racial equality in the hiring, promotion 
and conditions of service of those who work for government, as discriminatory 
action is a breach of law. Its indirect purposes may well be to improve race 
relations in the country in general, or pre-empt a strike threat by trade 
unions: ‘Regarding the rule of law as the inherent or specific virtue of law is a 
 140 
result of an instrumental conception of law’ (ibid., p. 223, italics added). Raz 
elaborates the instrumental conception of law by using the Aristotelian idea 
that ‘as with other tools, machines and instruments a thing is not of the kind 
unless it has at least some ability to perform its function. A knife is not a knife 
unless it has some ability to cut’ (ibid.). The purpose of the law is to guide 
behaviour: ‘Like other instruments the law has a specific virtue which is 
morally neutral in being neutral as to the end which the instrument is put’ 
(ibid.).  The specific virtue in the case of the rule of law is to guide behaviour 
efficiently: ‘The rule of law is an inherent virtue of law, but not a moral virtue 
as such’ (ibid., italics added).  
 
 Raz claims that the purpose of the rule of law is to guide behaviour efficiently 
as a consequence of seven of its commonly attributed features, most which 
Oakeshott agreed with. All laws should be prospective, open and clear; laws 
should be relatively stable; the making of particular laws (particularly legal 
orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; the 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; the principles of natural 
justice must be observed; the courts should have review powers over the 
implementation of the other principles; and the courts should be easily 
accessible. The rule of law provides a framework within which specific laws 
are made, amended and cancelled. Specific laws are intended to guide conduct 
in a particular manner and have particular consequences.  
 
Hayek also argued that both the rules of law and morality are instrumental: 
‘The rules of morality are instrumental in the sense that they exist mainly in 
the achievement of other human values’ (2006, p. 60). We can only rarely 
know what depends on them being followed in a particular case. So to observe 
them ‘must be regarded as a value in itself, a sort of intermediate end which 
we must pursue without questioning its justification in the particular case’ 
(ibid.).  Laws are also instrumental. From the perspective of an individual 
agent ‘they provide part of the data which, together with his knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place, he can use as the basis for his 
decisions’ (ibid., p. 133). For Hayek, the qualities of generality and 
abstraction, not non-instrumentality, marked true law. Although laws are 
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instrumental, Hayek agreed with Oakeshott that proper laws differ from 
commands: ‘In obeying them the individual still pursues his own and not the 
lawgiver’s end. Indeed, specific ends of action, being always particulars, 
should not enter into general rules’ (ibid., pp. 133-34). 
 
A substantive condition or a formal condition? 
 
The third important distinction that Oakeshott offered is that between a 
“substantive condition” and “formal condition” of things. He employed this 
distinction to support the idea that the state could be conceived as a 
purposeless association. It can be argued that in any practice association, 
agents are related in terms of some substantive purpose: such as ensuring 
their own peace and security, or merely ensuring that the rules of the 
association are acknowledged. Aristotle, for example, thought it pretty 
obvious that a state has a purpose, like everything else.93 He stated in the 
opening Chapter to Book One of his Politics that ‘every state is a community of 
some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good’ 
(2014, I). In Chapter Six of Book Three, he argued that the purpose of a state 
follows from the fact that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (ibid., I, ii). 
Members of a community are joined together in the state by their common 
interest in promoting their wellbeing: ‘This is certainly the chief end, both of 
individuals and of states’ (ibid., III, vi). Likewise, Hobbes averred that the 
Commonwealth is established by mutual covenants between the multitude ‘to 
the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think 
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence’ (2014, p. 75). 
   
So how did Oakeshott sustain the idea that a civil association can have no 
purpose? His answer here was that any plausible example of such a 
substantive purpose is merely a “formal condition of things”. For him, peace 
and security are not substantive purposes. They are formal conditions without 
                                                   
93 Oakeshott referenced Aristotle’s general argument that everything has a purpose in 
the Notebooks (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk II Ch. v Para 2; Bk III Ch. x Para 6 etc.): 
“Things are defined by their working and power”. A thing is a thing in virtue of some 
purpose; we have no other way of distinguishing one ‘thing’ from another except in 
terms of purpose, function etc.’” (2014, p. 65). 
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which there can be no durable association under a rule of law. Freedom, peace 
and security are inherent in civil association constituted under the rule of law. 
The purposes that characterise a teleocracy are, in opposition, always to be 
understood as a substantive requirement of life and an end to be pursued such 
as ‘having a job, a house of certain specifications (…) as distinct from their 
being no legal impediment to the enjoyment of these things’ (2006, p. 473). 
They are not a formal condition of things. 
 
Oakeshott conceded, however, that whereas chief amongst the ‘admitted 
goods’ in a nomocratic state is the freedom of citizens to make choices for 
themselves, in emergencies such as war or natural calamities, there may be 
temporarily imposed an overall purpose on the activities of its associates, 
when the continued existence of the association seems to be threatened in 
such a manner that ‘“survival” becomes, temporarily, the chief “admitted 
good”’ (ibid., 486, italics added). But it might be argued that the survival of 
the association is an ongoing concern and that everything a government does 
in some manner contributes to its survival. 
 
Oakeshott’s conception that a state can be purposeless is flimsy if we reject his 
distinction between a substantive purpose and a formal condition of things. 
Notwithstanding his insistence to the contrary, peace, security and stability 
are purposes, implying action, not just conditions of it: ‘When statesmen act, 
as Lincoln did, to preserve the union, or De Gaulle did to avoid civil war in 
France, to refuse to use the word “purpose” is worse than a quibble’ (Flathman 
2005, pp. 156-157).  
 
If peace and security are conceived as substantive purposes, as Hobbes and 
many others believe, the actual shape of the state is contingent on what is 
necessary to this end; and if “security” is construed as “social security”, 
“economic security” or “social justice”, the list of what a state can legitimately 
do is almost limitless. If we conclude that it makes no sense to claim that a 
state can have no purpose, Oakeshott’s idealisation of civil association is 
significantly undermined. And, as David Copp noted in his review of On 
Human Conduct Oakeshott neither explained nor defended the significance of 
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the distinction between substantive purposes and the formal condition of 
things. This is problematic as ‘it is on the meaningfulness of this distinction 
that the coherence of the idea of nomocracy or civil association ultimately 
hangs’ (Copp 1997, p. 237).94 
 
Law, Justice and Morality 
 
In Chapter Two, I argued that Oakeshott’s understanding of morality as a 
purposeless practice ignores the fundamental moral question of what we owe 
to each other, which informs all discussions of social justice. This section 
explores Oakeshott’s account of the relationship between law and morality 
and between the rule of law and justice. It will be suggested that his account of 
justice manifests the same “thinness” we observed in his account of morality. 
A good starting point is to clarify his account of what makes laws authoritative 
and what obliges the associates in a civil association to obey them. Does the 
obligation exist because the laws are “just” in some normative sense; or is it 
that they have been enacted in accordance with standard procedures? 
Oakeshott, I will argue, gives no clear answer here. 
 
Oakeshott used the Latin term auctoritas to capture what he meant by 
authoritatively enacted rules in a society governed under the rule of law: 
‘Authority defined, not in terms of the quality of its acts, but in terms of a 
procedure of authorisation’ (2006, p. 229).  The Romans adopted the term lex 
to signify law. It represented something that was written down, and reflected 
the process by which it was enacted. The essential point about lex is that its 
authority springs from the reality that it has been made according to the 
acknowledged law-making process, not from its reasonableness or 
convenience. A law may be unjust but it requires obedience until it is repealed. 
 
Oakeshott did not acknowledge rights-based accounts of political obligation. 
Nomocracy, or civil association, has authority because it is acknowledged to 
have authority; there is no other basis on which it could have authority. His 
                                                   
94 Copp’s objection was also made by D. D. Raphael (1975, p. 454), and B. Barber 
(1976, pp. 457-460). 
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view was very close to that of those legal theorists, such as H. L. A. Hart, who 
also derived the existence of a legal system from there being a sufficient 
number of people who take the “legal point of view”, or who acknowledge the 
authority of both particular laws and ‘rules of recognition’ (Hart 1994, pp. 94-
95). Oakeshott’s argument was similar to that of Socrates in the Crito. The 
members of a country cannot refuse to obey its laws without destroying it. 
Socrates had enjoyed the benefits of citizenship by living under Athenian law; 
therefore, he was obliged to obey the law even when he did not approve of the 
consequences (Plato 360 BC). Oakeshott argued that questioning the 
desirability of a law is a political act, whereas impugning the authority of a law 
is an act of civil disassociation.  
 
Oakeshott was, then, at odds with much contemporary liberal opinion (as 
exemplified by Ronald Dworkin), which is concerned with inalienable and 
innate natural rights and their relation to authority. 95 Oakeshott thought that 
laws, rights and customs were historical contingencies specific to individual 
communities. A civil relationship under the rule of law cannot be one in terms 
of the desirability of the conditions stipulated in the laws, ‘or of some quality 
of “rightness” or “justice” or “reasonableness” they may be deemed to possess’ 
(1999, 149). It does not even depend on the associates actually subscribing to 
the conditions. The exclusive terms of the civil relationship are the 
acknowledgment of the authority or authenticity of the laws. 
 
He argued that authentic laws require associates to know what they are, and 
to have established procedures for determining their authenticity and that of 
the obligations they prescribe. This condition is only satisfied where laws have 
been enacted by design and may be deliberately changed or revoked by 
persons who have come to occupy a legislative office following a recognised 
                                                   
95	See Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously (1977); and his essay ‘Liberalism’ in 
A Matter of Principle (1986b). ‘So the liberal, drawn to the economic market and to 
political democracy for distinctly egalitarian reasons, finds that these institutions will 
produce inegalitarian results unless he adds to his scheme different sorts of 
individual rights. These rights will function as trump cards held by individuals (...) 
the ultimate justification for these rights is that they are necessary to protect equal 
concern and respect’ (1986b, p. 198). 
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procedure: ‘The first condition of the rule of law is a “sovereign” legislative 
office’ (ibid., p. 150). Oakeshott claimed that the rule of law is silent on the 
particular constitution or procedure in respect of the particular legislative 
office, requiring only that these themselves be matters of law. So authority 
must be an endowment of the legislative office itself and since it is an 
authority to originate obligations, ‘it must be conferred in the knowledge of 
those obligated’ (ibid.). The legitimacy of authority depends on the 
recognition of those obligated to accede to its demands, which explains why 
Oakeshott was critical of attempts to locate political authority in any specific 
acts of authorisation, such as the will of the majority. Authority is legitimate 
as long as associates continue to accept an obligation to comply with its 
demands.  
 
Moreover, authority is quite distinct from power. He claimed, as an empirical 
fact, that without recognition of authority, power has never been enough to 
sustain an association of human beings. Power only gains a moral status when 
the source of power occupies an office and is recognized to have an antecedent 
right to exercise it. Recognition of authority is the acknowledgment of the 
moral right to make demands. The exercise of power can neither compel nor 
secure the recognition of power as moral. It may be one of the outcomes of the 
recognition of their authority, ‘but it cannot be a condition of their authority’ 
(Oakeshott 2008, p. 237).  
 
Oakeshott gave what can be described as a “positivist” response to the 
question of what constitutes authentic law: ‘That “law regulates its own 
creation” is not a paradox but a truism’ (1999, p. 155, n. 5). Positivism aligned 
him with the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart (1907-92).96 Hart was an almost 
exact contemporary of his and was considered by many to be the foremost 
                                                   
96 Hart’s major work was The Concept of Law (1994). A central part of Hart’s theory 
on legal positivism is that in any legal system, the rule of recognition is a master 
meta-rule underlying any legal system that defines the test for legal validity, or 
authentic law in Oakeshott’s terminology: ‘To say that a given rule is valid is to 
recognise it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule 
of the system. We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is 
valid means that it satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition’ (1994, 
p. 103). 
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Anglo-Saxon legal philosopher of his generation. It is likely, however, that he 
was more influenced by the German positivists such as Georg Jellinek (1851-
1911) and Hans Kelsen (1881-1973). In the middle of his essay ‘The Rule of 
Law’, Oakeshott commented that the idea of the rule of law ‘appears in a 
slimmed-down version in the writings of the jurist Georg Jellinek. It hovers 
over the reflections of many so-called “positivist” modern jurists’ (1999, p. 
162). Jellinek was Kelsen’s teacher. Oakeshott almost certainly had Kelsen in 
mind as a “positivist modern jurist”, as he had read Kelsen’s 1945 magnum 
opus General Theory of Law and State (1945). Oakeshott remarked in his 
1946 essay ‘A Philosophy of Politics’ that ‘Hans Kelsen, for example, has 
shown how the concept of the state may be reduced to that of law, and I think 
he has shown it fairly satisfactorily’ (1993, p. 131).97  
 
Positivism is the thesis that law is justified independently of its substantive 
content entirely by reference to its pedigree in a particular decision-making 
process, be it legislative or that of a constitutional convention. It is opposed to 
natural law, which gives priority to the substance of the law in question and 
declares invalid commands that violate it. A natural lawyer has little interest 
in such conventional legal materials as the text of the constitution, the history 
of its enactment, the long standing traditions of a political culture: ‘Only what 
the best theory of abstract justice and fairness would produce by way of ideal 
theory’ (Dworkin 1986, p. 397).  
 
However, if Oakeshott subscribed to the positivist thesis, his claims for the 
compatibility of freedom and the rule of law are problematic as positivism, 
without qualification, legitimises any law irrespective of content. Both Kelsen 
and Oakeshott sought to purge the rule of law, or Rechtsstaat, of its 
ideological elements. Kelsen was famous, though, for rejecting the idea that 
the law of dictatorships was not law, putting him in opposition to liberal 
theorists. He claimed that legal norms may have content of any sort. (2009, p. 
113). To many of Kelsen’s critics, such as natural law theorists, the whole point 
                                                   
97	‘The pure theory of law is a monistic theory. It shows that the State imagined as a 
personal being is, at best, nothing but the personification of the national legal order’ 
(Kelsen 2009, p. xvi). 
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of having a theory of law was to distinguish genuine legal systems from those 
characterised by their pseudo-legality. So if the protection of civil freedom was 
an overriding concern for Oakeshott, we need to understand the implications 
of his account of authentic law from the standpoint of its positivist 
implications. How is it that association under the rule of law is the best 
protection of individual liberty if valid laws merely have to pass the 
authenticity test in terms of their enactment? 
 
 Stephen Turner asks whether the rule of law is ‘a differentiating standard’, or 
whether it is merely equivalent to legal order itself, ‘and if it is a standard, 
what does its authority come from?’ (Turner 2014, p. 4). Oakeshott appeared 
to believe that the rule of law is coterminous with legal order. That is, 
authorisation is a matter of law, not justice. He argued that the authority to 
make law cannot be identified with, or deduced from, a natural quality 
attributable to the occupants, such as wisdom or charisma. Therefore, 
authority ‘must be an endowment of the office itself’ (1999, p. 151).  And since 
authority comes before the making of law, ‘it cannot be identified with what 
the law prescribes’ (ibid.). 
 
His position is consistent with his epistemological scepticism. In this case, this 
means that there is no norm other than the law itself to determine the 
authenticity of a particular enactment, where authority or authenticity is 
merely a matter of recognition of authority. The deliberations in terms of 
which the authority of a law may be approved or denied are, moreover, 
themselves enacted law. In which case the jurisdiction of the law is itself a 
question of law. But, this seems to offer little protection to the freedom that 
Oakeshott so esteemed. 
 
Moreover, Oakeshott’s account of authentic law, up to this point, seems little 
different to Kelsen’s idea of the state and law as captured by the conception of 
the Grundnorm: ‘Law regulates its own creation inasmuch as one legal norm 
determines the way in which another norm is created, and also, to some 
extent, the contents of that norm’ (2006, p. 124). The legal order is 
understood ‘as a hierarchy of different levels of norms’ (ibid.). 
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Oakeshott acknowledged that his and Kelsen’s understanding of the nature of 
law are contrary to the dominant Western tradition, which conflates law with 
justice to reflect the conformity of law with ‘natural’, ‘rational’ or ‘higher’ law 
(1999, p. 168). Like Kelsen, he gave short shrift to neo-Kantian theories of law 
or the theory of natural law: ‘The rule of law has no need of any such beliefs’ 
(ibid., p. 173). Not only is such speculation a waste of time, when conformity 
with natural law is cited as the condition of the obligation to observe the 
conditions prescribed by lex ‘they positively pervert the association: they are 
the recipe for anarchy’ (ibid.). This assessment echoed Kelsen’s view that 
natural law theses are ‘entirely irrelevant to the validity of positive law’ (2009, 
p. 416). 
 
For Kelsen, there is no notion of jus postulated in the rule of law. Instead, 
justice is a highly contested concept, whereas legality is a factual matter. The 
only question is whether a law was created in accordance with due procedure 
to determine its validity. Oakeshott took an even stronger position by 
identifying justice and law in his early work. In October 1923, he observed in 
the Notebooks that ‘Socrates was a Conservative in that he equates the just 
and the legal (...) There is no such thing as natural justice. What the law 
commands, that is just’ (2014, p. 22).  
 
He later admitted that there is something more than merely following the 
authorised procedure to be acknowledged when determining the jus of lex. It 
is necessary to differentiate authentic law and just law. Law is authentic 
because it conforms with the legal procedures that confirm proper enactment. 
But authenticity ‘forecasts nothing whatever about the jus or injus of its 
enactments. For that we must look elsewhere (1999, p. 152, italics added). 
 
Oakeshott contended that there is a “jus inherent in lex”, but this does not 
refer to the justice of individual laws. It refers to the understandings that are 
intrinsic to the notion of law: ‘They are conditions which distinguish a legal 
order and in default of which whatever purports to be a legal order is not what 
it purports to be’ (ibid.). He listed a number of formal points that are 
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uncontentious. Laws cannot be undisclosed or retroactive. There are no 
obligations except those imposed by law. Everyone is equally subject to the 
obligations imposed by law, without exception.  Only with respect to ‘these 
considerations and their like that it perhaps may be said that lex injusta non 
est lex’ (ibid., p. 153, italics added).  But, this partial list of what constitutes 
the jus inherent in lex tells us little about the shape of a state subject to the 
rule of law.  
 
He went on to discuss other “considerations”, distinct from questions of 
authenticity or conformity with the inherent morality of the law, relevant to 
jus: ‘Not merely as properly enacted, but as proper or not improper to have 
been enacted; beliefs and opinions invoked in considering the propriety of the 
conditions prescribed in a particular law’ (ibid.).The justice or injustice of 
particular laws is an attribute neither of the mode of association, nor of the 
totality of the laws that comprise the existing conditions of the association, 
‘but only of what a particular law prescribes’ (ibid.).  
  
Thus there is something in specific laws apart from their authenticity that 
bears upon their justice. What is this something else? His response to this 
question was somewhat opaque:  
 
‘It may float on the acknowledgement that the considerations in terms of 
which the jus of lex may be discerned are neither arbitrary, unchanging, nor 
uncontentious, and that they are the product of a moral experience which is 
never without tensions and internal discrepancies’ (Oakeshott 1999, pp. 155-
56). 
 
He claimed that the justice of a law is not related to its substantive 
consequences ‘whether or not it will tumble the heavens’ (ibid., p. 153). 
Moreover, law should not be concerned with those considerations that fall 
under the rubric of social justice or economic efficiency. The jus of a law 
cannot be recognised by the provision of substantive benefits such as the 
promotion of prosperity, the elimination of waste, or the equal or differential 
distribution of goods, or ‘with arbitrating competing claims to advantages or 
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satisfactions, or with the promotion of a condition of things recognized as the 
common good’ (1999, p. 153).  Considerations of efficiency or “fairness” in 
terms of the distribution of ‘reputed benefits or opportunities’ are irrelevant to 
the jus of a law. 
 
This would rule out legislation targeted at, for example, facilitating access for 
wheelchair users (the merits of different interests); national health provision 
(satisfying substantive wants); environmental protection (elimination of 
waste); or progressive taxation (differential distribution). This, then, was 
Oakeshott’s vision of a state as a civil association under the rule of law:  
 
A state in terms of the rule of law should, then, be that of an association of 
personae indistinguishably and exclusively related in respect of the obligation 
to subscribe adequately to the non-instrumental conditions which authentic 
law imposes upon their self-chosen conduct (1999, 174).   
 
So what is this something else, beyond procedural, non-consequential and 
non-distributive considerations, that constitutes the jus of a particular law? It 
must be something that is intrinsic to the rule of a law as a mode of 
association. If he could not specify this he ran the risk of being tarnished with 
the accusation levelled at Kelsen that his positivist account of law would make 
the actions of Nazi Germany legal, without qualification.98 
 
Oakeshott explained that what civil association requires for deciding the jus of 
a law is not a series of theoretical criteria but ‘an appropriately argumentative 
form of discourse in which to deliberate the matter’ (1999, p. 156). The 
appropriate form is one of moral discourse ‘not concerned generally with right 
                                                   
98	The question of whether the label “law’ could apply to rules as amoral as the 
enactments of the Nazis was confronted by the German courts after 1945. In dealing 
with this, the judges had to take sides in the philosophical debate over the concept of 
law. The voices of Gustav Radbruch and Hans Kelsen featured prominently. After the 
collapse of the Nazi regime, Radbruch redefined his position on legal certainty by 
introducing the following principle: when statutory rules reach an extreme level of 
injustice, so that the contradiction between positive law and justice become 
intolerable, they cease to be law. Radbruch implicitly rejected Kelsen’s vision of 
positivist purity. See Haldemann (2005, pp. 162-178). 
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and wrong in human conduct’ (ibid.). It should be narrowly focused on the 
sort of conditional obligations a law may enforce without being distracted by 
prudential and consequential concerns. It should be shielded ‘from the 
spurious claims of conscientious objection, of minorities for exceptional 
treatment and, so far as may be, from current moral idiocies’ (ibid.). Civil 
association has no place for either a Bill of Rights, ‘that is, alleged 
unconditional principles of jus masquerading themselves as law’, or an 
institution responsible for considering the jus of law and sanctioned to declare 
a law invalid if it were deemed to be unjust. Such concerns and institutions 
could be appropriate where an association is based on common interests 
where jus is merely a fair way reconcile interests with one another: ‘But they 
have no place whatever in association in terms of the rule of law’ (ibid.). 
 
At this point in his narrative we risk concluding that he is offering no 
protection of freedom in his account of the rule of law. One could imagine a 
highly aggressive, intrusive, dictatorial legal regime that complied with his 
core notion of the rule of law, which affords little protection for the individual 
against the state. But when we remind ourselves that Oakeshott, unlike 
Kelsen, was not providing a general theory of positive law, but of a rule of law 
association which he defined to be non-purposive. He was not offering a 
politically neutral definition of the rule of law, but an account of one 
particular type of legal order that reflected one of several possible modes of 
association.  
 
The dictatorship question can be quickly dismissed, as Oakeshott defined 
association by the rule of law as excluding purposive organisations. According 
to him, dictators or tyrants are paradigmatically purposive: ‘In this mode of 
association there is nothing whatever to correspond to the expression “the 
rule of law”’ (1999, p. 135). Both the usurper and the tyrant lack authority, but 
for different reasons. The former cannot make authentic law because he has 
come to power illegitimately. The tyrant cannot make authentic law because 
he uses power to promote his own interests. 
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This is an unconvincing argument. If, as he claimed, the way in which the 
legislative office is constituted is irrelevant to the authenticity of law, then a 
usurper’s laws will have authenticity as long as they are recognised as 
authoritative by the citizens. Moreover, Oakeshott implicitly denied the fact of 
revolution. Revolutions happen, and at some point the laws enacted by 
revolutionary governments, which may be enacted illegally according to pre-
revolutionary practice, are regarded as authoritative.  Second, his claim that a 
tyrant necessarily promotes his own interests is a stipulation without 
foundation. Tyrants do not necessarily promote their own interests. 
 
So how do we determine whether a law has been properly enacted? What are 
the ‘beliefs and opinions invoked in consideration of the propriety of the 
conditions prescribed in a particular law’? (1999, p. 153) His first response 
was identical to his understanding of morality: ‘The propriety which identifies 
the jus of lex must be composed of moral, non-instrumental considerations’ 
(ibid., p. 154). Apropos law, this means that laws should not be adopted or 
modified for utilitarian reasons. According to him, purposes and 
consequences are not appropriate grounds of morality and law. Moreover, the 
considerations appropriate to a law cannot ‘concern the supreme moral 
consideration which relates to the sentiments or motives in which actions are 
performed. The jus of lex cannot specify anything so grand as the conditions 
of “human excellence” or of human “self-realisation’’’ (ibid.).  
 
The beliefs and opinions invoked to determine the propriety of law can, 
moreover, have nothing to do with fairness because that would conceive of law 
as instrumental to ‘a substantive state of affairs’ (Oakeshott 1999, p. 170, 
n.13). As the character of lex is a non-instrumental rule, its jus cannot have 
anything to do with substantive satisfactions such as the right to life, or the 
right to have one’s basic needs taken care of.  
 
In the foregoing paragraphs Oakeshott has defined what beliefs and opinions 
are irrelevant to considerations of the propriety of law. The closest we get to a 
positive specification of the jus of lex in ‘The Rule of Law’ is that ‘to deliberate 
the jus of lex is to invoke a particular kind of moral consideration’ (1999, p. 
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174). The moral considerations are tightly circumscribed. They are not 
concerned with an ‘absurd belief in moral absolutes’ (ibid.). The consideration 
should be that the prescriptions of the law do not clash with the prevalent 
moral sensitivity. They should be capable of distinguishing between the 
conditions of ‘virtue’, the conditions of a moral association, good conduct, and 
those which are of such a kind that they should be imposed by law, justice 
(ibid.). So, as with his account of morality, the actual content of laws or their 
justice is contingent on the dispositions of those associated in the practice 
and, as he said in a book review in the Spectator, ‘the culture from which the 
laws spring’ (1988, p. 60).  
 
Oakeshott never questioned the nature of the culture from which the laws 
spring. He could not because of his claim that there is no independent 
position from which to criticise a culture, or tradition. Nor, as Kevin Williams 
points out, ‘does he raise questions about the relationship between an 
educated moral sensibility which should find expression in the laws and actual 
laws’ (1989, p. 234). Being moral is entirely a matter of observing historic 
moral practices.  
 
Yet as the state conceived as a civil association is most suitable for those who 
relish freedom of choice, the shape of the state under Oakeshott’s conception 
of rule of law becomes self-evident. If he was correct that there is no necessary 
set of purposes that a civil association must have, he has articulated an idea of 
a minimal state, whose members are united only by the acknowledgment of its 
authority. In this state:  
 
the rule of law bakes no bread, it is unable to distribute loaves and fishes (it 
has none), and it cannot protect itself against external assault, but it remains 
the most civilised and least burdensome conception of the state yet to be 
devised’ (1999, p. 178). 
 
 “Most civilised” and “least burdensome” are value judgements.  The use of 
such terms calls into question the plausibility of Oakeshott’s avowed attempt 
to construct a philosophical definition of law devoid of ideological content. It 
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begs the question as to whether any definition of law can be realistically 
neutral in human affairs, as this is conspicuously not the case in the definition 
offered by Oakeshott.  
 
Oakeshott’s conception of a nomocracy as non-purposive rules out a 
distributive role for the state. Such a role would be inconsistent with the non-
instrumental character that he attributes to law within the practice of civility. 
A nomocracy comes to an end if it assumes a distributive role: ‘There is (…) 
no place in civil association for so-called distributive justice’ (1975a, p. 153). A 
distribution of primary goods, to use Rawls’ term, requires a rule of 
distribution and a provider who possesses what is to be distributed’: ‘But lex 
cannot be a rule of distribution of this sort, and civil rulers have nothing to 
distribute’ (ibid.). 
 
 Oakeshott’s philosophical outlook was totally inimical to state intervention in 
the lives of citizens and, as a consequence, to interference with the institution 
of private property.99 These conclusions inevitably flow from his account of 
morality and law, in particular, its deep-rooted individualism. He feared state 
interference as he believed that it destroys people’s capacity and willingness to 
exploit ‘the adventure and risk of self-enactment’ (1975a, p. 276). In the end 
the dispute between positivists such as Oakeshott and normativists, such as 
Raz and Dworkin, over the nature of law and its relationship with justice 
comes down to a commitment to different understandings of morality. Raz 
and Dworkin see morality and law as instrumental; Oakeshott did not. He 
recognised that the pursuit of substantive objectives necessarily compromises 
liberty. Letwin interpreted Oakeshott as claiming that those who see morality 
and law as instrumental have repudiated freedom, correctly understood 
Because they have rejected non-instrumental morality they give the 
realisation of certain substantive objectives priority over safeguarding the rule 
                                                   
99 Oakeshott had little personal regard for property, at least in his youth: ‘The owning 
of property has become boring to us - we want to be free from its encumbrances. And 
this is the first sign of life. And it is not merely property itself which disgusts us; it is 
the whole ‘property attitude’ to things. We want to experience and ownership stands 
in the way of free experience (…) it is permanent settled and continuous, while 
experience is fleeting, momentary and dies with its death’ (2014 [1928], p. 157). 
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of law: ‘They are pursuing an instrumentalist morality at the expense of 
liberty’ (Letwin 1989, p. 63). 
  
The Superiority of Civil Association - a recapitulation 
 
At this point, we can draw together the key presuppositions of the structure of 
Oakeshott’s argument as to the merits of the state conceived as a civil 
association. My aim here is not to exhaustively re-examine each of these 
assumptions, but to highlight those areas where his argument is especially 
vulnerable to attack. 
  
1. Individual freedom is the basis of human dignity and thereby morality, 
and consists in the ability to choose one’s substantive purposes for 
oneself. 
2. Both morality and the rule of law, correctly understood, are non-
instrumental practices.  
3. Neither law nor morality in a civil association restricts human freedom 
as they are non-instrumental. 
4. The state is of necessity a compulsory association. 
5. An enterprise association does not restrict freedom as long as its 
members have the freedom to exit. 
6.  Membership of a state is compulsory, a state conceived as an 
enterprise association is a contradiction in terms as there is no 
possibility of exit from the association. 
7. Therefore, an enterprise state is immoral as it is inimical to freedom, 
and de facto coerces associates into purposes and projects of which 
they may not approve. 
 
Regarding the first premise, in the final chapter of On Human Conduct, ‘The 
Character of a Modern European State’, Oakeshott wrote that the recognition 
of freedom ‘as the emblem of human dignity and as a condition for each 
individual to explore, to cultivate, to make the most of, and to enjoy as an 
opportunity rather than suffer as a burden’ was a considerable historic 
achievement (1975a, p. 236). Civil association is the idealisation of the state 
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suitable ‘for adventurers, each responding as best he can to the ordeal of 
consciousness in a world composed of others of his kind’ (ibid., p. 243).  
 
Thus civil association presupposes the existence of “heroic adventurers” who 
value freedom above everything else, regardless of the difficulties it might 
entail. As such, it is the preferable form of association for those who share 
Oakeshott’s values and view of the world, as explored in Chapter One. But, as 
Bhikhu Parekh points out, Oakeshott never fully explained why freedom is the 
emblem of human dignity and why it must be defined in such narrow terms, 
nor why free agency and moral autonomy should be closely linked and 
equated: ‘These basic propositions are self-evident and unproblematic to him’ 
(1979, p. 503). 
 
 Oakeshott would no doubt counter this criticism, however, by pointing out 
that his valorisation of freedom reflects a disposition to see things in this way, 
and is not the result of a deductive argument. But if we interpret human 
freedom more expansively, in terms of “capabilities” for self-realisation or 
“human development”, a purposive state would be better suited to satisfying 
the aspirations of its associates and ‘a compulsory enterprise association 
would not appear self-contradictory and morally monstrous, nor civil 
association logically coherent and morally desirable’  (Parekh , p. 503).100 
 
The second and third premises have been attacked from a number of quarters 
and are the most vulnerable parts of his argument. The principal objection is 
that Oakeshott does not give a response to the question “what is the point of a 
practice”? As Oakeshott admitted, in another context, when practices and 
                                                   
100 “Human development” is closely associated with the work of Nobel laureate 
Amartya Sen, who is both a political philosopher and economist. He claims in his 
Tanner lectures on human values that ‘you could be happy without having much 
freedom. You could have a great deal of freedom, without achieving much. Freedom 
is not itself free of an individual’s capability or desire to use it to any particular end. 
Accordingly, economic development becomes not so much about making up for what 
people lack, such as modernisation, so much as removing the “unfreedoms” such as 
market inequalities or state violence that stop them living in a way they might 
otherwise choose’ (1979).  
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purposes are detached, each becomes an ‘ideal extreme’ or ‘unintelligible 
abstraction’ (1962, p. 70).  
 
The distinction between purpose and practice is especially difficult to sustain 
with regard to law. Civil society is based on rules; unlike moral practices, rules 
are made by legislators for specific reasons. A government needs revenue, 
however limited its scope. Even in a civil association, this presupposes laws to 
raise taxes. Legislators have choices over how best to raise this, whether 
through indirect or direct levies. Direct taxation can be raised through income 
tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, property tax or stamp duties. Indirect 
taxes can be raised through a sales tax, a value added tax or an excise tax. The 
exact mix of taxes in a system is determined with reference to purposes or 
consequences. One mode of levying a tax may create greater equality; another 
may preserve and widen inequality. The government must make a reasoned 
choice, which will typically reflect considerations of both values and efficiency.  
To specify the tax code in “adverbial” terms is easily done. The tax code may 
specify that taxation should be raised “progressively”, but it is to be raised 
progressively for some ulterior purpose. This is also true of laws dealing with 
succession, wills, property, freedom of speech and so forth, which can all be 
specified adverbially, but nonetheless reflect reasoned choices informed by 
values and consideration of outcomes.  
 
Parekh concludes of Oakeshott that ‘he is right to stress that civil society is 
constituted in terms of authority not purpose; but wrong not to appreciate 
that its conduct is necessarily purposive in nature’ (1975, p. 505). If we accept 
that a government necessarily pursues purposes, the ideal conception of the 
state as a civil association is fatally undermined. We have seen that Oakeshott 
was able to reconcile law and freedom only by assuming that the state has no 
purposes. If there are no purposes, there is nothing for cives to approve or 
disapprove. Oakeshott’s argument that cives need not approve of a law but 
need only recognise its authority, is unsatisfactory. The idea that if I strongly 
object to progressive taxation on moral grounds, yet accept the authority of 




Oakeshott did intimate at one point that what he objected to most in a state 
conceived as an enterprise association was when it pursues an over-arching 
‘sovereign common purpose (…) that determines all others’ and ‘where the 
office of government of such a state is to specify and to interpret this sovereign 
common purpose and to manage its pursuit’ (1975a, p. 315). Yet in practice, a 
state may pursue multiple purposes, which Oakeshott admitted ‘may be 
related to one another systematically or in terms of a means to an end’ (ibid., 
p. 316). Whether or not a single over-arching purpose is posited, as long as the 
myriad of purposes pursued by a modern state is broadly coherent, all and any 
of the purposes pursued should be considered, according to his line of 
thought, as violations of our freedom, and thus immoral. 
 
The fourth presupposition, that a state is inevitably a compulsory association, 
is less contentious. Without reprising the relevant arguments, it is fair to say 
that Oakeshott’s presupposition has a respectable intellectual pedigree. David 
Hume exposed the misguidedness of attempts, such as those of Hobbes and 
Locke, to derive political obligation from an idea of a metaphysical contract, in 
‘Of the Original Contract’ (Hume 1994). More recently, John Simmons has 
exposed the impossibility of attempts to derive political obligation from an 
idea of tacit consent as explicit consent is impractical in a large modern state 
(Simmons 1979). 
 
Proposition 5 seems similarly uncontentious: membership of an enterprise 
association does not compromise freedom if one has the right to exit. 
Proposition 6 follows on from Propositions 4 and 5. The bottom line, 
expressed in Proposition 7, that the state conceived as an enterprise 
association is immoral, stems from Oakeshott’s narrow, individualistic, 
identification of morality with negative freedom, and his argument that the 
state conceived as a civil association is non-purposive and does not constrain 
freedom.  
 
My conclusion is that Oakeshott’s answer to the question of what the state is 
for, is ultimately unsatisfactory. The distinction between a state conceived as a 
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civil association and an enterprise association cannot be logically sustained.  It 
is difficult to deny that the state as a civil association has at least one purpose, 
the maintenance of peace and security. Oakeshott called this a postulate of the 
idea of a state, but not a purpose. But, in contrast, the relief of poverty is not a 
postulate but a purpose and is thus alien to civil association. The distinction 
between a postulate and a purpose is, however, ultimately arbitrary. It could 
be argued that the relief of poverty, free education and health for all at the 
point of delivery are all postulates of the modern European state.  
 
In his less theoretical works, however, such as The Politics of Faith and the 
Politics of Scepticism (1996), and The Vocabulary of the Modern European 
State (2008), there are several examples that suggest that Oakeshott realised 
that his idealisation of civil association was not sustainable. Although he 
studiously avoided using the word “purpose’ its shadow is evident: ‘The 
activity of governing subsists not because it is good but because it is necessary. 
Its chief office is to reduce the severity of human conflict by reducing the 
occasions of it’ (1996, p. 32, italics added). Elsewhere, the “chief office” was 
defined as being the ‘maintenance of order’ and is referred to as ‘the first 
object of government’, and the ‘first and only object of government’ (ibid., p. 
34). In a state where the “Politics of Scepticism” is practised, ‘the sole concern 
of government is the effect of conduct upon public order’ (ibid., p. 33).  The 
expressions “chief office”, “sole concern” and “first object” all connote 
“purpose”. 
 
In his review of de Jouvenal’s Sovereignty, Oakeshott acknowledged that if 
there is a political good that it is the responsibility of government to uphold, ‘it 
is the social tie itself, the conditions of confidence and friendliness which 
make it profitable, and even possible, the activities of the countless duces and 
their associates who comprise a society’ (Oakeshott 2008, p. 128). If it is the 
case that the state necessarily pursues the the purpose of maintaining order 
and security and the conditions of confidence and friendliness, the answer to 
the question of what the state should do is merely contingent on the character, 
mix and dispositions of its citizens. An individualist will want a nomocratic 
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version. “Mass man” will want a purposeful state to provide for his security 
and wellbeing. 
 
 There will be, in practice, many intermediate views on the question of what 
governments should do. These will be influenced by the moral questions of 
what we owe to others and how to reconcile individualistic and collective 
conceptions of the good in order to maintain order. These questions roughly 
delineate the domain of politics and the political to which we now turn. 
  
 
Chapter 4: On Politics and the Political 
This chapter assesses Oakeshott’s thinking about politics and the political. I 
will examine the key topics he returned to under several separate, but related, 
headings. First, I will offer an interpretation of Oakeshott’s political purpose 
in his post-war writings. Second, I will describe his view of politics as a 
necessary evil and its implications for his political theory. Third, I will explore 
his understanding of the relationship between order and power, which was a 
constant preoccupation for him. Fourth, I will explore how his distaste for the 
activity of politics leads to the heavily circumscribed nature of politics and the 
political in the ideal state of a civil association. Fifth, I will consider his anti-
rationalism thesis and explore the coherence of his understanding of politics 
as a tradition of behaviour, or practice. Finally, I will evaluate whether the 
historical and theoretical polarity he posits between the “politics of faith” and 
the “politics of scepticism”, the mixture of which he saw as the essence of our 
confused political dialogue, is either a sustainable or illuminating distinction. 
Oakeshott’s post-war project  
As noted in the Introduction, after 1945, the main political parties in the UK 
adopted the collectivist idiom of government to varying degrees. This was 
manifested in an expanding welfare state grounded in the Beveridge report, 
which Oakeshott regarded as an example of “rationalism” in politics. He 
believed that the rationalist disposition that increasingly prevailed after World 
War Two put ‘too high a value on political action and plac[ed] too high a hope 
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in political achievement’ (1991, p. 26). This was also a concern of other ‘Old 
Whig’ liberals such as Hayek (1960, p. 354). It is reasonable to interpret 
Oakeshott’s writings on politics in the post-war period as an effort to puncture 
the pretensions of the collectivist, perfectionist aspirations of contemporary 
politics.  
This is consistent with Oakeshott’s assessment, noted earlier, that the 
transformation of the UK into an enterprise state started to accelerate around 
1906: under first Campbell-Bannerman, then Asquith, both “Liberal” prime 
ministers. As all parties by 1945 had been bitten by the rationalist bug, the 
likelihood of a return to a healthier political tradition that favoured 
individuality and personal choice appeared at best, unlikely to him. So long as 
the circumstances which cultivated the emergence of rationalist politics 
remained, it was to be be expected that politics would remain rationalist in 
disposition (Oakeshott 1991, pp. 33-34). 
RIP arguably marks the point when Oakeshott considered classical liberalism 
grounded in the rule of law to have ended. He observed that ‘the field 
appeared to be occupied by two parties, each inspired by a philosophy of some 
sort, but neither by a sound or coherent philosophy’ (Oakeshott 2007, p. 
205).101 The tone of the conclusion to RIP is deeply pessimistic. The political 
scene was ‘corrupt and unhealthy’ (1991, pp. 41- 42).  On one side [Labour], 
there was a group of ‘sanctimonious, rationalist politicians’ who advocated an 
ideology of selflessness and social service ‘to a population in which they and 
their predecessors have done their best to destroy the only living root of moral 
behaviour’ (ibid.). They were opposed by another group [Conservatives] who 
were trying to persuade the electorate away from Rationalism through a new 
rationalisation of its political tradition (ibid.). The ideological strands of post-
war Conservative rationalism included, according to John Gray, attributing to 
governments the aims of ‘restoring lost moral consensus’, of ‘reviving a 
fragmented national integrity or promoting maximal wealth creation’ (Gray 
1993, p. 42).  
                                                   
101  Review of Quintin Hogg’s The Case for Conservatism (1947). Oakeshott criticised 
Hogg for introducing “natural law” as a grounding for Conservatism. 
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Why was Oakeshott so pessimistic? The primary circumstance he considered 
responsible for the dominance of rationalistic politics was the inexorable 
growth of the mechanisms of power available to modern governments. By 
1961, Oakeshott’s tone in the Notebooks had become even more pessimistic. 
He came to think that contemporary political practice did not provide the 
protection necessary to ensure the freedom of individual choice. 
In his 1948 essay ‘Contemporary British Politics’ Oakeshott professed a 
cautious optimism, however, that the Conservatives could come to their 
senses in due course although ‘the bug of rationalistic politics’ had bitten 
deeply (2007, p. 217). Oakeshott admitted that it was too much to expect that 
the Conservatives might be invulnerable ‘from the universal infection’ of 
rationalism’ (Oakeshott 2007, p. 217). But he expressed his confidence that 
their powers of resistance were great, and when they recovered from the 
infection, the policy they should pursue at home would be clear: ‘It is a policy 
of diffusing those morbid concentrations of power which have grown up in our 
society during the past fifty years’ (ibid.).  
Oakeshott was clear as to what a sceptical Conservative response should be to 
the predicament presented by rationalistic politics in post-war Britain. 
Conservatives, he claimed, disbelieve in all brands of utopia but offer some 
modest improvement over the present state of affairs. The Conservatives 
should, and did, have a policy and programme. But they should have nothing 
to offer regarding the ‘catchwords, slogans, visions, ideal states of society, 
classless societies, new order, all the tinsel and finery with which the modern 
political charlatans charm their jewels from the modern political savage, the 
Conservative has nothing to offer’ (Oakeshott 2007, p. 214). 
The best that could be hoped for in practice would be to slow down the 
increasing corporatisation of the state and its rationalist programmes. 
Oakeshott confessed in the Notebooks that his contribution to this lay in 
subverting progressive thought: ‘undoing of the work of the progressives’ 
(2014, p. 474). My contention is that we can read Rationalism in Politics as 
his intellectual contribution to this project. 
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Politics as a Necessary Evil 
Throughout his life, Oakeshott viewed politics as, at best, a necessary evil. In 
view of the values that animated him, it is no surprise to find that he was 
aesthetically and rationally offended by the practice of politics, especially its 
competitive aspects. In his 1939 essay, ‘The Claims of Politics’, he wrote that 
‘political action involves mental vulgarity’, not because it requires the 
agreement and backing of those who are mentally vulgar, but because of the 
‘false simplification of human life implied in even the best of its purposes’ 
(1993a, p. 93). By 1948, he considered politics ‘a limited but second-rate 
affair’, a view I contend that he held consistently throughout his life (2007, p. 
215). Suvi Soininen, however, argues that Oakeshott came to believe that 
politics requires a ‘high level of political intelligence’ (Soininen 2005, p. 2).102 
Soininen supports this contention with reference to his statement in On 
Human Conduct that politics in a civil association requires ‘so exact a focus of 
attention and so uncommon self-restraint that one is not astonished to find 
this mode of human relationship to be as rare as it is excellent’ (1975a, p. 80). 
This misses the point, however, that civil association was, for him, an ideal 
state, of which we can only discern shadows in the modern state. We will see 
that his preference was for as little politics as possible, the ideal state achieved 
in a civil association.  
Oakeshott repeated his distaste for politics in The Politics of Faith and the 
Politics of Scepticism,103 written sometime in the early 1950s: ‘Politics is at 
any time an unpleasing spectacle’ (1996, pp. 19). This is because its practices 
offend ‘most of our rational and all of our artistic sensibilities’ (ibid.). It is a 
                                                   
102 In support of her argument, Soininen cites Gerenscer’s claim (2000, p. 107) that 
Oakeshott dropped his diminution of politics in the 1946 edition of his Introduction 
to Leviathan ‘to a more supportive position in the 1975 edition’ (Soininen 2005, p. 
14). In the 1946 edition, Oakeshott claims that ‘politics is a second-rate form of 
human activity, neither an art or a science, at once corrupting to the soul and 
fatiguing to the mind, the activity of those who either cannot live without the illusion 
of affairs or those who are so fearful of being ruled by others that they will pay away 
their lives to prevent it’ (1946, p. 39). This is omitted in the 1975 edition. 
103 Kenneth Minogue and Timothy Fuller claim that the manuscript of PFPS was 
probably finished in 1952, after his inaugural lecture at the LSE (Minogue 2012, p. 
232; Fuller 1996, p. ix). 
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necessary evil. Its value is when it succeeds in moderating the rule of 
indiscriminate violence in human affairs. When it does so, ‘there is something 
to be said for it, and it may be even thought to be worth the cost’ (1996, pp. 19-
20). But even if it is limited to this necessary objective we should recognise 
that ‘political activity seems to encourage many of the less agreeable traits in 
human nature’ (ibid.). 
Oakeshott’s low opinion of the practice of politics is much in evidence in the 
Notebooks: ‘Politics are an inferior form of human activity to anyone who has 
no desire to rule others’; and ‘politics is a suitable subject of conversation - 
indeed perhaps that is all it is suitable for’ (2014, p. 418, p. 361).  Oakeshott 
saw popular democracy as a cause of the degradation of politics. The nature of 
democratic politics ‘is what makes democracy difficult. Not only or not so 
much, the stupidity of the mass, but their superstition’ (2014, p. 373). This 
echoes the contempt for mass man, the individual manqué, that Oakeshott 
revealed in his essay ‘The masses in representative democracy’ and in On 
Human Conduct (1991, pp. 363-383; 1975a). Democratic politics is addressed 
to “mass man”, who is the opposite of the rugged individualist, the courageous 
gentleman, who is capable of participating in the practice of civility and for 
whom Oakeshott conceived of the state as a civil association. The problem of 
democratic politics is that ‘the real grievances of mankind are incurable; 
politics consists in manufacturing curable grievances’ (2014, p. 418).  
In this comment he revealed his disdain for common folk: ‘People have a great 
passion for happiness; they seek it and consider it their right. This is an 
invasion of lower-middle class morality’ (2014, p. 426). Gross 
oversimplification is consequently necessary in politics. As persuasion is the 
point of political argument, it is necessary that the politician enlists the biases 
and opinions of his audience not simply by disclosing the beliefs of the 
speaker: ‘It is a counterfeit activity (...) it is only genuine if you regard it 
simply as a device to explain’ (2008, p. 170). Its nature is that it is ‘supremely 
unsuitable for the young: anything but politics. For politics is essentially 
regulative, not creative’ (2014, p. 389).  We can imagine that Oakeshott would 
have been appalled, but probably not surprised, by the increasing 
professionalisation of politics, where many of the participants move from 
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studying the subject at university to jobs as researchers in policy units before 
becoming MPs, with no or very little experience outside: ‘There is nothing in 
the engagement of itself [of politics] to suggest a profession and much 
eloquently to deny it’ (1975a, p. 165).104 
 
Politics, for Oakeshott, was then, at best, a necessary evil. His negative 
comments on the subject in the Notebooks became even more critical over 
time. He came to believe that contemporary political practice did not 
adequately provide the protection necessary to ensure the freedom of 
individual choice. In 1961, he recorded that ‘rape is the typical crime of 
modern politics; politicians rape their victims, rulers rape their subjects; 
technology is the rape of the earth’ (2014, p. 444). In the light of these 
strongly held views, it is not surprising that politics in a civil association is 
circumscribed almost to the point of extinction. His claim that politics should 
be seen as the pursuit of intimations and his evident preference for a sceptical 
style of politics can be viewed as part of a desire to keep politics in its place. 
 
Order, Freedom, Power and Antagonism 
 
How conflicting views over the proper purpose of the state are accommodated 
in a representative democracy that contains a plurality of conceptions of the 
good life is a perennial political concern. Oakeshott was supportive of 
pluralism and very well aware of the potential for conflict. One of the 
definitions he offered of politics in the Notebooks was ‘the art of living 
together & of being just to one another - not of imposing a way of life, but of 
organising a common life. The art of peace; the art of accommodating 
moralities to one another. Methods - various’ (Oakeshott 2014, p. 444).  
                                                   
104 None of the current leaders of the three major parties in the UK, at the time of 
writing in March 2015, has significant experience outside politics. David Cameron 
was Director of Corporate Affairs at Carlton Communications for seven years. This 
was largely a lobbying function for Carlton’s digital TV ambitions. Ed Miliband has 
no experience outside politics unless we count one year’s experience as a researcher 
for the Channel 4 show, ‘A Week in Politics’, in 1992-1993. Nick Clegg’s experience 
outside politics is limited to one year as a lobbyist on behalf of Libya, two years as a 




A question raised by some commentators, however, is whether Oakeshott has 
anything to say about how to mitigate the antagonistic aspect of politics, or 
the political. This has been a prominent theme in political theory in recent 
years, often linked to the subject of “deliberative democracy”. 105  Chantal 
Mouffe draws a distinction between “politics” and the “political”.  The 
“political” is ‘the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of 
human societies’ (Mouffe 2005, Two: Politics and the Political).  By “politics” 
she means ‘the set of practices and institutions through which an order is 
created, organising human coexistence in the context of conflictuality 
provided by the political’ (ibid.). A political challenge, for example, is how to 
accommodate groups that have strong collective identities and may be hostile 
to liberal values. This is the domain of the political. Mouffe’s contention is that 
any robust political theory must understand antagonism and that politics, 
through changes to practices and institutions, is the medium through which it 
is addressed. 
 
Mouffe, while broadly sympathetic to Oakeshott’s conception of civil 
association, has suggested that his understanding of the political is 
fundamentally flawed because he ignored its antagonistic dimension. Mouffe 
argues that the use that Oakeshott makes of the distinction between civil and 
enterprise association ‘lies in his flawed idea of politics. For his concept of 
politics as a shared language of civility is only adequate for one aspect of 
politics; the point of the ‘we’, the friend’s side ‘(Mouffe 1993, p. 68).106 Carl 
Schmitt defined the friend/enemy relation as the key criterion of the political 
and, according to Mouffe, ‘what is completely missing in Oakeshott is division 
                                                   
105 Deliberative or discursive democracy holds that mere aggregation of votes is 
insufficient to achieve legitimacy for a rule or decision in a pluralistic democracy. 
Legitimacy can only come about through “authentic deliberation”, free from the 
distortions of unequal power. Jurgen Habermas’ work on communicative rationality 
and the public sphere is often cited as influential in this area, as well as Rawls’ The 
Idea of Public Reason (Habermas 1981 and Rawls 1999, pp. 129-180)  
106 Carl Schmitt postulated that a key criterion of the political was ‘the specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that 
between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 2007, Section 2). In Mouffe’s most recent book, 
Agonistics (2013), there is no reference to Oakeshott. 
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and antagonism’ (ibid.). She argues that to introduce the dimension of conflict 
and antagonism into Oakeshott’s model, ‘it is necessary to recognise that the 
respublica is the product of a given hegemony, the expression of power 
relations and that it can be challenged’ (ibid.).  
 
Mouffe’s objection is that Oakeshott’s model of civil association is suitable 
only for a society of like-minded people, not one where there may be deep 
antagonisms and resentments, a condition which is perhaps more 
characteristic of the contemporary world. To evaluate this critique, it is 
appropriate to clarify Oakeshott’s understanding of the problem of order, 
conflict, and its relationship to the exercise of freedom and submission to 
power.  
 
Oakeshott was, in fact, preoccupied with the question of how to balance the 
need for order while resisting the tendency of the state to accrue more than 
the necessary power to maintain it. In ‘A Reminder from Leviathan’, he wrote 
that a civilised way of life is not something God-given: ‘It is the invention of 
men, a delicate and uneasy achievement. beneath lies a volcano of primordial 
barbarism (…) “the restless desire for power” in all men which waits for an 
opportunity to spread confusion’ (2008, p. 38). He considered our civilised 
manner of living to be a contingent historic achievement that is always 
potentially under threat from the universal, latent desire for power: ‘The 
sceptic understands order as a great and difficult achievement never beyond 
the reach of decay and dissolution’ (1996, p. 32).  
 
Carl Schmitt, who inspired Mouffe’s work on antagonistic politics, claimed 
that ‘one could test all theories of the state and political ideas according to 
their anthropology and thereby classify these as to whether they consciously 
presuppose man to be by nature evil or by nature good’ (Schmitt 2007, 
Section 7). Oakeshott never felt it necessary to develop an elaborate theory of 
human psychology to back up his political theory. He generally avoided 
making universal claims about human nature beyond recognising the 
potential “volcano of primordial barbarism”. There was no place in his 
theorising for the idea of “human nature”: ‘A human being is a “history” and 
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he makes this “history” for himself out of his responses to the vicissitudes he 
encounters’ (1989, p. 9). A human being is as contingent as the culture in 
which he is situated. Individuals are not specimens of universal humanity but 
practitioners of particular cultures. Thus there is no need to resort to the 
notion of a generic “human nature”.  
 
He argued that the need for order is not grounded upon a doctrine about 
human nature ‘but on a reading of human conduct’ (1996, p. 33). We observe 
that men live in close proximity with each other and ‘are apt to come into 
conflict with one another’ (ibid.). When the conflict reaches a certain level it 
can make life vicious and unendurable: ‘The activity of governing subsists not 
because it is good but because it is necessary’ (ibid.). 
 
Whether this is a judgment based on a doctrine about human nature or a 
reading of human conduct is a secondary concern.  In the expression, “volcano 
of primordial barbarism”, however, there are clear echoes of Sigmund Freud’s 
account of the human condition in Civilisation and its Discontents ‘The reality 
…is that human beings are not gentle creatures in need of love, at most able to 
defend themselves if attacked; on the contrary, they can count a powerful 
share of aggression among their instinctual endowments’ (2013, Chapter five). 
Oakeshott reminded us of the consequences of forgetting this: ‘If we reckon 
without “the known natural inclinations of men” our projects will end in 
disaster’ (2008 [1951], p. 40). 107  The risk in the modern belief of ‘the 
evanescence of imperfection’ and the pursuit of perfectionist projects is that 
we forget that ‘the ius zelotarrum (which is the law of barbarism) is always 
ready to establish itself ‘(ibid. p. 38). He argued that welfare is no substitute 
for authority. The purpose of government should not be to civilise ‘but to 
maintain that peace and order without which civilisation is impossible’ (ibid., 
p. 39). This was especially a contemporary challenge. Writing in 1949, he 
claimed that the generational challenge was not to reconstruct society, ‘but to 
provide against the new tyrannies which an immense growth in population in 
a wantonly productivist society are beginning to impose: and to provide 
                                                   
107 Oakeshott referenced Hobbes’ Leviathan: ‘The known Natural Inclinations of 
Mankind’ (Hobbes 2014, p. 303) 
 169 
against them in such a manner that the cure is not worse than the disease’ 
(1991, p. 406). 
 
We noted in Chapter Three that Oakeshott viewed the provision of security 
not as a purpose per se, but as a presupposition of “the state”, without which 
the concept would have no meaning. Security, for him, was a necessary 
condition of things, not a substantive or purposeful one. Whereas we can 
question the distinction, it was clearly the case that he believed that pluralism 
and conflict should not be allowed to threaten order and security. By itself, the 
value of a commitment to peace and order is something few would question. 
Yet it begs the question of how they are to be maintained. He had little to say 
on this, other than stating that auctoritas is primary and welfare is secondary. 
He did not explore the possible connection between them. Stability and order 
may well be dependent on the perception of the bulk of the citizenry that the 
distribution of goods in society is “fair”, and provides sufficient welfare for all. 
Such considerations were alien to his thought. He conceded, however, that the 
chief office of government ‘is to lessen the severity of human conflict by 
reducing the occasions of it’ (1996, p. 32). 
  
Oakeshott considered government to be part of the problem in terms of a 
potential lapse into barbarism, as well as being only part of the solution: 
‘When its power is commensurate with its office it constitutes our most 
dependable safeguard against barbarism’ (2008, p. 39). He believed that the 
problem is the tendency of government to use overwhelming power to address 
the problem of order, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that conditions 
in recent times have encouraged an increase in the use of power. 
 
But government is only part of the solution to the problem of order. Oakeshott 
claimed that what prevents our relapse into barbarism ‘is the day to day 
operation of the mild inducements and scarcely perceived checks that 
constitute our manner of living’ (2008, p. 39). The use of prodigious power by 
government is less effective and ‘may bring us too close to barbarism to be 
easily recognised as a safeguard’ (ibid.). That is, our loss of civil liberties may 
be as bad as the disorder it is supposed to prevent, an argument that 
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continues to be made by civil libertarians fearful of possible government 
misuse of internet surveillance techniques. 
 
We noted in Chapter Three that Oakeshott saw the rule of law and separation 
of powers as the most effective antidotes to the untrammelled exercise of 
government authority: ‘The understanding of government as the prevention of 
coercion, as the power which holds in check the almighty subject’ (1991, p. 
406). Rule of law liberalism was concerned with the threat of “sovereign” 
authority. The threat was identified as the tendency of rulers to inhibit the 
enjoyment of rights ‘by the exercise of lordship’ (1975a, p. 245). According to 
him, the demise of old-fashioned Liberalism came about when the 
understanding of rights as a contingent historic achievement weakened. 
Rights evolved to include ‘the enjoyment of certain substantive conditions of 
things capable of being assured only in the exercise of lordship (employment, 
medical attention, education)’ (ibid.). Consequently, what threatened the 
interests of associates was ‘not a lordly managerial government, but a 
government which failed in its lordly office of assuring to subjects the 
enjoyment of these conditions’ (ibid.). An enterprise state is a necessary threat 
to liberty: it will inevitably accrue and exercise more and more power as it 
seeks to provide for “substantive conditions of things”.  
 
Pace Mouffe, Oakeshott was well aware that an actual respublica may 
accumulate unhealthy concentrations of power. In The Political Economy of 
Freedom ([1949] 1991), he posited that the kernel of English liberties is ‘the 
absence from our society of overwhelming concentrations of power’ (1991, p. 
388). It is a general condition of freedom, and all other conditions may be 
seen as encompassed within it.  In ‘Contemporary British Politics’, he claimed 
that the first duty of government is to preserve a dispersion of power (2007, p. 
215). He was specific as to what this means in policy terms Private monopoly 
in all its forms should be through the maintenance of effective competition 
wherever possible.  He had in mind both monopolies of capital and labour. 
Furthermore, restraint of trade should be treated as a ‘major crime’ (1991, p. 
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404). 108 Inflation, the leitmotif of economic disorder, was to be avoided at all 
costs, being ‘the mother of servitude’ (ibid.). He probably had in mind the 
Weimar Republic experience of hyper-inflation that many consider a causal 
factor behind the rise to power of Hitler. 
  
This, I think, is sufficient to demonstrate that Oakeshott was acutely aware of 
issues related to concentrations of power. We will now consider Mouffe’s 
charge that his ideal of civil association pays insufficient attention to the 
problems of antagonism and hegemony. 
 
Politics in a Civil Association 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, Oakeshott contended that the idea of civil 
association does not specify whether or not a government is interventionist, a 
contention that is endorsed by interpreters such as for example, Jeremy 
Raynor who denies that a preference for civil association has anything to do 
with a preference for a limited style of government (Raynor 1985, p. 335). This 
claim is difficult to sustain: the essence of civil association is that cives are 
joined together in a practice of obligation to observe the authority of non-
instrumental rules. The view that government has no legitimate grounds to 
intervene beyond implementing the adverbial rules that govern conduct rules 
out “interventionist” activities, such as providing for a certain level of social 
welfare, financed by a progressive system of taxation.  
 
One of Oakeshott’s persistent aims in his political writings was to expose the 
ambiguities in our political vocabulary. He claimed that the distinguishing 
characteristics of terms such as “civil” and “political” are that they must be 
comprehensive, general and self-sufficient if they are to avoid redundancy. 
Unlike many modern writers, he did not use the term “political” to include 
policing or distributive functions. To do so, he argued, would not explain what 
is logically distinctive about the term. Political declarations are not to be 
                                                   
108  The Trades Union Congress was a particular bête noire of Oakeshott, ‘a 
constitutionally irresponsible body which appears to exercise a powerful influence 
over the decisions of a Labour Administration’ (2007, p. 210). 
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confused with statements that approve the contingent satisfactions that may 
arise due to the operation of the conditions of the association or with 
statements that advocate the change of these conditions so that the upshot of 
their operation may be different and a supposedly better distribution of 
contingent satisfactions achieved (2008, p. 261).  
 
Raynor claims that ‘civil association could happily exist without politics’ (1985 
p. 334). This misses the point. Politics is a fundamental postulate of civil 
association, but Oakeshott conceived of it in a way that is barely recognisable 
to the citizens of a modern European state. This is not necessarily a critical 
observation. As a civil association is an “ideal”, whose character he admitted 
can only be perceived indistinctly in today’s actual states, it follows that the 
politics of such as association will also be “ideal” and not reflective of any 
concrete reality. However, on further examination, it becomes clear that his 
account of the political in a civil association is designed to suit freedom-
loving, aesthetically inclined individualists, who wish to keep politics to a 
minimum. That is, individuals who have the same contempt for politics as he 
himself did. 
 
To understand what politics means in a civil association, we must take note of 
several distinctions that Oakeshott drew that may not be immediately obvious 
to us based on our contemporary experience. A key distinction for him is that 
‘politics is categorically distinct from ruling’ (1975a, p. 166). Politics is 
persuasive, ruling is authoritative: ‘Expressions like “political rule” are 
categorically confused. Rulers may deliberate desirabilities, but it is not 
ruling’ (2008, p. 262). There is nothing to stop rulers participating in politics, 
but when they do, they must step outside their offices in order to participate. 
One cannot rule “politically” in a civil association, which is non-existent or in 
abeyance when rulers try to do so (1975a, p. 167). A second distinction is 
between ruling and leading. The latter is, by its nature, political, but belongs 
to the style of an enterprise association, where the dux is the head of an action 
group, and is not the rex. The latter is aloof from politics and gets on with the 
business of governing. 
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Persuasive leadership is the hallmark of an enterprise association. But 
Oakeshott argued that in exercising the skills of persuasive leadership rulers 
cease to be rulers and become managers, who have no place in a civil 
association (1975a, p. 168). Persuasive argument is largely conducted in the 
idiom of consequences and by coaxing and flattery, by vague promises of 
improved circumstances, by criticism, praise, subterfuge, or fear (ibid.). That 
is, associates in an enterprise are being persuaded to approve the conditions 
prescribed. In a civil association associates have an antecedent obligation to 
subscribe to the rules of the association whose authority lies in the recognition 
of the authenticity of properly enacted rules. When approval and obligation 
are confused ‘civil freedom is compromised to the verge of extinction’ (ibid.). 
 
As we reflect on his account of politics in a civil association, the extent to 
which a modern European state actually resembles an enterprise association 
is evident. Governing is largely practised in the mode of persuasive leadership. 
Political campaigning is continual, and the professional presentation of 
information regarding issues of ruling is the norm. Oakeshott was, of course, 
profoundly aware of these realities, and this underpinned his distaste for 
practical politics. 
 
Oakeshott used the term “politics” solely to refer to the respublica of civil 
associations. Respublica is the public concern of cives, which is the sum of the 
conditions that comprise a civil association. It is the manifold of rules and 
rule-like instructions to be subscribed to in all the ventures in which the self-
chosen satisfactions of agents may be pursued (1975a, pp. 147-148). Politics is 
the activity of considering the appropriateness of the requirements of the 
practice of civility, which can be deliberately changed, ‘where the practice 
itself (and not any desires to produce a substantive satisfaction) is the terms of 
the association’ (1975a, p. 161). This activity, so circumscribed, ‘may be 
counted unique to the civil condition’ (ibid.). 
 
In the references above we should note, first, that by 1975, he no longer talked 
in terms of political tradition but, instead, referred to “practice”. From the 
mid-1950s onwards, he had begun to substitute practice for tradition, possibly 
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because the latter was becoming a more ideologically loaded term, associated 
with a type of Conservatism that Oakeshott wished to distance himself from. It 
figured in ‘the avalanche’ of books on Conservatism by American authors such 
as Russell Kirk and Clinton Rossiter, which for Oakeshott, contained ‘too 
much Burke and all that’ (2008, p. 118).109 Practice is a more modest concept 
that marked his shift to emphasising the contingent aspect of politics. And 
this, in turn, emphasised the plural, specific nature of political practices. 
Practice, moreover, emphasises the role of the intelligent agent, which for him 
was a fundamental postulate of human conduct: ‘Practices themselves are the 
outcomes of performances’ (1975a, p. 56).  
 
Second, Oakeshott specified that the desirabilities of practices relate only to 
the conditions or rules of the practice itself, not to procuring satisfactions. 
Only in ‘vulgar parlance’ is the business of satisfying wants said to be political 
(ibid., p. 162). Third, he does not allow for the questioning of political 
authority in his specification of politics. This definition, as Oakeshott 
acknowledged, requires the ‘rejection or putting-by of much that belongs to 
fashionable doctrine’ (ibid., 161). But at what cost? It is questionable whether 
anything recognisable emerged from his description of politics that offered 
even a glimpse of what we would understand politics to be in a twenty-first 
century European state. According to Andrew Sullivan, ‘Oakeshott claimed his 
ideal country was Andorra - a strange accident of a place with almost no 
government at all’ (Sullivan 2010). 
 
Oakeshott distinguished another kind of activity, ‘a contingent engagement 
and relationship’ for which the word “politics” is often used, such as ‘the 
politics of a tennis club’ (1975a, p. 162). A tennis club exists to procure a 
‘substantive satisfaction’ for its members (ibid.). In the conduct of a tennis 
club, the “political” is ‘the concern that the adventure shall be pursued subject 
to certain contingent considerations’. Politics is the activity of caring for this 
concern and keeping these considerations in trim, for example, committee 
discussions on membership criteria and staffing levels. This, however, is a 
                                                   
109 See Oakeshott’s reviews of Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind (2008, pp. 104-
107; and Clinton Rossiter’s Conservatism in America (2008, pp. 149-150) 
 175 
‘metaphorical use of the word “politics”’ (ibid.). It is analogous to that ‘in 
which the prescriptions of a respublica are understood and deliberated in 
terms of their desirability’ (ibid.).  
 
The reason that this is not politics, properly speaking, is that the tennis club’s 
deliberations concern the consequential and contingent engagements of 
people who recognise themselves to be associated in another mode: ‘Namely 
in performances for procuring substantial satisfactions’ (1975a, p.162).  We 
should talk of “politics” properly speaking only in regard to the respublica of a 
civil association. Only it is concerned with what constitutes the association, 
that is, the authoritatively enacted, adverbial, non-instrumental rules that 
govern conduct. When a political proposal is made to change the respublica, 
whereas it may express a desire of the proposer, it is intended that all cives 
should have a civil obligation that they do not already have or should be 
relieved of a current civil obligation.  
 
So gay marriage, for example, is a political proposal, as it changes the 
adverbial qualification on marrying that it be only performed 
“heterosexually”, even though it directly benefits gays who wish to be married. 
Conversely, exempting Sikhs from the requirement to wear a helmet when 
riding a motorcycle would not be a political proposal, as this would refer only 
to Sikh cives. However, a proposal by a Sikh to abolish the requirement for all 
citizens to wear a helmet is political, as it refers to all cives. 
 
The nature of political activity is that it is an exploration of respublica in 
terms of the conditions it prescribes ‘which is at once acquiescent and critical’ 
(1975a, p. 164). The element of acquiescence is the recognition of the authority 
of the association. Oakeshott argued that politics presupposes acquiescence to 
authority because to deny authority is to repudiate civil obligation, which 
extinguishes civil intercourse ‘and with it the possibility of reflecting upon its 
conditions in terms of their desirability’ (ibid.). Dissent from the authority of 
respublica ‘is giving notice of a resolve to terminate civil association’ (ibid.).  
Politics, he argued, cannot be concerned with the worth of civil association 
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itself as this relates to the authority of respublica, which cannot be called into 
question.  
 
Politics, then, is concerned with criticism, approval or non-approval of the 
desirabilities of the rules relating ‘exclusively to respublica and therefore to 
bonum civile’ (ibid.). Oakeshott asserted that this understanding of politics 
required a disciplined imagination. Attention should be focused on the terms 
of civility as a ‘practice of just conduct’ (ibid.). That is, the conditions that 
need to to be recognised and subscribed to under threat of civil punishment. 
There is no room in the politics of civil association for concern for human 
happiness and virtue, questions of human destiny, or ‘the rift that lies between 
the aspirations of human beings and the conditions of human life’ (1975a, p. 
164). 
 
This description of political activity excludes the deliberation of most subjects 
that would commonly be understood to be political. A civil association 
necessarily excludes from politics any consideration of plans for the 
improvement of mankind, for diminishing any shortfall in satisfactions, or for 
moral improvement. These ‘cannot as such be political proposals’ (ibid., p. 
168). Furthermore, politics necessarily excludes any proposals for awards of 
benefits to individual or corporate interests justified on account of the merit, 
the bargaining power, or any other feature of the claimants. In a civil 
association these are not political proposals.  
 
Oakeshott admitted that this is an extremely “thin” conception of politics. This 
is unsurprising as he specified that civil association is a purposeless 
association, which in turn limits the purview of politics to deliberation of the 
terms of the association. He justified what he called ‘an implausibly 
circumspect character’ of politics with reference to his stated project in OHC 
of idealising the nature of politics in a civil association: ‘The ideal engagement 
of considering the desirability of rules where rules and not purposes are the 
terms of the association and where rules are considered to be deliberately 
alterable’ (1975a, p. 165).  
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Oakeshott recognised that the motive for a change in the prescriptions of 
respublica may spring from a ‘want, a wish for a benefit, or a plea for a 
removal of a disadvantage’ (ibid., p. 170). But for a proposal to become 
political, it must be recognised as a condition imposed upon conduct that ‘is 
totally indifferent to the advantage or disadvantage it may have for any 
interest’ (ibid.). So, for example, a change in a law will likely benefit the legal 
profession as clients will seek advice on its interpretation.  A new Finance Act 
may incidentally benefit the accountancy profession for the same reason. But 
this is not a political reason for a change of law in a civil association. 
Moreover, the public reasons that may be offered for a change in law exclude 
claims that are based on the truth or falsity of opinions, theorems, alleged 
statement of facts, doctrines, creeds or dogmas (ibid.). Also excluded as public 
reasons are beliefs that specific conduct be thought to be morally right or 
wrong or thought to be physically beneficial or harmful.  Such reasons are 
necessarily excluded by Oakeshott’s account of authority and obligation. Civil 
authority is the counterpart of civil obligation, and there cannot be civil 
authority if one is obliged ‘to acknowledge the truth or falsity of a theorem or 
doctrine’ (ibid., p. 171).  
 
We noted in Chapter Three that the obligation to live by the rules of a civil 
association does not even imply that we approve of them, let alone find them 
desirable. The mark of a “political” proposal is that ‘there is something to be 
thought and said’ about some rule excepting what may be thought and said 
about it in terms of fact or moral certitude. Political debate is deliberating and 
communicating in terms of these ‘other considerations’ (ibid., p. 172). 
Oakeshott does not specify what these other considerations might be, other 
than that they be “civilly desirable”.  The rules that are the outcome of political 
deliberation should be neutral between interests and indifferent to the truth 
or error of any belief. As a result, the considerations are not ‘themselves a 
substantive interest or doctrine’ (ibid.).  Civil desirabilities cannot, moreover, 
be deduced from ‘theorems about the natural conditions of a human life’ 
(Oakeshott 1975a, p. 173), for example, that man is an organism with the 
desire to live rather than perish, and that he is inadequately equipped to do 
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so.  The reason is that the civil condition is not ‘a shelter’; such considerations 
are irrelevant to the desirabilities of the civil condition (ibid.). 
 
Moreover, the wants of associates have nothing to do with the desirabilities of 
civil prescriptions or allocating satisfactions between competing agents. The 
fact that cives have wants has no logical connection with civil desirabilities. 
Oakeshott gave two examples to clarify this. A rule that obliges cives not to kill 
one another is not a conclusion that can be inferred from the fact that cives 
want to stay alive; such a rule is not civilly desirable because it satisfies such a 
want. The second example is that of property. He claimed that just because we 
want to enjoy affluence or avoid indigence, this is no reason for a civil 
institution of property.  It is not civilly ‘desirable or undesirable in virtue of 
being an efficient or an inefficient means to the achievement of this or any 
other substantive end’ (ibid., pp. 173-174). 
 
 The character of political thought and utterance is distinguished, then, by its 
character as circumstantial deliberation about respublica in terms of bonum 
civile (1975a, p. 173). The expression bonum civile translates as “civil 
interest”, not to be confused with the “general interest”. A “general interest’’ 
can only be construed as a common purpose or substantive “good” which is 
pursued by the related associates.  Considerations pertaining to a general 
interest belong only to an enterprise association. It would be contradictory for 
the politics of a civil association to be conducted with reference to a general 
interest such as a common good. 
 
 Oakeshott heavily circumscribed both the scope of politics in a civil 
association and what counted as valid political argumentation. This follows 
from his view that both morality and law are adverbial qualifications of 
actions that cannot be inferred from a law of reason, or a law of nature, ‘a 
principle of utility, a categorical imperative or the like’ (ibid., p. 174).  We are 
precluded from arguing politically that a civil rule needs to be amended or 
amplified on account of its not forbidding conduct that is generally thought to 
be wrong. So we cannot argue that adultery should be a criminal offence 
simply because it is widely thought to be morally wrong. Civil desirabilities 
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cannot be inferred from moral desirabilities. It is not necessarily a sign of 
something wrong with the law that they do not pull in the same direction or 
are even in conflict with what is thought to be morally desirable, although 
political reflection and declaration, concerned with civil desirabilities, is 
related to ‘moral considerabilities of its own’ (1975a, p. 175). 
 
If so much is excluded from the scope of political argument, we might wonder 
what is left for political debate. Oakeshott, moreover, under-specified the 
types of reasons that may count as properly political. Political utterances are 
not just opinions. Subjectivity may be impossible to eliminate, but nowhere is 
it less relevant than when reflecting on the appropriateness of the rules of 
civility (1975a, p. 176). The reasons offered must be capable of explaining the 
desirability of the constituent rules of a respublica. The mode of deliberating 
the desirabilities belongs to ‘the discourse of persuasion, not proof’ (ibid., 
pp.176-177). The practice of civil intercourse may be understood in terms of 
some abstract legal theorems such as tort, fault and liability, as well as general 
moral ideas, such as fairness and humanity, ‘“civilised” by being given civil 
meanings’, and elicited from a practice of civil intercourse (ibid., p. 177). Like 
the rules that compose the practice, these general ideas are subject to 
modification. The subject of political deliberation is then ‘neither quiescent 
nor agitated: it is a situation of continuous responses to circumstances in 
terms of rules’ (ibid., p. 178). 
 
The relevant considerations of political deliberation have the characteristics of 
being aids to political reflection rather than criteria. Although all 
considerabilities are necessarily conditional, Oakeshott argued that a few are 
more grounded than others. He offered two examples solidly grounded 
considerations. First, a civil prescription is undesirable, for example, if it is 
incapable of enforcement. Second, the scope of a rule should, moreover, be 
limited to actions only in respect of the capacity to harm other agents and any 
projected innovation should be such that the respublica should be able to 
accommodate it.  
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The first example points to the critical role which Oakeshott’s account of 
authority plays in his political theory. Difficulty in enforcing a rule per se does 
not makes it undesirable. It is the consideration that an unenforceable rule 
cannot be authoritative without ‘a great and arguably undesirable extension of 
the apparatus of detection’ (1975a, p. 179). The second example illustrates his 
rejection of J. S. Mill’s distinction between the public and private spheres. In a 
civil association everything can be private yet public at the same time. The 
wishes, choices and actions of an agent, together with his property, are 
recognised as private, but they are public ‘in respect of being required to 
subscribe to the conditions specified in respublica, and in no other respect’ 
(1975a, p. 183). Oakeshott argued that in principle, no action is exempt from 
civil conditions; but ‘civil intercourse recognizes a circumstantial privacy, 
beyond the formal autonomy assured to cives in civil prescriptions being laws 
and not surrogate choices of actions, which merits consideration’ (ibid., p. 
179). 
 
He argued too that, as the relevant considerations of political deliberation are 
not plausibly unconditional, any political proposal both relates to current 
achievements in civility and is an investigation of the intimations of those 
achievements (1975a, p.  180). Any change in circumstances or belief can 
trigger a political proposal. Oakeshott defined political intelligence as the 
ability to choose what should receive attention in this circumstantial flux, 
which is no mean task.  
 
Oakeshott did not pretend that this understanding of politics is anything other 
than in its ideal character. The main obstacle to recognising this ideal 
character has been the pre-emption of the word “politics” as a feature of 
modern European states that has no counterpart in civil association: politics 
understood as ‘the consideration of “managerial” decisions about the pursuit 
of a common purpose in contingent situations or the negotiation of 
advantages for private interests’ (ibid., pp. 181-182). The substantive character 
of “politics” and “political” is derived from the mode of association attributed 
to the state. As the state has been increasingly understood to be an enterprise 
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association, we will now turn to an examination of the ideas that underlie his 
understanding of the practice of politics in a modern European state.  
 
For Oakeshott, modern politics had taken the form of an ambiguous 
combination, in different proportions of these two modes of association. The 
activities of all governments are an ambiguous mixture of “rulership” and 
“lordship”’, the defining styles of civil association and enterprise association. 
In the latter, an office of “rule” is substituted by ‘a board of managers 
concerned with deploying human and other resources of the association in 
pursuit of the common purpose’ (2008, p. 265).    Politics is identified as 
deliberating proposals about the deployment of resources to achieve the 
common purpose. But for Oakeshott this was not politics, but something else: 
‘The most commonplace focus in relation to the modern state, the engagement 
to determine who gets what, and how as the contingent outcome of these 
conditions of association’ (ibid., pp. 265-266).  
 
Oakeshott did not give a name to these other deliberations. They are just not 
political in his judgment. Deliberation on such matters as the fair distribution 
of goods, minority rights and welfare provision, which dominate the literature 
of political philosophy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
refer to the provision of satisfactions in relation to the ‘current wants of this or 
that associate or groups of associates’ (ibid., p. 262). To describe such 
deliberations as political ‘convicts many current expressions of categorical 
incoherence’ (ibid.). 
 
In choosing to exclude the issue of wants from the political domain, Oakeshott 
exposed the shortcomings of his account of authority. He never explained why 
one should support a political order beyond the formal response that its rules 
are authoritative if enacted according to the established procedures for 
enacting rules. John Gray suggests that the Achilles heel of Oakeshott’s 
political thought, which it shares with classical liberalism, lies in the account 
of the nature and authority of the state. Both claim that the authority of the 
state does not depend on achieving success in attaining a substantive purpose, 
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or in its relation to the cultural character of its subjects: ‘Both claims are 
profoundly questionable’ (Gray, 1993, p. 43). 
  
The question of how to achieve political stability in a pluralistic society 
consisting of different comprehensive conceptions of the good dominated the 
later works of John Rawls.110 In Oakeshott’s account of the politics of a civil 
association, the question does not even arise. He acknowledged that the 
authority of an office of rule remains ‘always a delicate matter of current 
belief’ (1991, pp. 443).  It must be deeply rooted and must be ‘proof against 
disapproval and ridicule of the performance of the office… it hangs like a drop 
of dew upon a blade of grass’ (ibid.). Politics is reduced to the deliberation of 
modifications to the rules governing behaviour, according to the prevailing 
sense of “civil desirabilities”. For this to be possible, it arguably presupposes a 
common culture, or ‘at least a common disposition to value lex above one’s 
local cultural identity’ (Grant 1990, p. 85). In civil association, however, that 
somewhat “watery” fidelity called civility is the only thing that joins associates 
(Oakeshott 1975a, p. 147). 
 
For “watery”, we could substitute “thin”. The civil associates are parties to a 
consensus, but a thin one. They view the conditions of association that they 
are obligated to subscribe to as ‘prevailing winds which agents should take 
into account in sailing their several courses’ (1975a, p. 70). Even at the time of 
writing On Human Conduct, this could not be taken for granted, and it is even 
less true today, as the UK has become increasingly multicultural. Gray argues 
that the notion that political authority could ever be mainly formal arose 
through thinkers such as Kant, at a time when a common cultural identity 
could be taken for granted. This suggests that to secure a loyalty to civitas, 
something more is required than a ‘watery fidelity’ to lex, such as a fair society 
and respect for minority rights, consideration of which Oakeshott rules out in 
his specification of politics in a civil association. Gray argues that ‘it is a 
                                                   
110 Rawls conceived of ‘political liberalism’ as a solution to a problem in A Theory of 
Justice: ‘The serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized 
not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines but by pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ 
as well as ‘even mad, comprehensive doctrines’ (Rawls 2005, pp. xvi-xvii). 
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matter of brute historical fact that no government can, in any modern 
democratic state, long survive if it does not preside over sustained economic 
growth’ (1993, p. 43). In short, all modern states are to a considerable degree 
enterprise associations: ‘The enterprise state is a matter of brute historical 
fact, which we may indeed strive to temper, but which we cannot hope to 
overcome’ (ibid.).  
 
As the following sections will show, through his criticism of rationalism in 
politics and the politics of faith, Oakeshott’s main political motivation was to 
deflate the aspirations of those who wished to promote the enterprise state. As 
far as politics in a civil association is concerned, Mouffe’s criticism that it is 
insufficiently robust is well founded. In particular, as it is based on a 
celebration of individuality, it fails to acknowledge the importance of 
collective identities and the friend/enemy distinction that Mouffe, following 
Carl Schmitt, sees as the constitutive element of the political: ‘Every religious, 
moral, economic or other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is 
sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and 
enemy’ (Schmitt 2007, Section 4). Oakeshott, in fact, embodied the liberal 
‘negation of the political’, which Schmitt argued was intrinsic to 
individualism. He felt that this results necessarily in distrust towards all 
political forces and forms of state and government, ‘but never produces on its 
own a positive theory of state, government and politics’ (2007, Section 8).  
 
Oakeshott’s account of politics in civil association is ultimately unconvincing.  
He re-constructed the solution to the Hobbesian problem of civil strife by 
multiplying ‘the number of noble characters, or even better, somehow making 
the noble character the norm, rather than the exception’ (Muller 2010, p. 
325). Oakeshott claimed that pride and generosity are the virtues of noble, 
aristocratic individualists, and pride should be recognised as capable of 
generating a striving for peace more firmly grounded than any other: ‘It the 
surest motive for just conduct’ (1991, p. 343). Thus his account of politics in a 
civil association effectively ignores the problem of the political as cives are 
taken to be alike in the priority they give to autonomy. Consequently, politics 
becomes a small part of the conversation of mankind, concerned with the 
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desirabilities concerning their civil interactions and nothing more. The 
problems posed for order and stability by the existence of mass men in an age 
of representative democracy simply do not exist. There are no mass men in a 
civitas, who do not, unlike cives, ‘delight in one another’s individuality and 
enjoy one another’s company’ (1991, pp. 460-61). 
 
 Mouffe claims that the perspective of individualism does not allow one to 
understand how political identities are created. These are always ‘collective 
identities, constructed in the form of a we/they relation’ (Mouffe 2013, 
Interview with Chantal Mouffe). Perry Anderson stresses this point. He notes 
that ‘the collision of moral codes within the same state is the stuff of political 
life which the dream of civil association represses’, an observation that seems 
increasingly pertinent with the rise of Islamism in Western Europe (2005, p. 
23). Oakeshott’s account of politics in a civil association is unsatisfying. It is 
logically consistent with the structure of civil association but conflict, which is 
one of the most salient features of contemporary political life, is excluded 






Politics as Conversation 
 
Oakeshott, moreover, idealised politics as conversation, not as argument. The 
metaphor has generated secondary commentary disproportionate to what 
Oakeshott wrote on the subject.111 He did not elaborate his conception of 
politics as conversation in detail. There is nothing that could be described as a 
theory or a model of democratic politics. There are no programmes, policy 
prescriptions or models. In fact, he provided little more than occasional 
commentaries concerning the ethos of conversational politics that he 
considered appropriate to pluralistic democratic societies. 
 
                                                   
111 See Gerencser (1995), Plotica (2012), Soininen (2005b). 
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In his wartime Notebook entitled ‘A Conversation’, Oakeshott sketched out his 
thoughts, which he later developed in the essay, ‘The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind’ ([VPCM], (1991 pp. 488-541). In the former he 
outlined the importance and features of a conversation. He described it as ‘the 
microcosm of life and as an interpretation of human life’ (2014, p. 308). 
Oakeshott believed that scepticism of a sort is the essence of conversational 
politics, as conversation is ‘dialectic not eristic’ (ibid., p. 309). 112  The 
contributors to a conversation have a common civilisation and share certain 
common tastes while differing in their opinions.  Conversation presupposes 
the exclusion of ‘power & force’, and toleration (ibid., p. 310). A contributor 
may prevail on a particular point ‘but nobody “wins” the conversation as a 
whole’ (ibid., p. 310). Not all opinions need be represented in a conversation - 
certainly there is no place for the “fool” - and for conversation to be effective it 
should have a manageable number of participants. He thought that five was 
about the maximum for an effective conversation. More than this it is likely 
that ‘a dogmatic barbarian will be present who will break the spell and convert 
conversation into an argument or an enquiry’ (2004, p. 192). Implicitly, this 
constraint seems to deny the usefulness of the metaphor of politics as a 
conversation. 
 
In his essay, ‘The Voice of Conversation in the Education of Mankind’ 
[VCEM], which O’Sullivan suggests was written soon after the Second World 
War, Oakeshott further elaborated the character of conversation. It is totally 
different to enquiry, and from argument, debate or a symposium. (Oakeshott 
2004, p. 187). In all its various forms, the art of conversation consists of the 
acceptance ‘that talk is neither a search for “truth” nor the propagation of a 
belief but is to be understood as a partnership in intellectual pleasure’ (ibid., 
p. 188).  
 
The title of VCEM is strikingly similar to the later The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind (VPCM Oakeshott 1991). Whereas both have a 
common subject matter, their orientation, however, is different. VPCM 
highlights the risks of an excessively scientific outlook on the world, at the 
                                                   
112 Oakeshott’s note: ‘Plato, Meno, 75c-d; cp. Collingwood, New Leviathan, 24-27.’ 
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expense of the ‘playful’ voices of poetic or aesthetic experience. But both 
VPCM and VCEM emphasise a key attribute of conversation. It does not aim 
to produce consensus, and the worth of a conversation is not to be judged by 
the extent to which it produces it. In conversation ‘different universes of 
discourse meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an oblique relationship 
which neither requires nor forecasts their being assimilated to one another’ 
(1991, p. 490). Relevance in conversation is governed by the progression of 
the conversation itself: ‘It owes nothing to an external standard’ (ibid., p. 
494). 113 
 
Oakeshott thought that an understanding of politics as conversation could be 
an antidote to the violence of politics.  He explained this in a letter he wrote 
dated January 1948, to Karl Popper. Popper had written that there are two 
possible ways in which a decision can be reached: either argument or violence. 
According to Popper, a true rationalist is one who ‘would rather be 
unsuccessful in convincing another man by arguments than successful in 
crushing him by force’ (1948, pp. 109-110). Oakeshott disagreed with the 
contrast between reasoned argument and violence because he did not believe 
that ‘reason is capable of excluding violence (even in the long run), or that, 
because reason can’t, nothing can’ (28 January 1948). He contended that he 
knew of a system of politics that is neither truly nor falsely rationalistic: ‘The 
politics of conversation, as against your politics of argument’ (ibid.).  In his 
response, Popper politely pronounced himself ‘very ready to accept your 
delightful formula that a politics of conversation should replace my politics of 
argumentation’, but without explaining his reasons. (January 31, 1948). 
 
In a book review, ‘The Political Economy of Freedom’ (1991, pp. 384-406), 
Oakeshott repeated his conception of politics as conversation, but revealed it 
                                                   
113 Richard Rorty borrowed Oakeshott’s metaphor of ‘conversation’ to support his 
radical relativism: ‘If we see knowing as not having an essence, to be described by 
scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards to believe, then 
we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which 
knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts from the relation between human 
beings and the object of their inquiry to the relation between alternative standards of 
justification’ (1980, p. 389). 
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as one ‘in which past, present and future each has a voice; and though one or 
other of them may on occasion properly prevail, none permanently 
dominates, and on this account we are free’ (ibid., p. 388). The point here, 
however, was not to commend the conversational paradigm per se, but to 
insist that neither the past, as tradition, nor the contingencies of the present, 
nor expectations for the future, should dominate our political deliberations. 
He next used the metaphor in his inaugural LSE lecture on March 6, 1951, but 
without evaluation beyond the observation that ‘the politics of a community 
are not less individual (and not more so) than its language, and they are 
learned and practised in the same manner’ (1991, p. 62).  
 
In VCEM, he made the stronger claim that of all activities the one that has 
benefitted most from the refining touch of conversation is politics (2004, p. 
194,). He claimed that this was self-evident and, moreover, good for nothing 
else. The approximation of politics to conversation was, he thought, ‘the gist 
and meaning of democracy’ (ibid.) He opposed the ‘perverted’ understanding 
of democratic politics, which is misidentified with such ideas as the rule of the 
people, government representing the majority and the propagation of a 
democratic faith with ‘the politics of the man of conversation’ (ibid.). 
Oakeshott likened the character of the man of conversation to a hunter who 
takes part in the chase just for the pleasure of the ride: ‘It is a hunt without a 
victim’, and conversation is an art that welcomes many styles (ibid., p. 187). 
 
Oakeshott claimed that, historically, conversational politics was a reaction to 
dogmatic politics what we now call politics is the by-product of this encounter 
between the two styles of politics (2004, p. 195. He thought it was the English 
who had first explored the recognition that ‘politics is supremely eligible to be 
a conversational art’ (ibid.).  But, with reference to the Soviet threat after 
World War Two he noted that the forces of barbaric dogmatism had yet to be 
permanently defeated and threatened to usher in ‘a new dark age of 
enlightenment’ (ibid., p. 196).    
 
A conversational style of politics is, unsurprisingly, the political style of a civil 
association: ‘Singleness of purpose, so destructive of a civilised order of 
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society, is foreign to the character of the politician who is a man of 
conversation’ (2004, p. 196). A conversational politician is an undoctrinaire 
sceptic who will have no sympathy for the purposes of an enterprise state. 
This person was best exemplified by the mid-19th century English 
parliamentary tradition before it was corrupted by popular democracy. A 
conversational politician is resolutely anti- perfectionist: ‘If a “civilized” 
manner of living is one that accepts the unavoidable conditions of human life 
and makes the best of them, then a conversation may be recognised as its 
emblem’ (ibid., p. 198).  
 
In the Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, Oakeshott went so far as 
to advocate conversational politics. He argued that there was an imbalance in 
contemporary politics which sprang from a preoccupation with the future that 
threatened ‘to destroy the continuity of activity by destroying our sympathy 
with its earlier enterprise’ (1996, p. 87. In order to reinstate the balance, he 
recommended the promotion of the understanding ‘of politics as a 
conversation in which past, present and future each has a voice; and while one 
or other of them may on occasion prevail, none is given exclusive attention’ 
(ibid.).  
 
Conversational politics is also valuable because, to some degree, it addresses 
the problem of power, which, I have suggested, was one of Oakeshott’s 
preoccupations. He claimed that the sceptic will see the doctrine of the 
separation of powers as the proper mode of governing in which power is 
‘shared conversationally’ between a variety of ‘different interests, persons and 
offices’ (ibid., p. 89). Moreover, politics as conversation is equipped to cope 
with the ambiguity that inheres in our political vocabulary. Political argument, 
he argued, is not concerned with the proof of propositions.  In modern Europe 
politics is ‘a conversation between diverse interests, in which activities that 
circumstantially limit one another are saved from violent collision’ (1996, p. 
130). In these circumstances words which have within them a little room for 
interpretation may be more useful than a scientific vocabulary designed to 
exclude all ambiguity. 
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The conversational style of politics is, moreover, realistic. It appreciates that 
‘no problem in politics is ever solved permanently’ (28 January 1948).  The 
best that can be achieved politically is to keep the ship of state afloat in a sea 
of contingency. For Oakeshott, politics in a civil association, which is 
necessarily democratic, is neither a search for truth nor the dissemination of a 
belie’, but a pluralistic, conversational engagement. Success does not consist 
in the conclusion of the discussion by some incontestable declaration, but in 
keeping the conversation alive between persons who have a tendency not 
always to want to speak to each other (1975a, p. 256).  
 
Oakeshott claimed that politics in a liberal democracy is inherently 
conversational. In his review of Walter Lippmann’s book, ‘The Public 
Philosophy’, he contrasted the politics of a liberal democracy with Jacobinism. 
The politics of Jacobinism is where truth as opposed to error is the desired 
objective. Speech is recognised as argument but is allowed only until truth is 
realised.  A liberal democracy is, in contrast, characterised by sceptical 
politics. Truth emerges not as the opposite of error but merely as the converse 
of “lies”, and debate is largely free ‘because it is not recognised as argument 
but as conversation’ (1993, p. 116). 
 
What can we make of Oakeshott’s metaphor of politics as conversation? 
Commentators have interpreted it differently. Michael Minch calls it 
‘profoundly anticipatory, and all but prophetic in relation to the recent 
deliberative turn in democratic theory’ (2009, 2: Before On Human Conduct). 
Minch considers that VPCM anticipates the emergent communicative ideal 
that is exemplified in the work of Habermas and ‘which later deliberative 
theorists develop and extend’ (2009, 1: Introduction). Luke Plotica uses the 
metaphor to defend his claim that Oakeshott had more in common with 
agonistic democrats on the grounds that Oakeshott characterised plurality 
and “thin” consensus as conditions of democratic politics, and rejected “thick” 
consensus either as the telos or as something of a regulative ideal of 
democratic politics (2012). 
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In relation to my own thesis, we may say that his representation of politics as 
a conversation is the ideal of political activity in a civil association. It is the 
ideal style of political activity for sceptical, well-mannered individualists who 
share a common culture and moral language, but who have diverse opinions 
and value pluralism. The conversational paradigm emphasises the role of 
manners and procedures in political activity, as was typical of the liberal-
democratic politics based on the rule of law that Oakeshott sought to defend 
in the post-war years.  
 
In his introduction to the second edition of Reginald Basset’s Essentials of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1964), he spoke of parliamentary democracy as a 
‘noble and historic manner of conducting politics, reaching decisions and 
digesting the differences characteristic of a modern European society’ 
(Oakeshott, in Basset 1964, p. xxii). According to Oakeshott, ‘Basset was a 
Whig and he had the Whig’s pious attachment to our institutions of 
government’ (ibid.). He understood ‘that politics is not a manner of imposing 
what one believes to be desirable, or even just, but of doing this in a manner 
which does not outrage those with different opinions’ (ibid.) What we call 
parliamentary democracy is ‘an instrument of remarkable refinement and 
responsiveness, thrown up in the course of our political history, capable of 
digesting the enterprise of zealots’ (ibid., p. xxiv).  
 
The weaknesses of the conversational metaphor for political activity are the 
same as those we have already identified in his conception of the state as a 
civil association. To be welcome to the conversation and capable of 
participating in it, a conversant needs a ‘moral, intellectual and aesthetic 
bearing that is the privilege or misfortune of the few’ (Plotica 2012, p. 304). 
This suggests that the idiom is of limited applicability in the age of mass man, 
in whom these characteristics are substantially absent. Furthermore, in a civil 
association, where security and order are presuppositions not purposes, 
decisions need to be taken, often under conditions of duress. This involves 
achieving closure on decisions taken and thereby pre-empting further 
exchanges. The image of conversation, moreover, covers up or ignores the 
 191 
power relations evident in every discursive context, and Oakeshott had 
nothing to say on the role of political parties in this regard. 
 
Conversational politics presupposes scepticism. It will be challenging, if not 
impossible, for non-sceptical conversants to participate if they think that 
politics is more than the ‘politics of repair’, merely emphasising the habitual 
and customary (Oakeshott 1991, p. 26). Non-sceptical conversants might 
believe, for example, that the structure of a society is “unfair” and wish to win 
an argument on how this might be rectified rather than participating in an 
endless conversation. Such a man, according to Dr Johnson, ‘heated in talk, 
and eager of victory, takes advantage of the mistakes or ignorance of his 
adversary, lays hold of concessions to which he has no right, and urges proofs 
likely to prevail on his opponent, though he knows himself that they have no 
force’ (Johnson 1753).  An effective politician will appeal to the language and 
prejudices of his listeners in attempting to persuade, and will know that 
‘treating your adversary with respect is striking soft in battle’, whilst respect is 
a precondition of successful conversation (Johnson, quoted in Boswell 1984, 
Sunday, 15th August). These are the very habits that made practical politics so 
distasteful to Oakeshott.  
 
The above considerations lend support to Mouffe’s observation that division 
and antagonism are peripheral to Oakeshott’s political theory. His description 
of political conversation conveys an idea of plurality without significant 
antagonism. As we have noted, he was a keen student of Hobbes and no 
stranger to the existence of conflict and antagonism, but his political theory 
generally avoids engaging with the political consequences of this. This must 
count, at best, as a substantial omission, and at worst as a falsification of 
political experience. Other commentators contend that the metaphor of 
politics as conversation shows that he fundamentally misunderstood its 
nature.114 They argue that he advocated political passivism, or quietism, in his 
emphasis on conforming to the habits assimilated in a given political 
tradition. The metaphor of politics as conversation is seen as the essence of a 
passive understanding, which in turn is identified with political conservatism 
                                                   
114 See Crick 1963, 1991; Gellner 1980; and Pitkin 1976. 
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in which the past, in the form of a political tradition and its intimations, offers 
the primary reference point for politics.  
 
Such criticisms, of course, neglect the fact that Oakeshott’s account of 
conversational politics is an ideal type, and not a description of an achievable 
state of affairs. It is, Oakeshott admitted, suitable for good times and 
unachievable during periods of crisis. Politics is an ‘inherently intermittent 
activity’ rather than an on-going process, and like civil association, the politics 
of conversation will be ‘as rare as it is excellent’ (Oakeshott 1975a, p. 166, p. 
180). As to the charge that the metaphor lacks the theoretical completeness 
and practical relevance of other models of democratic politics, Oakeshott 
never claimed to have elaborated a comprehensive theory or that his writings 
were a guide to practical politics. He also never suggested that democratic 
politics could or should be nothing but conversation.  
 
Anti-rationalism and Tradition, or Practice 
 
A  typical assertion about political conservatism is that it can be grounded in a 
critique of enlightenment rationalism that questions the scope and limits of 
human reason.115  Jesse Norman MP observes: ‘This is one of the central 
intellectual roots of conservatism throughout the ages’, dating from Edmund 
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France  (2004). John Gray describes 
Oakeshott’s work as ‘the deepest twentieth century critique of the 
enlightenment’ (1995, p. 126). In this section the critique will be examined. It 
will be argued that whereas anti-rationalism may be a defining feature of 
tradition for conservatives, Oakeshott used it as a particular defence of a 
contingent tradition. That is, given his love of freedom and individuality, it 
makes no sense to read him as constructing a defence of tradition as 
intrinsically valuable. We should treat his anti-rationalist arguments in the 
context of his attempt to slow down the expansion of the managerial state, the 
defining feature of UK politics after 1945. Rationalism is the common 
                                                   
115 Not all anti-rationalists are conservative. John Morley (1886), F. A. Hayek (1949), 
the critic of “constructive rationalism”, and Karl Popper (1949), were all concerned 
with rationalist errors.  
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denominator that united all his enemies: moralities of general rules, moral 
perfectionism, the state conceived as an enterprise association, the 
contemporary obsession with technology and “progress”, and, as we shall see, 
the politics of faith.  
Oakeshott thought that there was a strong link between rationalism and “mass 
man”. He claimed that those social classes, which during the last four 
centuries have increasingly assumed political influence and authority, did not 
have time to obtain a political education before they gained power. As a 
consequence, they needed a crib: ‘A political doctrine, to take the place of a 
habit of political behaviour’ (1991, p. 30). The prevalence of rationalism can be 
seen as a failure of education. Rationalism in the modern era, Oakeshott 
argued, is a plausible method of concealing the absence of political education 
so that even those who suffer from the lack of education are often left ignorant 
that they lack anything (ibid., p. 35). By 1947 he thought that rationalism was 
so endemic that the inherited political habit and tradition that was the 
common possession of even extreme opponents in English politics, had been 
replaced ‘by merely a common rationalist disposition of mind’ (1991, p. 37).  
The purpose of his anti-rationalist argument was to expose a pervasive 
intellectual error that he believed has dangerous social and political 
consequences. Minogue described Oakeshott’s rationalist target as ‘the mono-
modal bore targeted in Experience and its Modes, for whom philosophy, 
poetry, history and even science are essentially practical’ (2003, 1).  The error 
is to think of politics as a succession of problems to be solved through the 
application of reason and the appeal to general rules: ‘That all contemporary 
politics are deeply infected with Rationalism will be denied only by those who 
give the infection another name’ (Oakeshott 1991, p. 25). A striking feature of 
rationalism is that it is a progressive infection. It is ‘of a kind which the 
passage of time must make more rather than less severe’, because it amounts 
to a ‘corruption of the mind’ (1991, pp. 36-37).  
I will structure my analysis of Oakeshott’s anti-rationalist thesis around six 
purportedly rationalist errors which he identified. These are classified by 
Shirley Letwin as follows: (1) over-rating the power of the individual mind; (2) 
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disregarding the irrational components of human behaviour; (3) failing to 
distinguish particular from universal principles; (4) Utopianism; (5) “The 
Politics of Uniformity”; and (6) the denial of practical wisdom (Letwin 1952, p. 
369). 
The rationalist targets of Oakeshott’s attack conceive politics as an exercise to 
achieve social goals through the implementation of rationally deduced means. 
He dated the onset of rationalism as a pervasive political influence to the early 
17th century. Its protagonists were Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Descartes 
(1596-1650): Bacon claimed that there was only one way to restore a sound 
and healthy condition in human affairs: ‘Namely, that the entire work of 
understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind from its very outset not 
left to take its own course, but guided at every step’ (1991, p. 19). Oakeshott 
identified Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) as the quintessential modern 
rationalist: ‘The age we live in is a busy age; in which knowledge is rapidly 
advancing towards perfection’ (Bentham 1776, Preface). Oakeshott described 
Bentham as a philosophe, which for him was a derogatory term, as it was for 
Burke: ‘The genius of the philosophe is a genius for rationalization, for 
making life and the business of life rational rather than seeing the reason for 
it, for inculcating precise order, no matter at what expense.’ (1991, p. 139). The 
rationalist overrates the power of the individual mind. He believes that 
thought is free from obligation to any authority ‘save the authority of reason’. 
He is the ‘enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, 
customary, or habitual (1991, pp. 5-6).116 
The rationalist error to which Oakeshott focused most of his attention was the 
denial of practical wisdom. He distinguished two kinds of knowledge: 
technical knowledge and practical knowledge. The former ‘is susceptible of 
precise formulation’ (1991, p. 12). The latter, ‘is not reflective and (unlike 
technique) cannot be formulated in rules’ (ibid.).  
                                                   
116 This reminds us of Burke: ‘Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it 
previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not 
leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled and 
unresolved. Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit; and not a series of 
unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes part of his nature’ (1887, 
W3: p. 347). 
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In Rationalism in Politics Oakeshott portrayed rational knowledge, or 
technique, as remote from ‘the genuine, concrete knowledge of the permanent 
interests and direction of movement of a society’ (1991, p. 27). He likened 
rationalists to ‘jumped up kitchen porters deputising for an absent cook. Their 
knowledge does not extend past the written word which they read 
mechanically - it generates ideas in their heads but no tastes in their mouths’ 
(ibid.).  The cook simile suggests that politics is about doing, and 
understanding what one is doing, not about following abstract theories. An 
experienced cook understands the art of cookery through practice, instinct, 
adaptation and modification. The jumped up kitchen porter is a rationalist 
cook, oblivious to the years that the skilled chef has spent getting to know his 
ingredients and tools. He attempts to succeed in the kitchen with what he can 
glean from cookbooks. As a result, he makes a mess of the dishes that he 
prepares. However, his repeated failures do not lead him to question his 
method of operating. Instead, each failure spurs the rationalist to search for a 
more comprehensive book of recipes. Oakeshott held that any attempt to 
derive theory from practice will necessarily fall short as a reliable guide to 
action: it can only be an abridgement, or abbreviation, of practice. 
 
According to Oakeshott, this method of operating is no more workable in 
politics than cookery. Nonetheless, rationalism had come progressively to 
infect political life to the point where it ‘is stronger now than at any earlier 
time’ (1991, p. 25). The rationalist in politics disparages current practices, 
customs and morals, insofar as these do not accord with his rational 
deliberations about how society ought to be ordered. He is interested in the 
truth of an opinion and the ‘rational’ ground (not the use) of an institution is 
all that matters to him’ (1991, p. 8). The political rationalist constantly 
scrutinises ‘the social, political, legal and institutional inheritance of his 
society’ (ibid.). 
 
The political rationalist, like the rationalist chef, is similarly inclined to 
interpret political failures not as evidence of failure in his own approach, but 
of the need for a more thorough implementation of rationalist social 
engineering. Rationalism involves, however, a discernible error, a 
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misunderstanding regarding the character of human knowledge ‘which 
amounts to a corruption of the mind’ (1991, p. 37). Oakeshott asserted that the 
error lies in the assurance it attributes to technique and in its ‘doctrine of the 
sovereignty of technique’ (1991, p. 25). By refusing to acknowledge this error, 
the rationalist is a threat to the order and health of society. 
 
Oakeshott was greatly influenced by Michael Polanyi in making the distinction 
between practical and technical knowledge. Polanyi was a research chemist. 
His personal experience of twentieth-century totalitarianism gradually drew 
him to philosophy. In ‘Rationalism in Politics’, Oakeshott remarks in a 
footnote that ‘some excellent observations on this topic are to be found in M. 
Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society’ (1991, p. 13 n.4). In his 1948 essay, 
‘Science and Society’, he calls attention to Polanyi’s ‘brilliant Riddell Memorial 
Lecture on Science, Faith and Society’ (2007, p. 243 n.1). Oakeshott clearly 
felt that there was much in common between his emphasis on practical 
knowledge, which cannot be formulated in general rules, and Polanyi’s idea 
that scientific research cannot proceed on the basis of rules alone: ‘The rules 
of research cannot be usefully codified at all. Like the rules of all other high 
arts, they are embodied in practice alone’ (Polanyi 1946, p. 33). Both believed 
that a central problem with modern politics was an erroneous theory of 
knowledge. Mark Mitchell judges that Polanyi subsequently developed this 
area of his thought more thoroughly than Oakeshott (2001, p. 34). 
 
In Political Education (1962), Oakeshott underscored the contingent nature of 
political activity, which he described as ‘attending to the general arrangements 
of a set of people whom chance and choice have brought together’ (1962, pp. 
112-113). The activity takes place within a state. Political activity concerns the 
manner in which the legal structure of the state is improved and revised (ibid., 
p. 135). In his view, political activity necessarily takes the form of adjusting 
the current arrangements by ‘exploring and pursuing their intimations, to 
make them more coherent’ as they are always only partly coherent (1991, p. 
57). Political activity is an exploration of the ‘sympathy for what does not fully 
appear’ (ibid.). Political activity ‘is a consequential enterprise, the pursuit not 
of a dream, or of a general principle, but of an intimation’ (ibid.) 
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Oakeshott admitted that there are other understandings of political activity. 
One conceives of politics as an empirical activity, by which he meant the 
pursuit of immediate desires, either one’s own or others (1991, p. 46). But, he 
held ‘this is politics without a policy’ and the only kind of education 
appropriate to this would be an ‘education in lunacy - learning to be ruled by 
passing desires’, or what he also described as ‘the politics of the felt need’, 
where politics are always swayed by the mood of the moment (1991, p. 9).  
 
Within the empirical conception, he claimed that political activity directed to 
the satisfaction of popular desires becomes a succession of crises. Something 
must be added to empiricism to make it work. For rationalists this something 
is a premeditated end to be pursued, or an ideology, which provides a way of 
discriminating between ‘those desires which ought to be encouraged and 
those which ought to be suppressed or redirected’ (1991, p. 48). Exponents of 
a political ideology believe that it is the spring of political activity. 
 
In Political Discourse (1991, pp. 70-95), Oakeshott acknowledged that 
ideologies such as Liberalism, Socialism, Capitalism and so forth can be useful 
as ‘vocabularies of beliefs’. They can act as a crib or shorthand method of 
communication which encourage political discourse in certain directions and 
suggest certain conclusions (ibid., p. 77). We can view a political ideology as 
an offer to see political situations and what is desirable and undesirable in a 
certain way and an ‘invitation to consider some consequences of political 
decisions and actions to be more important than others’ (ibid., p. 74). 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that ideologies often manifest only marginal 
differences and there is interaction between them, it is impossible to reflect on 
political situations or to participate in political discourse ‘without having 
command over one of the special political vocabularies current in 
contemporary Europe’ (ibid., p. 76). In contemporary Europe the problem is 
the degree to which traditions of behaviour have been superseded by 
ideologies and ‘the extent to which the politics of destruction and creation 
have been substituted for the politics of repair’ (ibid., p. 26). 
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Oakeshott argued, like Burke, that ideologies become dangerous when their 
component beliefs are given the logical status of axioms. This would 
necessarily impose a certain logical status on their conclusions. It implies that 
political discourse is somehow demonstrative rather than persuasive. But 
political decisions concern what is to be done in contingent situations where 
there may be several alternatives to choose from: ‘As soon as argument 
concerns itself with any contingent emergent situation (…) it must relapse 
from proof into undemonstrative argument’ (1991, p. 83). 117 
 
He claimed that the error in the ideological understanding of politics is that 
what it takes as the spring of activity is, in fact, only the result of subsequent 
reflection on it. In truth, political ideology ‘merely abridges a concrete manner 
of behaviour’ (ibid.). He argued, for example, that the Rights of Man, 
enshrined in the Constitution of the United States, did not exist in advance of 
political practice. They were abridgements of actual political conventions: 
‘The inspiration of Jefferson and the other founders of American 
independence was the ideology that Locke had distilled from the English 
political tradition’ (1991, p. 32). Politicians who think that they are 
formulating some wholly new political idea are mistaken. They are pursuing 
what is intimated within an immanent tradition. Ideology supposes that 
politics is the result of intellectual premeditation, and falsely supposes that 
because it is a body of principles, not itself subject to the activity of attending 
to the arrangements of society, it is able to direct that activity. He cited 
Rousseau’s concept of a ‘volonté general’ as an ideological principle that is 
supposed to substitute for deliberative discourse, but he thought that it had no 
instructions whatever for interpreting any actual political situation or the 
response to it. He attributed this to the fact that both moral and political 
ideals are incommensurable. What Aristotle calls the “admitted goods”, or 
‘preferable conditions of things’, of a society ‘cannot necessarily be secured on 
any one occasion’ (ibid., p. 80). 
                                                   
117  ‘As circumstances are infinite, are infinitely combined, and are variable and 
transient: he who does not take them into consideration is not erroneous, but stark 
made, he is metaphysically mad. A statesman, never losing sight of his principles, is 
to be guided by circumstances: and judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, 
he may ruin his country forever’ (Burke 1887, W7: p. 41). 
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Oakeshott noted a second version of ideological discourse: where truth is 
claimed to spring not from an ideology composed of axioms, but from one 
consisting of propositions understood to contain definitive information ‘about 
human beings, human circumstances and the course of events’ (1991, p. 85). 
For example, so-called laws of conduct, or laws of social change. He argued 
that even if reliable “laws” of social change could be established, they would 
not give us meaningful propositions in terms of which political dialogue and 
reflection could be undertaken. Let alone could they become demonstrative: 
‘For all political deliberation entails beliefs about what is better and what is 
worse (…) and explanatory laws themselves can provide no prescriptions’ 
(1991, p. 91).  
 
Moreover, these explanatory laws are incapable of generating political 
deliberation or political discourse, proving decisions to be correct or incorrect, 
as the more generalised the information, the less it can provide anything 
useful to political reflection and debate. Oakeshott re-emphasised the 
importance of contingency to political understanding. Every particular 
political situation will diverge from an ideal type in some way, and recognising 
this reality is crucial to reaching an accurate assessment of a situation (1991, 
p. 93). The divergences from the ideal constitute the practical situation of the 
politician. No recognition of a situation in terms of an ideal type is capable of 
counselling a response to the situation, let alone a single correct response. The 
best that can be hoped from this type of activity is that it might ‘provide a 
vocabulary of beliefs in terms of which some more marginally reliable maxims 
might be formulated’ (ibid., p. 94). 
 
Rationalism is used both to explain and prescribe action, and fails to 
differentiate between the two kinds of knowledge involved in all activities. It 
concentrates on technical knowledge, the knowledge of rules and principles 
used for means/end reasoning, at the expense of practical knowledge. The 
latter is key to understanding a practice such as politics: we do not learn how 
to cook by reading cookery books, and we cannot practise effective politics by 
referring to abstract principles. The rationalist has no sense of the ‘cumulation 
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of experience’ (Oakeshott 1991, p. 6). The rationalist ‘is the enemy of 
authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or habitual’ 
(ibid.).  Moreover, Oakeshott argued, rationalism in politics leads to the error 
called the Politics of Uniformity that is hostile to variety. He quoted Godwin 
to illustrate the point: ‘There must in the nature of things be one best form of 
government which all intellects, sufficiently roused from the slumber of 
savage ignorance, will be irresistibly incited to approve’ (1991, p. 10). 118 
 
A precondition of demonstrative reasoning in politics is that the prospect of a 
clash between moral ideals must be eliminated. This is an impossible 
condition to fulfil, as every ideal has an opposite. Freedom, for example, can 
be opposed to order. Privileging the former would result in anarchy. 
Privileging the latter would result in totalitarianism. Furthermore, 
‘demonstrative argument can be only concerned with the relations between 
abstract ideas’, but as soon as disagreement relates to an emerging contingent 
emergent situation it necessarily must revert from proof into undemonstrative 
argument (1991, p. 83). Oakeshott expressed this as the consequence of both 
moral pluralism and contingency. The essence of political discourse is that it 
is argument concerned with ‘contingencies, not necessities; with probabilities 
and expectations, not with demonstrable certainties; with conjectures, not 
proofs; with surmises and guesses, not with calculations’ (1991, p. 80). This is 
similar to Burke’s claim that nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on 
any political subject because all political activity is contingent.119  
 
Oakeshott’s anti-rationalist argument should not be conceived as 
irrationalism. This would be misleading. He specifically stressed the need to 
distinguish between rationalism and rationality. In ‘Scientific Politics’, 
published in March 1948, he emphasised the gap between his position and 
any form of irrationalism: ‘There is as much difference between rational 
enquiry and “rationalism” as there is between scientific enquiry and 
                                                   
118 William Godwin (1756-1836):  Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1992). 
119 ‘Circumstances which some gentlemen pass for nothing give in reality to every 
political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect. The 
circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious 
to mankind’ (Burke 1887, W3, p. 240). 
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‘‘scientism” and it is a difference of the same kind’ (1993a, p. 99). What 
Oakeshott rejected is not reasoned argument, but the idea that reason is only 
what can be reduced to rules, general beliefs or merely technical knowledge. 
In a letter to Popper, he emphasised that when he argued against rationalism 
he was not arguing against reason. His point was that rationalism was 
unreasonable: ‘ That reason has a place in politics, I have no doubt at all, but 
what I mean by rationalism is the doctrine that nothing else has a place in 
politics - and this is a very common view’ (1948).120  Moreover, in the political 
context the hankering for demonstrative political argument is dangerous as it 
may lead to discontent with conventional political discussion (1991, p. 95). 
 
Political deliberation is not demonstrative in nature. So if we adopt the 
rationalist point of view we will come to regard it as a kind of unreason. He 
considered this would be a terrible mistake because a dialogue that deals with 
speculations and options and the weighing of circumstantial pros and cons is 
reasoning, ‘and it is the only sort of reasoning appropriate to practical affairs’ 
(ibid.). The practical effect of adopting the rationalist point of view might be 
to bring all political discourse into disgrace. So much so that we might be 
inclined to do without it altogether - to give up reflection and argument 
because they could not be demonstrative (1991, p. 95).  
 
Politics should not be seen as the improvement of society in line with some 
abstract ideal, which is said to be absolute in value and universal in 
application, and which can be rationally applied according to a science of 
politics, which he described as the attempt to convert the enterprise of politics 
into ‘social engineering’ (1993a, p. 102). Oakeshott observed that the failure of 
the scientific form of politics is the failure that can be forecast for all 
ideological politics as it will be out of touch ‘with concrete, specific realities of 
any political occasion’ (ibid., p. 103).  
 
Manning and Robinson point, however, that in his criticism of ideological 
politics he completely failed to address the role of ideology as a language of 
                                                   
120 This point is elaborated by Oakeshott in his 1950 essay, ‘Rational Conduct’ (1991, 
pp. 99-131). 
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commitment: ‘Unless they admit to writing ideologically, it would appear that 
Oakeshott and Popper have thrown out the ideological baby out with the 
rationalist holist bathwater. Ideologies that must be dismissed as academic 
nonsense can, after all, make political sense’ (Manning and Robinson 1985, p. 
55). 
 
Burke claimed, in his criticism of the Jacobins, that a resort to rationalism 
and abstract principles is the radical style. Oakeshott went further: 
rationalism is incoherent, whoever uses it. In his view, modern liberals were 
as guilty as socialists for their dependence on rationalism. He cited Disraeli to 
underscore his point: ‘My objection to Liberalism is this, that it is the 
introduction into the practical business of life of the highest kind- namely 
politics- of philosophical ideas instead of political principles’ (quoted in 
Oakeshott 1993a, p. 107). He thought that all contemporary politics were 
deeply infected with rationalism, not just those of the left. The significance of 
Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) was that it is still a doctrine: ‘A plan to resist 
all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of 
politics’ (1991, p. 26).  Not only is rationalism incoherent, it is dangerous as 
rationalists do not recognise the damage they can do in politics: ‘The 
conjunction of dreaming and ruling generates tyranny’ (1991, p. 434).  
 
A particularly dangerous rationalist tendency is manifested in a revised type 
of utopianism that takes up one social problem at a particular time and is 
ready to disrupt the whole of society merely to solve that particular problem. 
Oakeshott gave the problem of unemployment as a contemporary example as 
one for which a permanent solution was sought: ‘I should say that no problem 
in politics is ever solved permanently, and that no problem in politics should 
be allowed to get out of proportion’ (Oakeshott to Popper, 1948). The real 
business of politics, he opined, is to maintain society in all its arrangements 
‘stable as well as progressive’ (ibid.). the problem with rationalism is that it 
tends to get individual problems out of proportion.  
  
Having rejected empiricism and ideology as being appropriate elements of 
political activity, Oakeshott asserted that the ends of political activity appear 
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within and can be appraised only when they are related to an already existing 
tradition of political activity (1991, p. 56). Political activity then springs from 
the existing traditions of behaviour and the ‘amendment of existing behaviour 
by exploring and pursuing what is intimated in them’ (1991, p. 62, italics 
added).  So what did he mean by the pursuit or exploration of intimations?  
 
The pursuit of intimations is something less than ‘logical implications or 
necessary consequences’ but this does not mean they are any less important 
for that reason (ibid., p. 57). He admitted that there is no fool-proof procedure 
to determine the intimation worthiest of pursuing. Mistakes are often made 
and the upshot may even be contrary to what was intended. Oakeshott used 
the term intimations in opposition to dreams, general principles, logical 
implications and necessary consequences. The pursuit of intimations captures 
an aspect of many familiar experiences: imagining possibilities; wanting to 
attempt something new; believing that a course is necessary or unavoidable; 
wanting to make amends for past mistakes; defending current practices 
against charges that they are mistaken or inadequate.  
 
The pursuit of intimations accepts the unavoidability in politics of appraisal, 
judgement and decision. If political actors could deduce logical implications 
from their situations, they could surmount familiar constraints. The reality is, 
however, that ‘a politician always has a certain field of vision and a certain 
range of opportunity’. What he can reflect on, aspire to, or to change is 
‘subject to the historic limits of his situation’ (1996, pp. 116-117). 
 
The underlying activity of pursuing intimations is conforming to a principle of 
continuity, and a search for coherence in our current practices. Oakeshott 
argued that although a political tradition may be ‘flimsy and elusive’ it is, 
nonetheless, not without identity: ‘what makes it a possible object of 
knowledge is the fact that all its parts do not change at the same time and that 
the changes it undergoes are potential within it’ (1991, p.61). The virtuous 
politician will understand that his choices are bound by the tradition to which 




Oakeshott’s account of politics, as the pursuit of intimations, is clearly 
conservative in its implicit justification of a prudent approach to change, 
broadly in the manner of Burke. Both stress the dangers of the rationalist 
manner of thinking that leads to ideological politics, and the risks of 
disregarding tradition. However, we should also note some important 
differences between them, not least the different role that each gives to 
tradition. For Burke, tradition is a stock of accumulated wisdom:  the ‘general 
bank and capital of nations and of ages’ (1887, W3: p. 346). This suggests that 
traditions have a strongly normative status, as long as they are not tyrannical 
in kind. Oakeshott emphasised the contingency of tradition: the way that 
things have turned out in the activity of pursuing intimations. There is 
nothing providential or normative about a tradition of behaviour.  
 
Oakeshott’s account of political activity as the pursuit of intimations within a 
tradition of behaviour can be challenged on several respects. The first 
concerns the status of his assertion that politics is the pursuit of intimations: 
‘Our mistakes will be less frequent and less disastrous, and our achievements 
more manageable, if we escape the illusion that politics can ever be anything 
more than the pursuit of intimations’ (1991, p. 58, italics added). In this 
phrase politics as the pursuit of intimations is presented as an empirical fact. 
If it is a fact, then to believe and act otherwise courts disaster. But, if we 
accept this argument then it constitutes a strong recommendation that we 
should become traditionalists.  But this contradicts his argument that 
philosophy is explanatory, with nothing practical to recommend. 
 
The pursuit of intimations initially conveys an idea of tentative, gradual 
change to the lex of respublica. But this begs the question of how to explain 
political conquest and revolution. Oakeshott insisted that the Norman 
Conquest of England and the Russian revolution of 1917 were the pursuit of 
intimations and not the obliteration of a current tradition of behaviour.  
Neither event was ‘a genuine cataclysm’ (1991, p. 59). The pursuit of 
intimations can sanction any activity short of a “genuine cataclysm”: ‘Political 
crisis appears within a tradition of political activity; and salvation comes from 
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the unimpaired resources of the tradition itself’ (ibid.). Oakeshott did not 
explain why the Norman Conquest was not a genuine cataclysm. In any event, 
it does not upset his theory because he stipulated that if events are genuine 
cataclysms, they are ‘the end of politics’ (ibid.). If they are not genuine 
cataclysms they are the pursuit of intimations, by definition.  
 
John C. Rees argues that for Oakeshott’s assertion to be coherent the meaning 
of the word “intimation” has ‘either to be stretched to cover all events 
normally described as political (including crises) - in which case “political 
activity” is made equivalent to “pursuing intimations”’ at which point the 
thesis is a tautology (1953, p. 74). Or the thesis is interpreted in its ordinary 
sense, in which case it becomes a hypothesis, subject to empirical tests: ‘As a 
hypothesis it has to face overwhelming tests to the contrary’ (ibid.). But if the 
proper meaning of Oakeshott’s assertion is that politics ought to be the 
pursuit of intimations, this is a normative judgment unmoored from a moral 
perspective, grounded merely in prudential considerations, and distant from 
many ordinary understandings of the purpose of politics. 
 
The essay ‘Rationalism in Politics’ is not a philosophical essay but a polemic 
against progressive politics of the type that installed the Welfare State in the 
UK after 1945. He repeated his long held view that philosophy is ‘not to 
recommend conduct but to explain it’ (1991, p. 34). But RIP is both an 
explanation and a recommendation. Notably in RIP he did not use the 
language of ideal opposites to frame his analysis.  The rationalist and the 
pursuer of intimations are not presented as opposites. The rationalist is 
presented as a dangerous existential threat and the pursuit of intimations as a 
logical necessity. Rationalism and the rationalist are described in emotive and 
pejorative terms such as the ‘vice of rationalism’ (ibid., p. 33).  The politicians 
of Europe are described as ‘jumped-up kitchen porters’ (ibid., p. 27). 
  
The Example of Education  
It is instructive to follow Oakeshott’s analysis of the developments in state- 
sponsored education to illuminate his anti-rationalist argument.  This was the 
 206 
only policy area he commented on in any detail. Oakeshott was especially 
concerned about what he saw as the possibly irreversible damage being done 
by the state to the education system as a consequence of rationalist thinking, 
which he felt had appropriated morality and moral education to its ends. 
(1991, pp. 40-41). Rationalists thought the proper method of moral education 
was by rule, by the presentation and explanation of moral principles. They 
failed to recognise that ‘moral ideas are a sediment’ that are significant only as 
long as ‘they are suspended in a religious or social tradition, so long as they 
belong to a religious or social life’ (ibid.). Oakeshott claimed that the 
destruction of parental authority was one casualty of moral rationalism. The 
alleged abuse of parental authority had led to its critics to deplore the scarcity 
of “good homes”: ‘we end up by creating substitutes, which complete the work 
of destruction’ (ibid., p. 41). 
Oakeshott claimed that a society which has adopted a rationalist idiom of 
politics will inevitably be steered or drift towards a wholly rationalist form of 
education (Oakeshott 1991, p. 37). For this reason, he thought that rationalism 
would lead to a progressive degeneration in a civilisation’s ability to think. He 
was not directly concerned with the pursuit of indoctrination through 
education, as in totalitarian societies, but the more insidious business of 
offering ‘no place for any form of education which is not generally rationalistic 
in character’ (ibid., p. 38). This means that education becomes focused on 
training in technical knowledge for utilitarian reasons, rather than an 
initiation into the moral and intellectual habits and achievements of a society, 
without any ulterior purpose, and the acquisition of genuine skill through 
doing (ibid.). He thus rejected even second-order utility to justify university 
education, which meant that he was antipathetic to efforts initiated by 
Margaret Thatcher to reform British universities by applying business 
management principles, a procedure that has proceeded apace in recent 
years.121 Oakeshott wrote in his 1950 essay, ‘The Idea of a University’, ‘a 
university is not a machine for achieving a particular purpose or producing a 
particular result; it is a manner of human activity’ ( 1989, p. 106). 
                                                   
121  See Marina Warner’s speech on the ‘disfiguring of higher education’ for a 
contemporary analysis of the issue (2015). 
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Oakeshott was critical of the Education Act 1944, the so-called “Butler Act” 
(named after R.A. Butler, the Conservative Ministry of Education). Prior to 
the Act the system of secondary education was an ad hoc creation, which 
failed to provide universal access. The Act remedied this. It initiated a system 
of universal, free secondary education, and raised the school-leaving age from 
fourteen to fifteen. Secondary schools were classified as “grammar”, 
“technical” and “secondary modern”, and targeted at pupils with different 
levels of ability and different aptitudes. Places at the former were filled by 
selection of the more academically talented pupils at age 11, by examination.  
This system was designed to fulfil what were then thought to be the needs of 
the economy for the provision of managers, technicians and workers. For 
Oakeshott, it was a good example of his view that Rationalism often generates 
ideologies that are inappropriate, because they are derived from the activities 
that they claim to guide. In education, social utilitarianism had become the 
lodestar, whereas for Oakeshott, it should be an introduction for the young to 
the values and traditions of their culture.  
Kenneth Minogue assessed how rationalist education fared in Oakeshottian 
terms in his Presidential Address to the Michael Oakeshott Association 
conference in 2003. Before long, according to Minogue, the comprehensive 
system of education inaugurated by the 1944 Act was taken over by another 
abstract idea: ‘That the schools should be instrumental to the remaking of 
society as something less stratified by class than what exists’ (2003, p. 2). This 
led to the abolition of grammar schools and introduction of neighbourhood 
schools of mixed ability. A further rationalist idea emerging at this time was 
the idea that pupils should be allowed to respond freely to their own 
individual need for knowledge at their own pace, at the expense of rote 
learning, which, according to Minogue, led to a breakdown of authority and 
discipline in British schools (ibid., p. 3).  
Subsequent innovations were vibrantly rationalistic in the sense of 
manifesting an ‘irritable tendency to solve problems’, such as the introduction 
of the National Curriculum (Minogue 2003, p. 3).  These innovations together 
with a succession of examinations at ages 7, 11, 16, and 18 and an inflation in 
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grade results led to the point that pupils were arriving at the doors of 
universities with less preparation than ever before: ‘They have been, as it 
were, trained but not educated’ (ibid.). Far from being an introduction into 
the culture and values of a society, getting an education today is understood as 
the acquisition of skills, which Oakeshott described as ‘a training in technique, 
a training that is, in the half of knowledge which can be learnt from books 
when they are used as cribs’ (1991, p. 38). 
Comment 
  
Oakeshott’s political rationalist is something of a “straw man”. The rationalist 
is such an egregious character that it is easy to knock him down. It is 
questionable, however, whether any recent political thinker comes close to his 
characterisation of the rationalist. David Kettler claims that ‘no serious 
political thinker since the middle of the nineteenth century has doubted that a 
complex tension marks the relationship between continuity and innovation, 
that the new is in some sense generated by the old’ (1964, p. 488). Oakeshott 
characterised political activity in 1947 as politicians finding the intricacies of 
the world so unmanageable that they were enchanted ‘by the offer of a quick 
escape into the bogus eternity of an ideology’ (1991, p. 34). An alternative, 
more charitable, description is that politicians were doing their best in the 
financially difficult circumstances of post-war Britain to implement a set of 
reforms that had broad popular support and which, moreover, were intimated 
in the political tradition. 
 
 The pursuit of intimations assumes that an existing political practice is 
broadly coherent. Given the contingency of tradition, it may well be that a 
tradition of behaviour is intimated unclearly, so there is no obvious direction 
intimated. Oakeshott admitted that intimations can point forward, backwards 
and sideways. The beliefs that compose a tradition are described as ‘a multi-
voiced creature’, which seems to be a ‘most unreliable oracle’ and it is 
unreasonable to expect a straight answer from ‘our somewhat miscellaneous 
beliefs, preferences, approvals, disapprovals’ (1965, p. 90). 
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 An existing practice, moreover, may be coherent, but morally reprehensible. 
In South Africa, for example, the institutional apparatus of apartheid could be 
seen as the result of the pursuit of the intimations of the social and political 
practices of the white Afrikaans majority after the Second World War. But, for 
most outside observers, such a pursuit of this intimation is ethically 
reprehensible because the tradition itself is offensive.  
 
The pursuit of intimations, like tradition, can also fail to provide answers. It is 
an open question as to how we choose between conflicting intimations. If 
there is a dominant intimation to be followed, as Hayek noted, ‘the decisive 
objection to any conservatism (…) is that by its very nature it cannot offer an 
alternative to the direction in which we are moving’ (1960, p. 1). The most it 
can do is to slow down unwelcome developments, ‘but since it does not 
indicate another direction, it cannot prevent their continuance’ (ibid.). 
Moreover, if Oakeshott was correct that anti-rationalism had progressively 
infected the practice of politics, he was implicitly recommending that we have 
no alternative but to pursue the intimations of an infected tradition of 
behaviour. But, this would only serve to make a situation worse, not better.  
 
It is unclear whether he believed that a tradition had boundaries, and that the 
pursuit of intimations must be necessarily within the boundaries of that 
tradition. Or, whether his claim is merely that any end of political activity 
must have been intimated in some political society at some time.  His example 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, though, suggests the latter. He 
claimed that the French revolutionaries were not requesting abstract rights 
grounded on a theory of the ultimate nature of man, but the legal and political 
rights concretely embodied in the English constitution. Whereas it may be 
true that the revolutionaries took some inspiration from England, it is unlikely 
that many historians would agree that their demands were merely intimated 
in the common law rights of Englishmen at that time. Moreover, if Oakeshott 
is correct, this would justify an end of political activity if intimated in any 




My thesis is that one should interpret his doctrine of anti-rationalism on 
which his political conservatism is based as an attempt counteract progressive 
thought, which in the post-war period favoured a purposeful, managerial 
state. It is mistaken to interpret him as using anti-rationalism to ground 
uncritical traditionalism, or conservatism. The conservatism of Oakeshott, 
like Burke, was characterised, in the first instance, by opposition to the idea of 
complete or radical change, and not by opposition to change as such or by any 
commitment to preserving all institutions and traditions. Both claimed that 
the rapid implementation of rationalist schemes put societies at risk of 
destruction or chaos and should be resisted. The justification of this 
presupposes the primacy of the socio-political values of order and stability, 
which cannot themselves be determined by an appeal to history or tradition. 
 
Oakeshott claimed that conservatism is a disposition to value a particular 
state of affairs, not merely any state of affairs. The disposition is obviously 
affected by current circumstances: ‘If the present is arid (...) this inclination 
will be weak or absent’ (1991, 408). The circumstances in which he wrote his 
conservative essays disposed him to be conservative as the direction of change 
meant that things could only get worse from his perspective.   Andrew 
Sullivan rightly concludes that Oakeshott offered only a ‘contingent defence of 
a contingent tradition’ (2007, p. 5). By this he means that Oakeshott could not 
use the anti-rationalist argument to support any tradition. This would be 
unsustainable from the moral point of view. It is a contingent defence in that 
rule of law liberalism, which I contend best describes his political disposition, 
does not need an anti-rationalist thesis to support it. We noted in Chapter 
Three that he argued that civil association is the only moral form of 
compulsory association that is the state, which is a sufficient defence in itself.  
 
Oakeshott’s anti-rationalist doctrine should be read as a tactical defence of 
what was left of rule of law liberalism in post war Britain. It added little to the 
prudential “conservative” arguments offered by Burke 150 years earlier in his 
defence of Old Whiggism.  Jesse Norman describes Oakeshott’s anti-
rationalism as ‘a highly sophisticated and nuanced generalization of Burke’ 
(2013, p. 9). But, Oakeshott’s arguments lack the emotional impact of Burke’s, 
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who always made explicit the moral basis of his argument. Burke supported 
the aims of the American revolutionaries and radical reform in Ireland, for 
example, not on the basis of the pursuit of intimations, but from a belief that 
both causes were morally justified. Norman describes Burke’s conservatism is 
one of value, whereas Oakeshott’s is one of disposition (2013, p. 10). 
 
The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism 
 
In the posthumously published The Politics of Faith and the Politics of 
Scepticism [PFPS], Oakeshott described two opposing styles of political 
activity. The opposition is that between the politics of faith and scepticism. 
The subject of PFPS, which is generally thought to have been completed in 
1952, is no longer rationalism, but an analysis of the tradition of European 
politics in terms of the movement between two extreme styles of politics, or 
“polarities”, which began to emerge in the 15th century and which have lasted 
to the present day, ‘to which our current habits and manners are joined by an 
unbroken pedigree’ (1996, p. 2). The extremes, or poles, are associated with 
the ideals of faith and scepticism. 
 
Oakeshott cautioned the reader against making the mistake of ‘converting 
logical opposites with historical enemies’, or of regarding faith as a reaction 
against scepticism, or the source of faith as the failure of scepticism, or the 
spring of scepticism in the collapse of faith’, (ibid., p. 30). The polarities are 
both theoretical and historical, and Oakeshott claimed that practice in modern 
times has always been a mixture of the two styles and has never reached either 
extreme: ‘Historically our practice and our understanding of government has 
occupied a middle region with only sporadic excursions to the horizons’ (ibid., 
p. 11, p. 38; italics added).  
 
In this section I consider whether the opposition of the politics of faith and the 
politics of scepticism offers any further insight into Oakeshott’s account of 
political activity, or whether it is merely a reworking of his anti-rationalism 
thesis. It may be significant that the term “rationalism” largely dropped out of 
Oakeshott’s writings from the early 1950s onwards, for reasons that are 
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unclear. It may also be significant that PFPS went unpublished in his lifetime, 
which suggests that Oakeshott was to some extent dissatisfied with certain 
aspects of it. We should note two considerations that may explain this. First, 
as Kenneth Minogue pointed out, PFPS arguably had a different objective to 
RIP. The latter is a harsh polemic against rationalism. The former, however, 
attempted to “domesticate” rationalism as part of a broader theory of modern 
politics (2012, p. 246). It will be seen that the process of domestication did not 
achieve its objective. Second, it was, as Timothy Fuller remarks, as close to a 
book of advice with practical implications as Oakeshott produced, and as such 
an enterprise anathema to him. This may be why he decided to leave it 
unpublished. 
 
The polarities of faith and scepticism reflect different views on the activity, or 
practice, of governing. The politics of faith is identified with the desire to 
achieve perfection by political means, when government activity is not 
understood as merely ancillary to the pursuit of perfection but recognised as 
‘the chief inspirer and sole director of the pursuit’ (Oakeshott 1996, p. 25). 
“Faith” in this context is not to be confused with a doctrine of ‘cosmic 
optimism’ in which perfection is an inference from the creator, or a 
providential gift (ibid., p. 23). On the contrary, it is a secular mind-set, which 
he styled as “Pelagian”. Faith is the belief that the achievement of perfection 
can be achieved by our own efforts and that human power is adequate to 
achieve salvation.  
 
There are, of course, as many versions of the Politics of Faith as there are 
interpretations of the meaning of perfection, but in modern times the Politics 
of faith has been expressed in two main idioms; a religious version and an 
economic version (1996, p. 58). According to Oakeshott, the politics of faith 
had dominated political thought and action for the past one hundred and fifty 
years. This was made possible by the discovery of ways to continually increase 
the power of government. The increase in power was, in fact, the most 
important condition of the rise of the politics of faith: ‘It belongs to this style 
of politics to welcome power rather than to be embarrassed by it’ (ibid., p. 28). 
 
 213 
His discussion of the role of power suggests the near-inevitability of the 
dominance of faith in contemporary circumstances. He called it a ‘general 
rule’ that what men wish to do is determined by what they can imagine 
themselves doing with the resources they have at their disposal. He claimed 
that the politics of faith is not the cause of a great increase in the amount of 
power available to government, but the consequence of a contingent 
expansion of that power (1996, pp. 45-6). The more power that is available to 
government, the more government will be tempted to exercise ever closer 
control over the activities of their subjects, and the available powers to control 
and direct ‘themselves generated the beliefs which belong to the politics of 
faith’ (1996, p. 46).  
 
Medieval rulers, however, did not have such powers at their disposal. 
Governments did not have the capacity and competence to pursue this style of 
politics, and this realisation stood in the way of the enterprise ever occurring 
to them (ibid., p. 48). A significant and continuing casualty of improvements 
in the methods of power has been the disappearance of the intermediate 
authorities that historically stood between a weak central government and its 
subjects, leaving them ‘naked before a power which in its magnitude was 
becoming comparable to a force of nature’ (ibid., p. 49). The centrality of the 
link between power and the politics of faith was, for Oakeshott, almost a law 
of nature. Every technological progress that ‘adds to man’s mastery over his 
world’ and improves productivity when arrogated to government makes the 
Politics of Faith more likely (1996, p. 50). If the politics of faith is a 
consequence of the stimulation that the availability of power gives to the 
aspirations of government, it is difficult to see how the politics of scepticism 
stands a serious chance in the modern age.  
 
Oakeshott claimed that the politics of faith is a style of politics, pursued in 
more than one style, ‘which is coeval with the modern world’ (1996, p. 65). 
Although this idiom of politics has been universal throughout modern Europe, 
it has never been the sole property of any European country or political party 
(1996, p. 66). Both understandings of governing have been ever-present in 
modern times, although the particular form each takes will depend upon 
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contemporary circumstances. They are styles of political activity, and not 
unchanging doctrines. Each has manifested in varying degrees of 
completeness and in a variety of versions’ (1996, p. 21). In Oakeshottian 
terms, a “productivist” version of the politics of faith has come to be the 
common currency of mainstream political parties. The faith that human 
perfection can only be achieved in a “productivist” community, this being 
more than the search for a higher standard of living (ibid., p. 63). 
 
The prevalence of faith has resulted in the extended meanings given to certain 
words in our political vocabulary. “Security” is extended to mean “welfare”, 
then further extended to mean “salvation”. “Work” becomes first a right, then 
a duty.  Every minimum is converted into a maximum until “freedom from 
want” and the enjoyment of happiness are claimed as rights (ibid., p. 63). 
Oakeshott quoted E. L. Thorndike (1940) as a modern day example of the 
productivist version of the politics of faith, the lineage of which can be traced 
back to Francis Bacon. Thorndike claimed that when we reflect on human 
nature in relation to welfare it shows ‘that man has the possibility of almost 
complete control of his fate, and that if he fails it will be by the ignorance and 
folly of men’ (Thorndike in Oakeshott 1996, p. 65). 122 
 
What is notable, Oakeshott stressed, is the ‘manifold character quality of our 
manner of government’, and it never had been ‘simple, monolithic, or 
homogenous’ (1996, p. 8). This explains the ambiguity present in our political 
vocabulary, as it has had to serve two masters.  In view of his strictures against 
rationalism, Oakeshott made the surprisingly revisionist claim that the 
ambiguity has functioned to hide divisions ‘which to display fully would 
invite violence and disaster’ (1996, p. 21, italics added). The main defect of 
our ambiguous political vocabulary is mainly philosophical. The ambiguity 
makes it problematic for us to think clearly about our politics and ‘stands in 
the way of profound political self-knowledge’ (ibid.). In other words, if either 
style of political activity came to dominate our political life, the upshot would 
be worse than the muddle in which we find ourselves. This suggests that 
                                                   
122 Oakeshott described Francis Bacon as ‘the chief architect of the politics of faith’ 
(1996, p. 52).  
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Oakeshott had become somewhat reconciled to contemporary political 
realities. 
 
But what is the politics of scepticism, and is it something we can glimpse even 
remotely in contemporary political activity? In contrast to his exposition of 
the politics of faith, Oakeshott’s description of the lineage and tenets of the 
politics of scepticism is somewhat sketchy. Its most fundamental feature is 
that it is disinterested in the pursuit of human perfection (1996, p. 31). He 
suggested that the roots of sceptical politics can be found in ‘prudent 
diffidence rather than in some radical doubt’ (ibid.). Prudent diffidence was 
combined with an understanding of human nature associated with writers 
such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Pascal and de Montaigne among others. When they 
contemplated the ‘the weakness and wickedness of mankind and the 
transitoriness of human achievement’ in the context of the the activity of 
governing led to political scepticism (1996, pp. 75-6) 
 
The “prudent diffidence” refers to the arguments against perfectionism we 
already noted in his second ‘Tower of Babel’ essay where, he claimed, to 
pursue perfection ‘as the crow flies’ will invite disappointment and misery 
(1996, p. 31). The detachment of governing from the pursuit of perfection, he 
argued, deprives the activity of government of any ulterior comprehensive 
purpose. As there is no ulterior purpose and, in particular, no common good 
to be pursued, the “specific activity” of governing is the maintenance of order, 
which the sceptic recognises as a great and difficult accomplishment and, 
where appropriate, to enhance the system of rights and duties and the 
attendant system of means of redress, ‘which together compose the superficial 
order’ (ibid., pp. 32-34). So sceptical politics, like conversational politics, is 
appropriate to a civil association, but altogether alien to an enterprise 
association. 
 
We have noted already that Oakeshott attributed the emergence of the politics 
of faith to the circumstantial ability of governments to harness more and more 
power for themselves as a consequence of developments in science and 
technology. The politics of scepticism is a mirror image of this consideration: 
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‘They are, generally speaking, the politics of the powerless’ (1996, p. 69). It is 
the style of governing suitable to conditions in which government has only a 
small opportunity to direct the activities of its subjects. Thus scepticism is the 
default position when the levers of power are absent. But scepticism needs 
something to recommend it in the presence of power, which is the 
contemporary default position. 
 
The springboard of the modern politics of scepticism is, unsurprisingly, anti-
perfectionism, anti-rationalism and a non-purposeful understanding of the 
law grounded largely on prudential considerations, it reflects all of the 
unifying themes of   Oakeshott’s political doctrines. He did not link these ideas 
directly to the politics of scepticism, which is perhaps surprising, as PFPS was 
written shortly after the essays collected in Rationalism in Politics. But, 
nonetheless, the themes are implicit in much of what he says.  
 
To the sceptical school belongs ‘a distinguished body of writers; to go no 
further than the great names, Hume, Burke, Bentham, Macaulay, and, I think, 
Adam Smith himself’ (1996, p. 73). The inclusion of Bentham and Smith in the 
sceptical school suggests an idiosyncratic interpretation of their work. 
Oakeshott claimed that true sceptics resist the politics of faith because they 
object to the imposition of any comprehensive pattern of activity, whether 
economic or otherwise. And the reason they opposed any version of the 
politics of faith is because they detect a whole range of mistakes. These 
include an unjustifiably optimistic reading of human behaviour, ‘the 
impoverishment of mankind by reducing all activity to that which could easily 
be controlled by government’, a misreading of the political importance of 
private property and ‘bringing the law into disrepute’ by expecting it to do 
what it cannot do and the promotion, at home and abroad, of that ‘insecurity 
which in their view it should be the chief office of government to mitigate’ 
(1996, p. 73). 
 
The opposition of faith and scepticism is, then, a reworking of Oakeshott’s 
ideal contrasts between reason and tradition, moral perfection and 
imperfection, individuality and mass man, and civil association and enterprise 
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association. There is, however, a significant difference. In the previous cases, 
Oakeshott unequivocally demonstrated the fitness of one ideal to his 
understanding of the human condition. We might expect that he would simply 
denounce the “politics of faith” as the “son of rationalism”, and aver the 
fitness of the politics of scepticism, but this was not the case. He remarked 
that ‘mere denunciation’ of the politics of faith was out of place, and insisted 
that we must recognise the politics of faith not on its own terms ‘as the final 
orientation of our political activity’, but as ‘a flight to one of the extremes of 
which our complex politics is capable’ (1996, p. 127). The trigger for a 
movement in one direction between the poles is largely circumstantial.  It is 
seldom the result of design, more likely it is the consequence of negligence 
(ibid., p.12). 
 
The gist of Oakeshott’s argument, as Fuller highlights in his introduction to 
PFPS, is ultimately Aristotelian, because it locates the activity of governing as 
a mean between the two “polarities”. Oakeshott claimed that each style of 
politics, when standing alone, will provoke a characteristic nemesis, which in 
both cases ‘turns out to be a self-destructive stops this self-destruction (ibid.). 
Minogue described Oakeshott’s argument as a ‘revisionist exercise’ in showing 
that the politics of faith must be granted an essential place in western political 
life (2012, p. 234). So “mere denunciation” would be a futile exercise in view 
of this historic reality. The best that can be achieved is to make an argument 
to return to a more sceptical style of politics as a counterweight to the dangers 
inherent in the politics of faith. The modern day challenge of the politics of 
scepticism is to identify the way in which government can most economically 
undertake its age-old function of maintaining ‘an order and balance relevant 
to the current conditions and activities of the society (1996, pp. 86-87, italics 
added). Its job is to promote an understanding of politics as a conversation in 
which past, present and future all participate.123  
                                                   
123 This quotation echoed Burke, who in Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
described society ‘as a partnership in all science, a partnership in every virtue and in 
all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many 
generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’ 
(1887, p. 359). Oakeshott also used the partnership metaphor when he described 
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 This is a practical political recommendation. Oakeshott implicitly conceded 
the supremacy of the politics of faith.  “Order and balance” are relevant to the 
“current conditions and activities of the society” - which he acknowledged to 
have long been dominated by the politics of faith and to have resulted in the 
Welfare state. Thus his recommendation can be reduced to a plea to do what 
is necessary to maintain order “most economically”, in view of the 
consideration that in a representative democracy, mass man will take the 
trappings of the Welfare state for granted. We should note that by 
“economically”, he refers not just to the use of resources, but the use of power. 
The sceptic appreciates the rule of law on account of it being a manner of 
governing that is economical in its use of power. He sees that government by 
the rule of law is an emblem of that dispersion of power which government 
exists to promote (1996, p. 88). However, as noted in Chapter Three, this 
assertion only makes sense if we conceive of the state as being purposeless. 
 
 Oakeshott claimed that the problems associated with the politics of faith 
overshadow those of the politics of scepticism. The politics of faith is not 
compatible with the circumstances of modern Europe, which is characterised 
by moral and cultural pluralism. It risks awakening ‘the politics of Terror’, 
which lies dormant in all versions of government as the pursuit of perfection, 
when it is foisted on a diversified community’ (ibid., p. 95). The politics of 
faith is only suitable for a monolithic society, which might be expected to have 
monolithic politics; and as faith entails the ‘minute and comprehensive 
control of all activities’, it is clearly unsuitable for pluralistic societies (1996, p. 
92). 
 
Moreover, the politics of faith is self-defeating. If government promises 
salvation, the achievement of government will ‘be too great or too small, and 
in both cases gratitude is turned to hatred’ (1996, pp. 97-98). The minute 
control over the activities of the subjects, and the devotion and sacrifices 
                                                                                                                                                 
government under the rule of law as involving a ‘partnership between past and 
present between governors and governed which leaves no room for arbitrariness’ 
(1996, p. 88).  
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required of them, attached to a single overpowering principle that this style of 
politics requires, will be shown to be to no avail. Government will claim that 
nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the pursuit of perfection. The 
politics of faith in its pure form results in the kind of dystopia we noted in his 
second ‘Tower of Babel” essay ‘where engagements, loyalties, undertakings 
will be swept aside’ and actual misfortunes will be ignored or discounted 
‘while the poor, the oppressed, the terrorized, the tortured are forgotten’ 
(1996, pp.98- 99).  It is unlikely that citizens will be loyal to a state that 
wreaks such mayhem ‘Where it will be difficult to hide the slaughter and 
impossible to conceal the corruption, and where the ship is so conspicuously 
preferred to the crew’ (ibid.). 
 
This is a description of the consequences of the politics of faith at its polar 
extreme. It might be realised only in totalitarian states, such as the former 
USSR and the present day Islamic State.124 But even in a less extreme form, its 
defects are clear. Oakeshott clearly had the post-war welfare state in mind 
when he spoke of the logic of security. “Security”, he claimed, has a scale of 
meanings in our political vocabulary. There is a critical point on the scale, on 
one side of which protection against some of the shifts of fortune is recognised 
to be among the activities of government. Up to this point the inspiration 
behind government protection is the observation of actual miseries suffered. 
Security is understood as the ‘assurance of relief’ (1996, p. 99). The limit to 
security being understood in this manner is the protection that can be 
afforded without enforcing an all-embracing blueprint of activity on the 
community (ibid., p. 100). When a person is defended against misfortune in 
such a fashion as to ‘deprive him of the authority to defend himself, the limit 
is passed’ (ibid.). 
 
Beyond this point on the scale, security becomes understood as well-being, 
and the purpose of government is understood as being to provide for this. This 
                                                   
124 Oakeshott held that Russia was an obvious example of the Baconian version of the 
politics of faith: ‘What distinguishes it from most of the other regimes in Europe 
which have moved decisively in the direction of faith is the degree in which it has 
divested itself from every vestige of the pull of scepticism’ (Oakeshott 1996, p. 132 
n.6). 
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results in a community organised for the exclusion of unpleasant 
circumstances. This requires the government to control the activities of the 
community minutely in the pursuit of well-being. When perfection is 
identified with security, the normal condition of the subject will be one of 
slavery ‘qualified by whatever privilege he can secure for himself by an even 
more prostrate submission’ (ibid.). But this is a self-destructive style of 
governing. Productivity will decline as there is little reward for effort.   
 
Oakeshott’s objection to the politics of faith combines his distaste for the 
productivist orientation prevalent in modern society with a libertarian 
attitude to the state provision of social welfare that can trace its lineage back 
to Kant. The price of security is submission and liberty is destroyed. Its major 
consequence is that it leads to a concentration of power that justifies 
government having and exercising more power. This becomes self-defeating 
as government inevitably fails to deliver because the protectors pledge more 
than they can deliver. It is only ‘when the pull of scepticism is exerted on this 
version of faith that self-defeat is avoided’ (1996, p. 102, italics added).  
 
Oakeshott contended that in its ideal form, the politics of faith has a moral 
infirmity. Moral activity, he claimed is one in which a ‘norm of self-limitation’ 
is discernible (1996, p. 103). But the politics of faith does not recognise such a 
norm. Oakeshott quoted Nassau Senior125 as an example of what he meant: ‘It 
is the duty of government to do whatever is conducive to the welfare of the 
governed. The only limit to this duty is power’ (Nassau Senior in Robbins 
1952, p. 45). The pursuit of perfection contains no conception of self-
limitation, as whatever state we are in can always be made more perfect. The 
only constraint is the power and resources available. But just to respond to the 
provocation of power, to follow wherever it may lead and to take advantage of 
every increase, ‘is not a moral activity; it is only a display of energy’ 
(Oakeshott 1996, p. 103).  
 
Not only does the politics of faith lack self-limitation; it is, on the contrary, 
self-aggrandising. The recognition of the politics of faith as the pursuit of 
                                                   
125 Nassau William Senior (1790-1864), British lawyer and economist. 
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perfection ‘harnessed to power’ provides momentum for continuous 
improvement in the tools and techniques of power.  He referenced the 
extension of education and the activities of the BBC as examples of how 
enterprises can become endowed with a ‘spurious moral character’ due to the 
energy and determination with which their objectives are pursued (ibid., p. 
104). Without a principle of self-limitation, such activities transform their 
pursuit from being a moral activity to a ‘mere response to the incitement of 
power’ (ibid.). We should highlight the importance of “self-limitation” to him. 
As we noted in the discussion of order and power, Oakeshott believed the 
greatest threat to individual freedom was the increase in the means to exercise 
power available to modern governments. This makes the politics of faith 
particularly problematic in contemporary circumstances as it lacks self-
limitation at a time when the instruments of power are constantly being 
augmented. 
 
In contrast to the dystopia that results from an unqualified pursuit of the 
politics of faith, the downside of pursuing the politics of scepticism is ‘both 
less devastating and more subtle’, but ‘it is unsteady when it stands by itself’ 
(1996, p. 105). If the politics of faith leads to greater government, the politics 
of scepticism represents the idea of minimal government. It is not, however, 
to be confused with anarchy. The politics of scepticism has the positive office 
of maintaining the public order of a community: ‘it can rise above minimum 
government, and be imperial in its own province’ (1996, p. 106).  Scepticism is 
not to be associated with weak government: ‘It is paramount because its 
activities are limited’. Under normal circumstances this style of government is 
never fully stretched. It has something left in reserve for emergencies - in 
contrast to the politics of faith, which, by definition, is always at the end of its 
tether in the pursuit of perfection. 
 
In his account of government according to the politics of scepticism, 
Oakeshott echoed the idea of a “Night-watchman” state, popularised by 
Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). Nozick explained how the 
minimal state results from a rejection of anarchy. Its functions do not extend 
beyond the provision of protection against force, theft and the enforcement of 
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contracts. But whereas both Nozick and Oakeshott rejected “Utopia”, or 
“perfectionism”, Nozick offered a rights-based libertarian defence of minimal 
government, whereas Oakeshott offered qualified scepticism to trim the 
activities of the state. 
 
Whereas the politics of faith is dangerous because it lacks a principle of self-
limitation the weakness of scepticism springs from the opposite source: ‘The 
severe self-limitation that belongs to its character’ (Oakeshott 1996, p. 106). 
The purpose of the politics of scepticism is to preserve public order, but its 
tendency to be scrupulous, and never disproportionate, in carrying out this 
duty tends to leave implementation of the task unprepared. He concluded that 
scepticism, like faith, when it remains by itself is somewhat inappropriate in 
modern Europe communities, which can be characterised by a disposition for 
hasty and continual change.  The politics of faith is alive to change and will 
endeavour to suppress it when it conflicts with the pursuit of perfection. The 
politics of scepticism, however, is relatively uninterested in any kind of 
change. The consequence is that it will tend to be inattentive to those effects of 
change that come within its jurisdiction. Namely, the advent of circumstances 
which require a modification in the scheme of rights and duties if order is to 
be maintained. The insensitivity to change ‘is a defect of the virtue of this style 
of government’ (1996, p. 107).  
 
Oakeshott’s claim was that government in the sceptical style is not sensitive 
enough to changes in moral opinion, security considerations and such like 
that intimate changes to the laws of a society or the activities of government. 
Scepticism’s resistance to the necessary changes means that it is likely to be 
overcome by the ‘nemesis of political quietism’ (1996, p. 108). The nature of 
scepticism is its tendency to understatement. It is unlikely to recognise 
conditions of emergency in a timely fashion. The final nemesis of scepticism is 
its tendency to reduce politics to ‘play’ (ibid., p. 110) Oakeshott defined play in 
this context as an activity that is practiced on certain formal occasions and in 
accordance with precise rules. The meaning of the activity to the participants 
lies not in the targeted end result, but in the mood in which it is enjoyed and 
fostered in the cause of attaining the end result. Oakeshott had in mind the 
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English tradition of the administration of justice and parliamentary 
government where opponents can be friends and debate takes place without 
hatred. This is, of course, foreign to the politics of faith ‘where debate is 
argument, not conversation’ (1996, p. 111). 
 
But the style of governance according to the politics of scepticism is out of 
sympathy with contemporary political sensibilities. It assumes imperfection, 
accepts plurality, and remains neutral between different conceptions of the 
good life. But the intellectual temper of this mode of government is foreign to 
an activist climate of opinion in a world where all activities are taken 
seriously, where industry is considered virtuous and the energetic pursuit of 
goals a good thing, the assumptions of scepticism ‘fix upon government the 
character of frivolity’ (1996, p. 110). That is to say, the two poles of our politics 
can be reformulated as a contrast between “earnest” and “play”, a variant on 
the contrast between “work” and “play” identified in Chapter One. This was 
central to Oakeshott’s ideas about how we should live, given his 
understanding of practical life as inherently frustrating due to the never 
ending process of new wants emerging from the satisfaction of current wants. 
 
Oakeshott’s contended that in modern Europe, faith and scepticism are not 
merely opponents, but also necessary partners if disaster is to be avoided. This 
reflects his reluctant acceptance that rationalism and the politics of faith are 
so ingrained in our political culture that to pretend otherwise would be futile. 
The unsuitability of the sceptical style to the governance of modern Europe, 
which in itself is evidence of its defeat, is an inappropriateness ‘to a condition 
of “emergency” and “war”’ (1996, p. 113). He accepted that the model for the 
allied victory in the Second World War was the state organised as an 
enterprise association dedicated to victory and the unconditional surrender of 
the enemy. This marked the ascendancy of the politics of faith. Consequently, 
he argued, no government can expect to stay in power, and no party can 
assume to be heeded, which does not at least have the appearance of being 
ready to respond to emergencies.  
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Oakeshott argued there is an asymmetry between the deficiencies of faith and 
scepticism. The politics of scepticism ‘suffers from a strong contingent liability 
to self-defeat’ (1996, 125). It is unstable when it stands by itself. While the pull 
of scepticism may rescue faith from certain self-destruction, the counter 
balance of faith saves scepticism from only probable self-destruction. That is, 
the flaw in the politics of faith is innate, in the politics of scepticism it is 
conditional. 
 
Oakeshott formulated a general practical principle to capture his view of 
where the mean lies between faith and scepticism: ‘Excess and defect are not 
equidistant from the mean’ (1996, p. 115). He reminded us of Isocrates’ 
observation that moderation consists in deficiency rather than in excess. The 
mean is a lot closer to scepticism than faith. As a practical matter, he argued, 
we should recognise that our current style of politics offers a liveable 
intermediate region in which we can avoid its harmful extremes by pursuing a 
doctrine of moderation, as offered by Halifax in The Character of a Trimmer 
(ibid., p. 121). The Trimmer has the virtue of not interpreting the words in our 
political vocabulary in their furthest scope.  He is one who ‘disposes to keep 
the ship on an even keel (...) he will be found facing in whatever direction the 
occasion seems to require for the boat to go even’ (ibid., pp. 123-124). The 
Trimmer has a much closer affinity to scepticism than faith and ‘he has the 
advantage of the sceptic in his ability to recognize change and emergency’ 
(ibid.). 
  
The Trimmer might be an apt metaphor for Oakeshott himself in the nineteen 
fifties. He had retreated from the principled attack on rationalism set out in 
RIP but had not yet defended the principled libertarianism, which he did 
twenty years later in On Human Conduct. The Trimmer is the quintessential 
Oakeshottian conservative, suspicious of the ‘jump to glory style of politics’ 
where governing is understood as a ‘perpetual take-over bid for the resources 
of human energy’ in order to concentrate them in a single direction (1991, p. 
426). This style of politics operates on the principle that ‘to govern is to turn a 
private dream into a public and compulsory manner of living’ (ibid.).  
Oakeshott viewed the Trimmer as having more in common not with referee, 
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not a star player: ‘Strong, alert, resolute, economical and neither capricious 
nor overactive’ and careful to avoid blowing his own whistle’ (ibid. p. 433). 126 
 
I wish to suggest that Oakeshott’s reliance on scepticism as the basis his anti-
progressive argument may have left many otherwise sympathetic readers with 
“one hand clapping” when reading PFPS. His opposition of faith and 
scepticism is problematic in that it highlights the limitations of his binary 
method of comparing and contrasting “ideals” - in this case, faith and 
scepticism. Oakeshott does not justify why he chose “faith” and “scepticism” 
as polar opposite styles of governing in his reading modern European history. 
It is merely asserted. He could have chosen simplicity and complexity as the 
poles, or collectivism and individuality, which might have been more 
consistent with the contrasts he drew elsewhere.  
 
Scepticism, as Oakeshott describes it, is not the polar opposite of faith but a 
version of faith, in as much as the maintenance of order is considered by its 
practitioners to be the purpose of government. This is a version of the 
problem we noted in Oakeshott’s claim that a true civil association is 
purposeless, although order is presupposed. What scepticism entails is merely 
contingent upon what the voters in a representative democracy need from 
government to maintain order. Contrary to what Oakeshott claimed, the polar 
opposite of faith is anarchy: defined as ‘the absence of a master, a sovereign’ 
(Proudhon, 1969 p. 264). 
 
In setting up the politics of faith as a “straw man”, appropriate for an 
enterprise association, it was easy for Oakeshott to knock it down as 
                                                   
126 Several politicians have been described as Oakeshottian. In the New Statesman, 
Ed Smith recently argued that David Cameron is essentially Oakeshottian: ‘Instead of 
setting the agenda, he holds the right balance; in place of vision, he seeks informal 
compromise; far from using logical arguments to pursue utopia, he has a non-
rational grasp of his particular era and its demands. These are the features of an 
Oakeshottian conservative’ (2013, p. 2013). Dean C. Hammer argued that George W. 
H. Bush was an ‘Oakeshottian President’ who sold himself to the electorate on the 
basis that ‘what matters is not who has a better plan for the future but who can best 
manage the present’ (1995, p. 301). On the left, Adam Gopnik claimed in the New 
Yorker that Bill Clinton’s ‘lack of consistent principle and a “bottom line”’ makes him 
a model Oakeshottian statesman’ (1996, p. 196). 
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something only Utopian dreamers, of whatever political persuasion, could 
conceive. The opposition of faith and scepticism offers little insight into the 
dilemmas of politics in a modern, pluralistic and democratic European state. 
There is broad consensus that the task of the state is to improve the provision 
of public goods such as security, health and education. But there is 
disagreement as to the specification of these goods, how best to provide them, 
and how best to distribute the costs of provision among citizens. As the goods 
are incommensurable, political debate is often a matter of setting priorities, 









I have attempted a critical assessment of the political doctrines of Michael 
Oakeshott. I acknowledged in the introduction that to claim that Oakeshott 
advances a doctrine, or doctrines, might be controversial. Such a claim would 
have offended both him and those commentators who subscribe to the idea 
that he was a “disinterested philosopher” who was aloof from the concerns of 
practical politics. But, as I hope to have demonstrated, he had quite a lot to 
say on the matter, although he approached it selectively. Oakeshott was 
indifferent, however, to much of what interested most political theorists of his 
generation and those of today: ‘He has sought refuge from confronting the 
tensions and decisions which plague political life. And in this he has 
systematically bypassed the work of most of those now thinking about politics’	
(Kettler 1964, p. 488).  
 
My contention that Oakeshott promoted doctrines is based on two 
considerations. A sizeable portion of his work, such as his book reviews, his 
Notebooks, and many of his posthumously published essays and monographs, 
most notably The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (1996) are 
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clearly not strictly “philosophical”	 in the way he himself defines the term. That 
is, these texts are not merely explanatory. Moreover, On Human Conduct 
(1975a), his last major work, is suffused with value judgments. These are 
particularly concentrated in the final essay. This is not a criticism: most 
contemporary political theorists assume that the subject of politics is 
unavoidably normative.  
 
I have used the term ‘doctrine’	 in Crick’s sense: ‘A coherent sum of assertions 
regarding what a particular topic should be’	 (op. cit., p. 24). Oakeshott 
concerned himself with two topics: firstly, the question of what the state is for 
and, secondly, the matter of securing an understanding of the nature of 
political activity. In answer to Andrew Vincent’s question about whether 
Oakeshott was really using philosophy to advance a conservative ideology, my 
answer is that he was not.  His doctrines are not sufficiently comprehensive to 
warrant the term “ideology”. Moreover, he was only contingently conservative. 
That is, he was conservative in the actual circumstances in which he wrote. 
This does not mean that he would have been conservative in all 
circumstances. 
 
My central claim is that Oakeshott’s work, in its conception of the state as a 
civil association, can be reasonably interpreted as idealising what I have called 
“old fashioned liberalism”, or “rule of law liberalism”. Yet, he realised that the 
direction and tone of politics during his lifetime was developing inexorably 
towards a conception of the state as an enterprise association. The most he 
could contribute, under these conditions, was to slow this march, or, in his 
words, to	 undo the work of the “progressives”. In this sense he can be 
described as conservative, and Rationalism in Politics can be read as 
contributing to a conservative objective. However, Oakeshott was pessimistic 
that the process could be reversed given the constraints of popular democracy 
and the “infection” of all political parties with rationalism. The Notebooks, in 
particular, reveal a rich seam of cultural pessimism in his thinking. 
 
Oakeshott did not deny the importance of doctrines. Writing in The Social 
and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe in 1940 he said, ‘these 
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doctrines are all we have, each of them are an expression of something in our 
civilization’	 (1940, p. xii). They are a way, he posited, of ‘conceiving the 
fundamental character of society, and by implication, five separate and 
distinct ways of conceiving the nature and earthly destiny of man’	 (1940, p.  
xiv). 127 By his own definition of doctrine, Oakeshott’s argument that the state 
conceived as a civil association is morally superior to an enterprise association 
surely qualifies. It is a distinct way of conceiving the nature and earthly 
destiny of man. Civil association is a libertarian destiny; enterprise association 
is a collectivist destiny. Oakeshott’s preference for the former is indisputable.   
 
Oakeshott claimed, moreover, that those doctrines are not philosophies in the 
strict sense but, nonetheless, have a body of philosophical ideas connected to 
them (1940, p. xv). Woven into his doctrines are a number of distinct 
philosophical ideas, examined here in antecedent chapters, which I will now 
review in summary. 
 
In Chapter One, I explored the values and dispositions that underlie 
Oakeshott’s political thought. These are grounded in a specific understanding 
of the human condition and the inescapable fact of mortality. This is captured 
in his expression, “the deadliness of doing”, a reference to the never-ending 
process in which the satisfaction of one desire merely creates another. How to 
cope with this reality was a constant preoccupation for Oakeshott.  His 
musings in the Notebooks on the ontological condition of mortality and the 
potential for both religion and love to help us deal with the limitations that 
defy dreams of human perfectibility are particularly striking. So too is the 
deep scepticism he exhibits towards claims advanced in the name of three of 
the rising forces of the twentieth century -- science, materialism and progress.  
 
The worldly/spiritual duality is one of a succession of dichotomies, or 
contrasting “ideal types”, through which he explained his thinking. While 
these vary in their terminology and focus, each of these dualities expresses an 
entrenched dichotomy between the modernist notion of the conscious pursuit 
                                                   
127 The doctrines are Representative Democracy, Catholicism, Communism, Fascism 
and National Socialism. 
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of pre-determined goals - an endeavour that is bound to lead to 
disappointment, frustration and futility - and the ‘worldly’	 embrace of the 
sensual, the experiential and the contingent. Restated, and subtly re-
conceptualised, versions of this duality crop up throughout his writing. The 
first appearance of this dichotomous habit can be located in an early essay 
Work and Play (1995), in which he counters the instrumental pursuit of pre-
determined goals –	which he calls “work”	 -- and the spirit of play, an intuitive 
embrace of the ethos of enjoyment, experience and emotion. The metaphor of 
‘play’	 is especially important. It signals his commitment to the intrinsic value 
of experience, as opposed to the pre-determination of one’s goals and desires. 
 
He further marks a contrast between ‘worldly man’	 and ‘religious man’. Such 
ideas undergird his critique, advanced during the 1940s, of rationalism and its 
influence upon politicians and planners. Those who lived in the ‘worldly way’, 
he maintained, directed their lives towards the pursuit of various kinds of 
‘immanent’	 ideals, including those associated with religion. Fulfilment, 
according to this model, was deferred to an unknown and unknowable future, 
with goals pursued only so far as they fitted with this schema; 
accomplishments praised according to norms that had been stipulated prior to 
experience itself. But ‘religious man’	 - unlike many actual people who pursued 
religious convictions –	 did not, he insisted, live by deferring satisfaction, but 
was fully immersed in, and open to, the pleasures and pain associated with 
experience in the here-and-now, living genuinely in the present. The truly 
good life, he was convinced, was that associated with the unselfconscious 
libertine, a character who –	 following conventional usage –	 he typically 
sketched in the image of the gentlemanly amateur.  
 
The Notebooks illustrate the constitutive role in this thinking of his 
romantically inclined, non-materialistic conception of the good, and suggest 
that interpretations that stress his Tory traditionalism, and set him in the 
footsteps of Burke, are wide of the mark. They show too that he was endlessly 
preoccupied by the figure of the rakish gentleman, a character typically 
presented in the wider contemporary culture as emblematic of a disappearing 
age. Oakeshott sanctified “the gentleman” as the vehicle for the ideal of 
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unfettered individuality. He is a central motif in Oakeshottian thought, and is 
arguably the inspiration for the notion of civil association. 
 
The gentlemanly amateur was, for him, a descendant of the Epicurean 
tradition. This suggests that an author widely seen as the high priest of 
twentieth-century Conservatism, was in fact a strong advocate of a conception 
of freedom that was strongly individualistic and decidedly libertarian. The 
enemies of liberty were latter-day stoics: ‘To despise ambition & to be free 
from the world had become a cult - a negative cult. But with Epicurus it was a 
positive way of life - "Live Alone”. The freedom of the Stoic was an escape: 
that of the Epicurean a fulfilment’	(2014, p. 230). 
 
The overall picture that emerges of Oakeshott through a consideration of his 
values and disposition is of a complex figure who looks, for the most part, 
much more like a libertarian individualist than a Burkean conservative. The 
ethos to which he subscribed was recurrently depicted through positive 
references to the ‘manly’ values associated with the gentleman, including 
‘‘‘Physical’ courage, nerve, respect for tradition & contempt for convention, a 
proud sense of personal honour, an indifference to death’. These qualities he 
characterised as the moral outlook of an aristocrat (2014, p.  507).  
 
I noted in Chapter One the extent of the romantic influence upon him. This 
helps explain the difficulty of aligning Oakeshott with any single ideological 
perspective. Indeed, The Notebooks lend support to the argument that his 
work can, in some ways, be read as an elegiac hymn to a way of life that was 
fast disappearing. Oakeshott had a highly individualistic, romantic and 
pessimistic mind that was growing increasingly disillusioned with the pattern 
and pace of twentieth-century life. 
 
In Chapter Two, I considered Oakeshott’s account of morality. I noted that 
this is an area of his thought that has received relatively little systematic 
attention. I suggested that his account is exclusively concerned with the 
morality of individuality. He ignored the question of altruism: what we owe to 
others beyond the mere observation of current moral conventions in our self-
disclosures as we transact with others. His reverence for individuality is so 
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extreme that it results in contempt for “mass man”, who is obsessed with 
security. Quite frequently –	 as for instance in his essay ‘The Masses in 
Representative Democracy’- he depicts “mass man”	 as an archetype who 
stands in stark contrast with the spirit and ethos of the rugged individualist, 
the courageous gentleman. This is an unlikely starting point for most 
contemporary political theorists. 
 
What is apparent here is that one of the sources of such judgements was 
Oakeshott’s enduring, Edwardian unease about the advent of mass 
democracy. “The people”	 are very rarely invoked in a positive manner in 
relation to the politics of his age. As he put it in 1955, the nature of democratic 
politics ‘is what makes democracy difficult. Not only, or not so much, the 
stupidity of the mass, but their superstition’	 (2014, p. 373). This powerful 
seam of pessimism about the participative dimension of democratic politics 
needs to be brought into plain sight for those debating his relevance, and must 
be considered along with those features of his thought that continue to appeal 
today. This should not be taken to mean that his thinking was devoid of 
insight for those theorising on the nature and specificity of ‘the political’, but it 
ought to suggest that an anchorage in Oakeshottian thinking is an inherently 
paradoxical, and necessarily uncomfortable one, for those committed to 
democratic values. 
 
When individualism is combined with Oakeshott’s romanticism, anti- 
materialism and dislike of modernity, it is evident why he argued that the 
state should be organised as a civil association. This is the form of political 
association best suited to a gentleman who is indifferent to materialism and 
considerations of the common good, such as him. For Oakeshott, material 
“aspiration” was both vulgar and futile as the satisfaction of one want merely 
leads us to focus on a new want. 
 
His preference for a morality of habitual behaviour over a morality of 
reflective rules, grounded in his scepticism and anti-perfectionism suggests 
that for him morality is merely conventional.  There is no vantage point from 
which to criticise existing moral practices other than what is intimated by an 
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existing moral tradition, a conclusion that many will find disturbing. His 
argument was based on his philosophical claim that theory and practice are 
separate and, as we saw in Chapter Four, is the ground for his anti-rationalism 
and critique of ideologies. 
 
I examined two claims that are crucial in Oakeshott’s argument for the 
superiority of civil association. Firstly, he argues that morality necessarily 
presupposes individual freedom of choice. Moral self-enactment consists of 
making one’s own choices, and virtue consists of promoting one’s own good 
opinion of one’s self. But merely to equate morality with freedom of choice 
underrates the scope of morality. He argues that the constraints apparently 
imposed by moral convention are not really constraints, properly understood. 
He claims that morality is a non-instrumental practice that prescribes how we 
act in our transactions with others, not what we choose to act upon. His 
contention that moral conventions are ‘adverbial’, not instrumental, is the 
crucial move in his account of morality as it relates to the superiority of civil 
association.  It enables him to argue that there is no sense in the idea of a 
morality of the “common good”.  Conduct can only be virtuous if it is chosen. 
By extension this precludes a role for government in promoting substantial 
moral ends. A government cannot promote the “common good”	 without 
destroying the freedom of its individual citizens. This is immoral according to 
his stipulation of morality as rooted in the freedom of the individual to make 
her own choices. 
 
In Chapter Three, I examined the presuppositions of Oakeshott’s argument 
that the state conceived as a civil association is the only truly moral form of 
political association. The coherence of the argument depends on several 
controversial claims. The first is that individual freedom is the basis of human 
dignity. The second is that laws are like moral rules, properly understood. 
They are non-instrumental rules that do not compromise freedom. The third, 
and most controversial, is that a state can be conceived as not having a 
purpose - a civil association. If it has a purpose it is an enterprise association 
that subordinates the freedom of choice of its citizens to the state’s purpose 
and thereby threatens human dignity. As a state is a compulsory association 
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from which is impossible to exit, it follows that an enterprise association is 
immoral. Oakeshott came dangerously close, moreover, to an unqualified 
positivist account of law where justice means little more than ensuring that 
the proper procedures are followed in enacting legislation. I conclude that 
Oakeshott’s doctrine of a civil association is problematic, unless it is construed 
as reflecting the broad preferences of freedom-maximising individualists. 
 
In Chapter Four, I considered his account of political activity.  In particular, I 
examined his contention that political activity cannot and ought not be 
thought of as anything other than the pursuit of the intimations of an existing 
political tradition. We can best understand Oakeshott’s anti-rationalist thesis 
as an attempt to	 undo the work of “progressives”:	 those advocating greater 
state direction of society and the economy on rationalist grounds. Whether 
formulated as traditional politics (as contrasted with rationalistic politics) or 
as the politics of faith (as contrasted with the politics of scepticism), his 
arguments can be construed as an attempt to stay the threats to individuality 
and pluralism posed by the collectivist and perfectionist idiom of government. 
This, he believed, has been increasingly present in European politics since 
1945. He was pessimistic, however, that much could be achieved, as 
contemporary political activity had become heavily “infected” with the politics 
of faith and rationalism.  
 
I consider Oakeshott’s account of political activity as incomplete for two main 
reasons. Firstly, his idealisation of politics in a civil association largely ignores 
its antagonistic dimension. He expressed a preference for minimal politics. 
This is achieved in a civil association where freedom-loving individualists 
converse over worthwhile amendments to “civic desirabilities”. Based upon a 
utopian image of the state, this is a caricature of political activity so far 
removed from concrete experience that its usefulness must be in question. 
Secondly, his argument that politics are, and ought to be, the pursuit of the 
intimations of a political tradition both ignores the fact of revolution and 
suggests that radical change is impossible, even though he recognised that 
there is nothing providential or normative about a tradition of behaviour. 
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The historian of medieval Europe R. W. Southern claims that a writer’s 
success of a writer must be assessed by the on-going study of his works. And, 
more importantly, ‘by later scholars improving or enlarging his works, and 
going on to follow a similar method with similar material’	 (Southern 2001, p. 
33).  By this demanding standard Oakeshott must be judged as having had a 
limited impact. At the inaugural Oakeshott Association Conference, the 
philosopher Anthony Quinton argued that ‘Oakeshott has practically no direct 
philosophical legacy’	 (2001). But that judgement refers to general philosophy, 
of which Oakeshott wrote relatively little after Experience and its Modes, 
except for his account of agency in the first essay in On Human Conduct. 
Where the history of political ideas and political theory are concerned, though, 
there are only a few examples of Oakeshott’s ideas being improved and 
enlarged, it is clear that they remain of interest to a select audience, as 
evidenced by the quantity of secondary literature produced in recent years. 128   
William M. Clay remarked of Oakeshott’s legacy, however, at the 2013 
meeting of the Michael Oakeshott Association,	 ‘that Oakeshott’s work will 
always be a minority taste and enjoy a marginal influence’.  
 
This thesis has been largely concerned with Oakeshott’s political theories, 
although engagement with this side of his work has demanded excursions into 
other areas of his thought. But we must note that the attraction of Oakeshott’s 
ideas for many is much broader than politics. This is especially the case for 
those interested in history, education, religion and aesthetics, and those 
attracted to his analysis of the human condition and how to deal with its 
challenges. Noel O’ Sullivan, for example, lists four reasons for reading him. 
First, his positive outlook ‘in an age whose leading intellectuals such as 
Heidegger, Sartre, Camus and Beckett were best known for such concepts as 
nothingness, absurdity, angst, despair and nihilism’ (2001, p. 1).  
 
The second reason is that Oakeshott gave a precise account of the ideal of 
civilised living. The third reason is Oakeshott’s philosophical understanding of 
‘the role of imagination in disclosing the full texture and complexity of human 
                                                   
128 Kenneth Minogue’s The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life 
(2012) is an exception. 
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experience’ (ibid., p. 6). The fourth is ‘Oakeshott’s ideal of liberation which 
links his philosophy to his personal life’ (ibid., p. 7). 
	
When we consider his influence on practical politics, both of the politicians 
who have had the opportunity to champion Oakeshott in a public forum in 
recent years have declined to do so. Oliver Letwin MP gave a scathing critique 
of his concept of the state as a civil association in the	 ‘Oakeshott Memorial 
Lecture’	 at the LSE on the 19th October 2011. 129  He described the 
teleocracy/nomocracy, or civil/enterprise association distinction as a ‘wholly 
inadequate distinction’	 to describe the character of the modern state and  the 
conclusions Oakeshott came to were erroneous. Letwin argued that it it is 
obvious	 that the modern state is both a civil and an enterprise association and 
described Oakeshott’s argument that the state can manage by adverbial rule 
‘as contortionist attempt to rescue a false thesis’	 (Letwin 2011). Jesse Norman 
MP is evidently well versed in, and favourable to, many of Oakeshott’s ideas, 
but concludes that if we are looking for inspirational conservative ideas we are 
more likely to find them in the social conservatism of Burke than in 
Oakeshott’s anti-rationalism. 130  
  
Both of these judgements are too severe. Letwin overlooks the point that civil 
association is an ideal, not a goal that we should try to achieve.  As regards 
Norman’s comparison of Oakeshott with Burke, he does not see that neither 
author aims to promote conservatism merely for the sake of conservatism. 
Both harness anti-rationalist arguments in defence of a specific specific: that 
to Britain posed by the French revolution in the case of Burke; and the threat 
to rule of law liberalism posed by the enterprise state in the case of Oakeshott. 
 
Kenneth B. McIntyre describes the reception of Oakeshott by American 
conservatives as resembling ‘the sound of one hand clapping’ and states that 
his influence on public intellectuals and policy makers has remained 
                                                   
129 Conservative MP for West Dorset, Minister of State for Policy in the Cabinet office 
since 2010 and one of David Cameron’s inner circle. He is Oakeshott’s de facto 
literary executor following the death of Shirley Letwin 
130 Norman is the Conservative member for Hereford and South Herefordshire. He 
gave the Michael Oakeshott Memorial Lecture at the LSE in 2013. 
 236 
negligible (2010, p. 255). Andrew Sullivan recalls that, ‘I remember once 
discussing Oakeshott with the father of neo-conservatism, Irving Kristol. For 
him Oakeshott was anathema, a dangerous relativist an irresponsible 
bohemian, indifferent to the need to fight and win in political conduct. In this 
diagnosis, Kristol was indeed correct’ (2010). 
 
Yet in terms of inspiring others, nothing could be further from Oakeshott’s 
personal ethos. Oakeshott offered insight, not inspiration.	 He wrote, in the 
context of Hobbes, that human life is a predicament and ‘every masterpiece of 
political philosophy springs from a new vision of the predicament, each is the 
glimpse of a deliverance or the suggestion of a remedy’	 (1975b, p. 6). In his 
analysis of the purpose of the state, Oakeshott vividly illustrated one aspect of 
the modern political predicament. The cost to individual freedom posed by the 
managerial enterprise state that has multiple purposes, but no over-arching 
sense of purpose. He laid bare the assumptions, trade-offs and risks we take in 
preferring a version of the politics of faith to the politics of scepticism. 
Moreover, he was consistent in doing this from a moral point of view, without 
ever resorting to consequential or materialist arguments.	 
 
But Oakeshott knew all too well that the conditions in which individuality 
could thrive were disappearing, and so the individualist ideal that he lauded 
was freighted with a deep sense of elegy and loss. The medley of ideas 
discussed in this thesis constitute the platform upon which his own, highly 
distinctive understanding of the political took shape. Politics, he argued, 
needed to be understood within its own limits, and insulated from moral 
visions or ideological programmes that threatened to jeopardise its 
constitutive features. And it needed to be preserved, above all, from hubristic 
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